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ABSTRACT
In the first few years of the twentieth century, there
was a flurry of excitement in the British press over the
alleged American economic

11

invasion" of England.

British

writers of that time and historians since have made it clear
that by 1901-2 the scope of American activity in England was
already impressiye.

This study attempts to trace the response

of British opinion to the emergence of this American challenge to British economic supremacy, in the United States and
around the world as well as in England, in the period 18731903.

It is a study not of the real dimensions of this

American challenge but of the growing British awareness of
it and is based upon an examination of representative organs
of the British press.
During the years 1873-89, which are treated in Chapters
I and II, discussion of the American challenge was general
and wide-ranging.

The most consistent theme was that, while

the "Great Depression" kept British economic activity at a
relatively low level, industrial America was growing rapidly.
Alarming predictions of future American economic strength
were coupled with the recognition that the Americans were
becoming increasingly self-sufficient in products formerly
supplied by the British and that the Americans were beginning
to compete with the British in exporting manufactured goods
to world markets, especially to Canada.
The years 1890-97 saw the continuation of these themes
but concern over ".McKinleyism" dominated the pages of the
British press.

Chapters III-V deal with the domestic aspect

of "I1cKinleyism": the losses--real and anticipated--resulting
from the prohibitive levels of the McKinley and Dingley
tariffs; the transfer of British capital and labor across the
Atlantic; and the rapid growth of American basic industries
such as textiles, coal, iron and steel behind the high wall
of protection.

The next four chapters deal with the external

aspects of the period 1890-97.

Chapter VI deals with the

increase of American manufactured exports; schemes to revive
American shipping; and the global expansion of American influence.

Chapters VII and VIII examine reciprocity and compe-

tition in Canada and Latin America.

Chapter IX deals with

American competition in Europe, Africa, Asia, the British
Empire and in Britain itself.

The chapter concludes with an

examination of 1897, for the beginnings of the excited public
discussions of the American challenge which marked the first
years of the new century may be traced to this year, which
witnessed both the passage of the Dingley Tariff and sizeable
shipments of American iron and steel to British and other
foreign markets.

The climax of this British concern over

American competition in the years 1898-1903 is treated in a
brief epilogue.
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INTRODUCTION
By the late nineteenth century, America-watching was
already a British tradition of long standing.

~ong

the

welter of conflicting opinion and testimony offered by British commentators there was a fairly common and consistent
observation; this was the general and rather complacent
prediction that at some time in the future the American
nation must become the most prosperous in the world.

For

centuries prominent Englishmen kept returning to this theme.
William Paterson, who had been instrumental in founding the
Bank of England in the seventeenth century, had presented
this prescient vision of the American future:

Ir neither Britain singly, nor the maritime
Powers of Europe, will treat for Darien, the period is not very far distant when, instead of
waiting for the slow returns of trade, America
will seize the pass of Darien. Their ~ext move
will be to hold the Sandwich Islands. Stationed
thus in the middle, on the east and on the west
sides of the New World, English-Americans will
form the most potent and singular empire that has
appeared, because it will consist, not in the
dominion of a part of the land of the globe, but
in the dominion of the whole ocean. They can make
the tour of the Indian and Southern Seas, collecting wealth by trade wherever they pass. During
European wars they may have the carrying trade of
all. If blessed with letters and arts they will
spread civilization over the universe. Then England, with all her liberties and glory, may be
known as Egypt is now.l
1 Quoted in Benjamin Taylor, "The Coming Struggle in the
Pacific," Nineteenth Century, XLIV (October, 1898) 1 661.
1

2

In the late eighteenth century Edmund Burke had stated

it this way:
Young man, there is America--which at this day
serves for little more than to amuse you with
stories of savage man and uncouth manners; yet
shall, before you taste of death, show itself
equal to the whole of that commerce which now
attracts the envy 01· the world.2
Some of Burke's contemporaries were more specific.

Thomas

Malthus had warned his countrymen that, if England were ever
to lose her position of manufacturing leadership, the danger
would come from America, with her superior resources:
According to general principles, it will finally answer to most landed nations both to manufacture for themselves, and to conduct their own commerce. That raw cotton should be shipped in America,
carried some thousands of miles to another country,
there to be manufactured and shipped again for the
American market, is a state of things that cannot
be permanent. A purely commercial State must always
be undersold and driven out of the market by those
who possess the advantage of land. 3
The generation of Englishmen which saw the repeal of the
Corn Laws and the booming prosperity which characterized the
mid-Victorian years was no less impressed with the American
future.

As early as 1835 Richard Cobden had urged his coun-

try to adopt many of the American economic innovations if
they hoped to keep pace. 4 By mid-century The Economist had
2 Quoted in "England and Her Second Colonial Empire,"
Quarterly Review, CLVlII (July, 1884), 135.
3Quoted in "Ritortus," "The Imperialism of British Trade:
Part I," Contemporary Review, LXXVI (July, 1899), 140.
4 see H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States:
A Rister of An lo-American Relations ·
~ew York:
St. Martin s Press, 1 5 , 74.
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!orecast:
From the relative progress of the two countries
within the last sixty years, it may be inferred
that the superiority of the United States to
England is ultimately as certain as the next
eclipse.5
).nd the British economist Robert Torrens, less confident than
Cobden and The Economist of the wisdom of unilateral Free
Trade, wrote at about the same time:
In the United States the rewards of industry
are more than commensurate with its efficacy; the
attraction of higher profits and higher wages turns
upon their shores, from all the other quarters of
the globe, a never-ebbing tide of capital and labour; their progress is the most rapid that the
world ever saw.
The United Kingdom presents a different picture. Here the rewards of industry are not commensurate with its efficacy. The tide of capital and
labour recedes from the British shores.6
In the late 1870s and early 1880s, such observations
were still being made.

In 18?9, in an article destined to

be widely and sometimes angrily quoted by his contemporaries,
William Gladstone wrote

of the menace which in the prospective development
of her resources America offers to the commercial
supremacy of England. On this subject I will only
say that it is she alone who, at a coming time,
can and probably will wrest from us our commercial
supremacy • • • • We have no more title against her
than Venice or Genoa or Holland has had against us. • •

•

5March 8, 1851; quoted in J. H. Clapham, An Economic Risof Modern Britain, Vol. II, Free Trade and S~eel, 18501[__ (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), 10.
6 Quoted in "Ritortus," "The Imperialism of British Trade:
Part I," 141.
to~

?"Kin Beyond the Sea," North American Review (1879);
quoted in Allen, Great Britain and the United States, 82.
Allusions to, and paraphrases of, this remark were frequent
in the Bri~ish press in the late nineteenth century; see
below, passim.

7
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By 1879, however, it was no longer possible to make such
statements without being controversial.

The Great Depression,

which had begun in 1873, had produced a wave of introspective
analyses and foreign comparisons.

Free Trade was coming
under heavy attack and its antithesis, Fair Trade, 8 was beginning to win considerable support.

As a competent and

cautious analyst of Britain's economic situation wrote: "a
not inconsiderable section of the community both hope and
expect" that Britain would re-adopt a system of protective
tariffs.
The most loyal and patient free-traders are not
without serious cause for discontent with the
existing condition of things • • • • Free trade is
now more than at any previous period on its trial.
The crisis is pregnant with important issues • • • • 9
One of those issues was the alleged American challenge
to British economic superiority. 10 While, in the last decades
of the nineteenth century and later, numerous predictions of
American economic greatness continued to be made in the
characteristic future mode, a new sense of imminent danger
began to appear in many observations on America.

There were

8 For the sake of consistency I will capitalize both the
phrase "Fair Trade" (which was always capitalized) and the
phrase "Free Trade" (which appeared in a variety of ways) except when the latter term appears in some other fashion in
a direct quotation.
9James Stephen Jeans, England's Supremacy: Its Sources,
Economics$ and Dangers (London: Lon3mans, Green, and Co.,
1885) t ll -116.
10 rt is not without significan:e that most of the earlier
statements above were quoted by British writers of the late
nineteenth century.

5
not a few who argued that the often-predicted American assumption of economic supremacy was at hand.

They were angered

by the apparent complacency of Gladstone's statement and
others like it.

The vigorously-debated issue of the Ameri-

can challenge, and the broader debate over Britidh fiscal
policy of which it was a part, were indications that by the
end of the 1870s the British were becoming aware of, and
very sensitive to, important changes in the nineteenthcentury economy.

British discussion of the American chal-

lenge occurred against the background, first, of the Great
Depression, and secondly, of Britain's loss of the industrialcommercial monopoly she had long enjoyed.
In 1873 the great mid-Victorian economic boom came to
an end. 11 For the next two decades and more, the economic
11 The literature on the Great Depression is extensive
and increasing. As Derek H. Aldcroft has written: "In the
last few years the period 1870-1914 has become as popular as
t.he classical industrial revolution as a field for scholarly
study." The book which Aldcroft edited, The Develo ment of
British Industry and Forei n Com etition
London:
eorge Allen & Unwin Ltd.,
, is t e best introduction
to the role of foreign competition during the Great Depression.
It provides case studies of ten major British industries.
Its use for this dissertation is limited, however, by the
fact that the contributors are primarily concerned with the
entrepreneurial response to foreign competition. Important
also, but with similar limitations, are two articles by David
E. Novak and Matthew Simon, "Some Dimensions of the American
Commercial Invasion of Europe, 1871-1914: An Introductory
Essay," Journal of Economic History, XXIV (1964), 591-605;
and "Commercial Responses to the American Export Invasion,
1871-1914: An Easay in Attitudinal History, 11 Explorations in
Entrepreneurial History, Second Series, III (Winter, 1966),
121-4(. A recen~ ganeral treatment of the period can be found
in the first ten chapters of William Ashworth, An Economic
History of England, 1870-1939 (London: Methuen~ Co., Ltd.,
!9E'>O); it is more concerned with questions of long-term growth
and response, as is much of the recent work, than with the

pi
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indices by which the British were accustomed to measure their
economic performance all declined.

Reliable statistics on

the home market and on invisible exports (profits from shipping, banking, insurance, foreign investments, and so forth)-indicators which would have helped to maintain confidence-were not available at the time.

The British public had there-

fore grown accustomed to gauging its economic well-being
almost exclusively by means of foreign trade figures and the
profit-loss statements of such key concerns as the textile,
metals, and

s~ipping

industries.

Gladstone typified this

attitude when he wrote that, though he recognized the importance of the home market, "foreign trade is none the less the
main instigator of progressive industry and enterprise in
every domestic department ••••• 1112
declined throughout the 1870s,

These accepted indicators

reaching bottom in 1879, and

this led to the extensive public interest in and debate of
economic questions which characterized the last Victorian
generation.
particular features of the Great Depression. A summary of
the current debate over the Great Depression can be found in
Charles Wilson, "Economy and Society in Late Victorian Britaint" Economic History Review, Second Series, XVIII (August,
1965;, 183-98. For a more descriptive approach to the Great
Depression, consult J. H. Clapham, An Economic Histor. of
Modern Britain, Vol. II, Free Trade and Steel
-1
, and
Vol. III, Macfiines and Nationa . . iva ries
with an
ilo ue
l ~·€w
e acmi lan ~ompany,
; and the excellent collection of material in W.H.B.
Court, British Economic Histor
1870-1914: Commentar and
Documents Cam ridge: T e niversity
12william E. Gladstone, "Free Trade, Railways, and the
Growth of Commerce," Nineteenth Century, VII (February, 1880),
375.

a
?
Coinciding with the Great Depression was the appearance
of commercial and industrial rivals.

It had become obvious

to nearly everyone in Britain that the British commercialindustrial monopoly was a thing of the past.

Even before

1873 Britain had had to face new rivals in certain industrial
products, chiefly textiles.

The United States, France, Bel-

gium, and other countries had found it relatively easy to
establish the unsophisticated factories required for the production of the cruder sorts of textiles; soon they were selling these in competition with British goods both in their home
and in foreign markets.

In certain other manufactures also,

especially in those which involved new inventions, Britain
had found that other nations could successfully compete with
her (the Anerican sewing machine, for example, was highly successful throughout the world by the time of the Civil War).
But it was particularly the events which marked the decades
following the Civil War--the unification of Germany, American
continental expansion, the rise of economic nationalism, the
economic dislocations which periodically affected the world
economy during the late nineteenth century--which made international economic competition intense for the first time.
German unification had proved to be a very effective
stimulus to industrialization and the search for foreign
markets.

The British first became concerned about the German

threat in the mid-1880s.

Their alarm declined during the

comparatively prosperous years in Britain between 1886 and
1891 and then increased again in the renewed depression of
the early 1890s.

It reached a crescendo in 1896, marked by

p
8

the publication of E. E. Williams' Made in Germany. 1 3
Recognition of the American danger had come even earlier.
The conclusion of the Civil War was followed by a wave of
railroad building which brought the far-flung regions of the
~ontinent

into a fruitful economic union.

This was accom-

panied by a rapid growth of population, the result in part
of a tremendous influx of immigrants; the rapid growth of
manufacturing industries; an enormous expansion of agricultural exports, followed by impressive increases in the export
of manufactured goods.

Small wonder then that some British

observers began to reassess the traditional forecasts about
the United States and to bring them up to date.

Concern

about the American challenge made its appearance in the 1870s.
It ebbed and flowed during the 1880s and 1890s and then reached
its peak in the so-called "American invasion" of about 18971903.
The British, then, had clearly become aware by the last
decades of the nineteenth century that they faced two serious
competitors, two rivals for economic pre-eminence.

They re-

sponded to these rivalries, however, in significantly different ways.

The debates about these two challenges were dis-

tinct and marked by decidedly different characteristics.
The German rivalry was considered by the British to be
something sinister.

In his autobiography the poet Robert

1 3For the British reaction to 3-erman competition, see
Ross J.S. Hoffman, Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalr ,
187~-1914 (Pb.iladelp ia:
niversity o
ennsy vania ress,

!93 ).

9
Graves discusses his prep school days at Charterhouse a few
years before World War I and comments that the German implications of his middle name, von Ranke, presented certain difficulties, for
Businessmen's sons, at this time, used to di~cuss
hotly the threat, and even the necessity, of a trade
war with the Reich. "German 11 meant "dirty German."
It meant: "cheap, shoddy goods competing with our
sterling industries." It also meant military menace, Prussianism, useless philosophy, tedious scholarship, music-loving and sabre-rattling.14
German rivalry stimulated British self-examination in such
areas as technical education and up-to-date business methods,
but it also stirred up hostile national feelings.

This hos-

tility grew all the more intense after the mid-1890s as AngloGerman diplomatic tensions increased.
The American rivalry, though it prompted occasional
vitriolic commentaries, was debated in a very different atmosphere.

British views of the American challenge could not be

limited to a jealous and narrow observance of increased
sales in this or that market; the Anglo-American relationship
was much too complex for such a possibility.

In the first

place, though it was probably truer of the British than of
the Americans, neither felt that the other was foreign in the
full sense of the term. 1 5 One part of the English mind had
14Good-bye to All That (rev. ed.; Garden City, New York:
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957), 39.
l5For example, the prominent British economist, Robert
Giffen, wrote of "the United States--and our leading foreign
competitors • • • • " "The Dream of a British Zollverein,"
Nineteenth Century, LI (May, 1902), 700.

ji
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always been both possessive and patronizing with regard to
America.

If the United States were destined for future great-

ness, was this not, most Englishmen would have asked, the
result of the combination of unlimited resources and British
traits?

Were not these .Americans, these future economic

leaders, also Anglo-Saxons, cousins to the British, even
"Brother Jonathon"?

Secondly, by the mid-1890s at the latest,

many in England had come to believe that the United States
had reached maturity and was now a fit partner for Britain
in the task of civilizing the world.

The older nation might

look upon the deeds of her offspring with a mixture of awe
and pleasure, horror and chagrin, but she did not doubt that
it was ready to take its place in the world alongside its
parent. 16
The British, of course, could not fail to recognize the
ever-increasing industrial capacity of the United States: i·ts
ability not only to satisfy the domestic demand for manufactures but also to export--for the first time on a significant
scale--man~factured

goods to the neutral markets of the world,

to Britain's colonial possessions, and even to Great Britain
16The Times frequently referred to Americans as "our
kinsmen 11 and a quotation from the New York Herald which appeared
in The Times illustrates what was also the prevalent English
view: "If the younger brother sometimes makes himself disagreeable, he none the less respects his elder brother, and the
elder brother is now showing himself respectful of the younger
and quite willing to let him have his own way • • • • " The
Times, July 2, 189?, 5. Many other examples of such feelings
can be found in Bradford Perkins, The Great Ra nrochement:
En land and the United States. 189 New York: Athenellill,
he United States.

11

herself.

These were the pivotal points for British discussions

of the American challenge.

But the close relationship of

the two nations made it impossible to avoid raising also a
host of related questions about American resources, character,
the fiscal system, and s0 forth.

More concretely, the special

nature of the Anglo-American relationship meant that few
Englishmen could confront such issues as the American tariff,
American textiles in Latin America, American hammers in Australia, or American coal in London without attempting to
analyze the curiously successful (or outrageous) American
system of protection; the high (or low) quality of life of
the American workingman; the real (or only apparent) prosperity of the American people.

Beyond these there were also

more general comparisons of the British with the American
economic system and attempts, explicit or implicit, to compare
the overall economic strength of the two nations.
What had been only prophecy before the 1870s was--as
British observers measured American economic strength during
subsequent decades--coming ever closer to reality.

The

United States seemed to be bidding to take Britain's place
as the leading economic power of the world.
raised new questions for the British.

This inevitably

In their raising of

these new questions, and in the answers they attempted to
supply, can be seen the American challenge of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.

My

intention in this

dissertation is to explore, by examining representative
organs of the British press, the response of British public

12

opinion to this emerging American challenge to British economic supremacy in the period from 1873 to 1903.
Public opinion can be defined and dealt with in a number of ways.

Attention in this dissertation will be focused

upon a very narrow segment of the British population for
several reasons.

The late Victorians themselves had an

elitist view as to the formation and dissemination of public
opinion.

Furthermore, it was only this recognized elite

which concerned itself in a comprehensive way with the implications of' the American challenge.
A satisfactory description of this opinion-making elite
was furnished by the astute political observer, James Bryce.
In both The American Commonwealth, in which he compared public opinion in Britain and the United States, and again in
Modern Democracies, Bryce devoted considerable attention to
this important aspect of modern politics.

In the latter

work he defined public opinion as
the aggregate of the views men hold regarding matters that affect or interest the community. Thus
understood, it is a congeries of all sorts of discrepant notions, beliefs, fancies, prejudices,
aspirations. It is confused, incoherent, amorphous,
varying from day to day and week to week. But in
the midst of this diversity and confusion every
question as it rises into importance is subjected
to a process of consolidation and clarification
until there emerge and take definite shape certain
views, or sets of interconnected views, each held
and advocated in common by bodies of citizens.17
Bryce believed that "those who make public opinion" were the
l?James Bryce, Modern Democracies (2 vols.; New York:
The !'!3.cmillan Company, 1921), I, 153'=54.

13
"journalists and other public writers, and a small fringe of
other persons, chiefly professional men, who think and talk
constantly about public affairs." 18 It was "an exceedingly
small percentage" of the citizenry "who practically make
opinion.

They know the facts, they think out anJ marshall

and set forth,- by word or pen, the arguments meant to influence the public." 19
The outlet for this opinion-making elite in late nineteenth-century England was what R.C.K. Ensor has called the
"dignified phase of English journalism."

This included the

monthly and quarterly journals of opinion "which everybody
in the government read, and to which the best writers of the
day contributed" 20 as well as the better newspapers. It is
these organs of the British press which constitute the principal sources for this study.

Specifically, they are (1)

newspapers: The Times and The EconQmist; (2) some of the leading journals of opinion: The Contemporary Review, The Edinburgh Review, The Fortnightly Review, The National Review,
The Nineteenth Century, 21 and The Quarterly Review; and (3)
certain books and pamphlets which were addressed directly to
the American challenge.
18 James Bryce, The American Commonwealth (new rev. ed.;
2 vols.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1913), II, 321-22.
l9Bryce, Modern Democracies, I, 156-57.
20R.C.K. Ensor, "England: 18?0~1914 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, i936), 144-45.
21
r will cite it by this title throughout the dissertation, though beginning January, 1901, the title became The
Nineteenth Century and After.

14
Other sources, Hansard for example, might well have been
consulted.

No doubt they would have yielded additional exam-

ples and illustrations.

It seems reasonable to suspect,

however, that their use would not add important new dimensions
to what is already an overcrowded study.

In

sho~t,

the sources

which have been consulted seem sufficiently representative
of that British public opinion which is the focus of this
dissertation.
Certain topics which were part of, or related to, the
American challenge will either be ignored or will receive
only occasional attention.

Some of them, such as the Ameri-

can agricultural invasion, were of major importance and their
exclusion has been dictated by limitations of space.

Others

are ignored or slighted for the same reason, or because they
are of only indirect importance, or because they were too
technical to have been widely discussed among the public.
Such topics include: general emigration from the British
Isles and Colonies to the United States; American securities
on the London Stock Exchange; bimetallism; the money market
and the flow of gold; and American fiscal policy other than
the tariff.
The basic organization of this study is chronological.
The period 1873-1903 falls into three fairly distinct groups
of years, each of which has its own dominant characteristics.
During the years 1873-1889 discussion of the American challenge tended to be general and wide-ranging.

The most con-

sistent theme was not that the United States was already

15
successful in direct competition with Britain but that industrial America was growing rapidly while Britain stagnated.
The years 1890-189? witnessed some continuation of these
same themes, but the period was dominated by two American
developments, ultra-protectionism and dramatically increased
industrial production, especially in iron and steel.

The

former threatened British producers with the loss of the
American market through allegedly prohibitive duties and
with the loss of at least some neutrai markets through American reciprocity treaties with other nations.

The latter en-

dangered not only the .<\.merican and neutral markets but British
markets as well.

The beginnings of the excited public dis-

cussions of the American challenge which marked the first
years of the new century may be traced to 189?, which witnessed both the passage of the Dingley Tariff and sizeable
shipments of American iron and steel to British and other
foreign buyers.
A new dimension was added to the American challenge
when, as a result of the Spanish-American War, the United
States took on the trappings of a world power and expressed
new ambitions for American commerce, industry, and shipping.
This coincided with sufficiently large-scale American exports
to Britain of goods and capital to touch off the controversy
over the alleged "American invasion" of England.

It coin-

cided also with those economic problems which were caused
by the Boer War and with the crisis of morale which accom-

panied it.

British concern over the American challenge

16

reached its peak in the years 1901-1902.

However, the years

1898-1903, important and dramatic though they were, are treated briefly in this study in the form of an epilogue, since
an account of those years is already available. 22
British alarm over the "American invasion" receded
rapidly after 1903.

Joseph Chamberlain and his followers

kept discussion of the American and other challenges alive
for a time, for the bogey of foreign competition was the core
of the fiscal reformers' tactics.

But the decisive victory

of Free Trade in the election of 1906 effectively put an end
to public concern over the American challenge.

The pre-war

decade was an exceedingly prosperous one for Britain, as it
was also for the United States.

American economic growth

and competition did not disappear between 1906 and 1914; it
simply ceased to disturb the British.

Above all, a much more

ominous threat began to monopolize British attention.

The

international situation forced them to focus their attention
closely on the German danger, which was a military as well
as an economic threat to Great Britain.

22see, for the fullest treatment, Richard H. Heindel,
The American D:nnact on Great Britain, 1898-1914 (Philadelpnia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940), Chs. VII-IX.

There is also useful information in John H. Dunning, American
Investment in British Nanufacturing Industry_(London: George
I11en & Unwin, Ltd., 1958).

PART I.

1873-1889

CHAPTER I
THE CONDITIONS FOR DEBATE EMERGE
The Quiet Years, 1873-77
The Great Depression stimulated British concern about
American economic competion, but was not the cause of it.
Such competition had been brought to the attention of the
British well before the economic debacle of late 18?3.

As

early as 1840 testimony had been given before a Select Committee of the House of Coiilmons which made it clear that the
United States had sold cotton goods in the East and West
Indies, in Brazil, and in other South American markets "at
a lower price than the same kind of goods made in England
could be sold for." 1 As a result of pre-Civil War tariffs,
the Americans had become more and more self-sufficient in
the production of leather and wooden articles, of iron ware,
and of toolsa:ild implements.

After capturing a large part of

the domestic market from European suppliers, American manu£acturers had turned their attention to foreign markets.
American-made boots and shoes, carriages, and numerous other articles of manufacture now [1873] compete
in the world's markets with the cheapest product of
.British workshops, while in the case of mining and
agricultural tools and implements, the American products have driven the British out of the field all
1

Point

David Syme, "Restrictions on Trade from a Colonial
or View, " Fortnightl;r, XIII n. s. (April, 1873), 449.

17

18

over the world. 2
The British hardware industry was particularly alarmed at
.American competition, according to Ryland's Iron Trades Jour-

-

nal (1871):
The edge-tool trade is well sustained, and we have
less of the effects of American competition. That
competition is severe, however, is a fact that cannot be ignored, and it applies to many other branches
than that of edge-tools. Every Canadian season
affords unmistakable evidence that some additional
article in English hardware is being supplanted by
the produce of Ncrthern States, and it is notorious
how largely American wares are rivalling those of
the mother country in other of our colonial possessions, as well as upon the Continent • • • • The whole
subject is one demanding the serious attention of
our manufacturers.3
Outside of the specific British trades already experienc-

ing American competition, however, the subject does not seem
to have led to any important public discussion during the
early years of the Great Depression.

By 1874 there were

businessmen who worried that the depressed state of trade
might last for some time and that this might be an indication
of previously unsuspected weaknesses in the British economy.
But the experts ridiculed them as alarmists, insisting that
there was no cause for concern and that Britain was accumulating unparalleled riches.

In particular, Britain's leading

economists and statisticians insisted throughout the seventies that English trade was not suffering from foreign com4
pe t 1. +..
.... 1on.
The Times scoffed at "the excessive excitement
2 Ibid., 449-50.
3Quoted ibid., 450-51 and note.
4
L.J. Jennings, "English Trade and Foreign Competition,"
guarterl~, CLII (July, 1881), 271-74.
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which seems to exist in some quarters about the depression
of trade" (December 27, 1878) and insisted that there was
"no evidence that the amount of the permanent foreign demand

is

changed" (January 11, 1879)0

When, in 1879, Gladstone

envisioned.the future greatness of the United

St~tes,

he was

sufficiently confident that Britain would retain her marvelous prosperity that he professed he was not inclined "to
murmur at the prospect" of American supremacy.5

While, on

the one hand, the experts denied that American competition
played any part in Britain's economic distress, they also
took pains to make clear to the British public that the United
States was suffering as much as or even more than Britain from
the unhappy trade conditions which followed the panics of
1873. 6 With the exception of a few random remarks,7 allegations of American competition or superiority played no part
in the very limited and mild-tempered public discussions of
the Great Depression during the years 1873-1877•
The most widely accepted explanations of trade depression
5All quoted ibid.
6 see Horace White, "The Financial Crisis in America,"
Fortnightly, XIX n.s.(June, 1876), 810-29; and Robert Giffen,
11
The Liquidations of 1873-6," Fortnightly, XXII n.s.(October,
18??), 510-25. The question whether Britain or the United
States suffered longer or more intensely from depressions was
constantly debated during the late nineteenth century; see
below passim.
?Britain's technical and industrial libraries and museums,
it was charged, were inferior to those of the United States and
France. Lyon Playfair, "On Patents and the New Patent Bill,"
Nineteenth Century, I (April, 1877), 324-25. And it was pointed
out that the United States had a greater attraction for British
emigrants than did the British colcnies. Sir Julius Vogel,
"Greater or Lesser Britain," Nineteenth Century, I (July, 187?),
825.
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during the 1870s and 1880s had little or nothing to do with
foreign competition or British incapacity.

Commercial crises

were believed to be naturally recurrent; they were held to
be periodic adjustments that affected all commercial nations. 8
They were explained as nothing more than a serious fall in
prices, which resulted from the curtailment of the purchasing
power of Britain's customers and which had little real effect
on the productive powers of the nation.9

Or they were held

to be the result of overproduction and perhaps of foreign
tariffs, but in any case foreign competition as a cause of
.
. . .
d 10
depression
was minimize
•
The Reaction against Complacency
Beginning in 1878, more than four years after the panics
which had launched the Great Depression, a reaction

set in

against the relatively complacent analyses of the experts.
Prices, profits, and foreign trade had continued to plummet
since 1873.

They reached their nadir in 1879.

Despite a

general economic revival between 1879 and 1882, there were
many in Britain who by now were thoroughly alarmed.

The

British experienced a crisis of confidence in the late 1870s
8 Giffen, "The Liquidations of 1873-6,"(1877), 510-25;
and James Steph~n Jeans, England's Supremacy, 116.
9Giffen, "The Liquidations of 1873-6,"(1877) and "Trade
Depression and Low Prices," Contemporary, XLVII (June, 1885),
800-22; Thomas Brassey, "The Depression of Trade," Nineteenth
Century, V (May, 1879), 788-90.
10Archibald R. Colquhoun, "An Anglo-Chinese Commerical
Alliance," National, VI ( Octob~r, 1885), 162.

21
and early 1880s.

They were exposed in the press to a noisy

debate over what one writer called the "conditions and prospects of England. 1111
By 1878 there were some who were concerned that, as Gold.,in Smith put it, nEnglish commerce • • • may have passed
its acme." 12 One of the causes behind such concern was foreign rivalry; according to another analyst,
There is probably no question in which greater
interest is felt at the present time in the several
centres of manufacturing industry than that of
foreign competition.13
Even Gladstone, who in 1879 had looked forward to American
supremacy with equanimity, in 1881 allegedly "no longer exults
over a prosperity which advances by 'leaps and bounds,' but
warns the nation that its progress appears to have been
arrested."l4It was this crisis of confidence in the proper and suecessful operation of the British economy which produced the
Fair Trade movement, which sought the re-establishment of
protective duties in order that Britain could negotiate favorable commercial treaties with the high-tariff nations of the
world. 1 5
11

One of the first targets of the Fair Traders was

Jennings, "English Trade and Foreign Competition," 271-74.

12Goldwin Smith, "The Greatness of England," Contemporary,
XXXIV (December, 18?8),_8.
- -- - ·1 3james Henderson, "England and America as Manufacturing

Competitors," Contemporar;y, ·xxxrrr (O?tober, 1878), 458.
14JenniD.gs, "English Trade.and-Foreign·Competition," 271-74.

15See B. H. Brown,
The Tariff Reform Movement in Great
Britain, 1881-1895 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943).
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those who denied the existence of a depression or the dangers
of foreign tariffs and competition.

L. J. Jennings complained

that British manufacturers failed to recognize their need
ror state aid to enable them to compete with foreign goods
in the English market.

"They are," he wrote, "if anything,

disposed to underrate the extent of competition to which they
are now exposed at home.

The

newspape~s,

as a rule, make

very light of it, and speak of the importations of manufactured goods as utterly insignificant. 1116
The special object of Jennings wrath was The Times.
Since 1874 it "has systematically denied that any depression
whatever has existed in trade, just as it does at the moment
• • •• It is only by an occasional accident that the truth

has leaked out," as in the following example from The Times
(March 30, 1881):
Although the special falling off in our exports
to foreign countries may be partly explained by the
foreign loan collapse of the last few years and in
other ways, which do not imply a diminished taste
!or our manufactures abroad, the decline seems so
general and so large that there can oe little doubt
of its being produced to some extent by the hostile
tariffs of foreign countries and the advances the~
have themselves made in manufacturing. It is becoming important, therefore, to have attention directed
to new markets.
He also criticized The Economist for its remark that only
slightly more than one-tenth of British imports in 1880 had
consisted of manufactures.

How trifling this sounds,

16Jennings,"English Trade and Foreign Competition," 271-?4.
l?L. J. Jennings, "Fair Trade and British Labour," Quarterlz, CLII (October, 1881), 564-65.
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Jennings remarked,

u..~til

one realized that it amounted to

at least .;f40,000,000 and possibly as much as;K70,ooo,ooo. 18
The Fair Traders claimed that the disregard expressed
by leading papers and politicians amounted to a conspiracy
of silence.

According t.::> Jennings, "it is, in fact, by a

policy of suppression and misrepresentation that politicians
of the Chamberlain school are now seeking to mislead the
nation in regard to its position and prospects. 111 9 W. Farrer Ecroyd, whose 1879 pamphlet "Self-Help" is usually taken
to mark the beginning of the Fair Trade movement, was even
more explicit in accusing politicians of intentionally ignoring a dangerous situation.

He charged that the Liberal Party

habitually admired foreigners and deprecated the English,
and hence it was marked by "its readiness to accept the relative decline of this country and future greatness of America
•••• "

For this reason the Liberals refused to countenance
any talk of an American threat. 20 Sir Edward Suliivan argued
that those who deliberately ignored the American and other
perils had selfish reasons for opposing an honest discussion
of the issues.

Such opposition, he claimed, came from the

large import houses which made greater profits from foreign
than from English goods; it came from the stock-brokers, the
18 Jennings, "English Trade and Foreign Competition," 271-74.
l9Jennings, "Fair Trade and British Labour, 11 564. Ironically, identical accusations were aimed at Chamberlain when
he launched his own campaign for tariff reform in 1903.
20 w. Farrer Ecroyd, "Fair Trade," Nineteenth Century, X
(October, 1881), 604-05.

London bankers, and the promoters of foreign enterprises who
had never before been so prosperous; but "above all" it came
from the politicians who believed that Free Trade had brought
them prosperity and political popularity. 21
The acrimonious campaign of the Fair Traders focused
public attention on such issues as foreign competition, the
loss of foreign markets due to protective tariffs, and the
alleged superior growth rate of protected industrial economies.

The atmosphere of the mid-1880s was vividly expressed

by James Stephen Jeans, though he himself did not doubt Britain's ability to weather the storm.

"There is abroad a very

uneasy and restless spirit," he wrote, a fear of impending
trouble which was turning people away from the economic principles which had contented them in the past.

"From many dif-

ferent quarters it is proclaimed that England's sun is setting,
or about to set," simply because England had been experiencing
an undeniable but "relative depression of trade."

Yet Jeans

had to admit that foreign rivalry was real, and he saw it as
a natural result of British achievement.

England had estab-

lished the techniques of industrial production; her ships
carried abroad machinery to be utilized and products to be
imitated.

Without such English assistance "our former custom-

ers would not have become so largely our competitors as they
are today."

He acknowledged that in textiles, in iron and

steel, "in the mechanical arts, and in a hundred minor
21 sir Edward Sullivan, "Isolated Free Trade: Part I,"
Nineteenth Century, X (August, 1881), 179.
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industries, her pre-eminence has been threatened, and in some
cases with unmistakable success." 22
A Royal Commission had been appointed in 1885 to "inquire
into the extent, nature, and probable causes of the depression now or recently existing in various brancha3 of trade
and industry."

Jeans recognized that the Fair Traders hoped

that the Commission would recommend protection and that even
"the most loyal and patient free-traders are not without serious cause for discontent with the existing condition of
things."

"Free trade," he concluded, "is now more than at

any previous period on its trial.

The crisis is pregnant

with important issues, and it needs that we should • • • examine their character, scope, and tendencies." 2 3 Among the
issues which were examined by Jeans and by many other Englishmen during the 1870s and 1880s were the implications of the
new economic world which had only

~ecently

come into being,

and the American challenge which was one of the results of
the new economic conditions.
Recognition of a New Economic World
That England had been rudely awakened to the fact that
she was no longer the only industrial nation in the world was
a common theme in the 1870s and 1880s, possibly because the
argument could be put to use by both Fair and Free Traders.
22

Jeans, England's Supremacy, vi, 159, 233-34.

2 3ibid., 115-16.

-
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It was frequently pointed out that England had enjoyed a
considerable head start over other nations, industrializing
under relatively secure circumstances while Continental Europe
vas in nearly constant upheaval and the United States had
ecarcely begun to develop itself.

But during the more

tranquil years since the American Civil War and the unification of Germany
the free intercommunication of the people of Europe
and America, the growth of capital abroad, the adoption everywhere of our improved machinery and industrial organization, the spread of technical knowledge
in other countries in a greater degree than in
England, have all combined to sap the pre-eminent
position we have held as the best and chapest
producers of those manufactures w~!ch enter most
largely into general consumption.
The advantages which England had enjoyed at mid-century
were advantages which we could not enjoy forever,
and it would be folly to suppose that they can
return. The trade of the world will henceforth
be divided among different nations, and the most
enterprising and the most s~ilful will get the
lion's share of it, provided that a fair field
and no favour is afforded to a11.25
Others recognized that "England has little or no superiority
24 "The Lancashire Cotton-Strike," Quarterly, CXLVI (July,
1878), 501; Jennings, "English Trade and Foreign Competition,"
306; Jeans, England's Supremacy, 160-61; Lord Penzance, "Collapse of the Free Trade Argument," Nineteenth Century, XX
(September, 1886), 338; Prince P. Kropotkin, "The Breakdown
of Our Industrial System," Nineteenth Centur;y:, XXIII (April,
1888)' 512-13.
2 5Jennings, "English Trade and Foreign Competition," 306.
Those who opposed facto~y legislation also found the debate
timely: "It is shallow conceit on our part to continue poohpoohing foreign competition, and to imagine that we can safely
continue to work shorter hours than any country j,.n the world."
Archibald 'W. Finlayson, "Falling Trade and Factory Legislation," Nineteenth Century, XIII (June, 1883);, 973.
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in processes or machinery that may not be--if they have not
already been--borrowed or stolen by our neighbours."

The

time had passed when each industry was exclusively centered
in one place and had its exclusive secrets. 26
Many of the more moderate observers insisted that the
industrial states of the world could co-exist in prosperity.
And the close economic ties between Britain and the United
States were clearly recognized; the depressed conditions
taught many Englishmen that British and American prosperity
were complementary rather than competitive. 2 7 But the new
awareness of the proliferation of industry could produce
more somber conclusions as well:
we no longer monopolize the markets of the world as
we formerly did • • • • commercial supremacy • • • has
gone from us forever. We have played the noble part
of teachers and leaders to the race, and now our
pupils have grown to manhood and set up in business
on their own accounts, as indeed they might have been
expected to do. Did we think to hold the world's
trade for ever, with the crowded continental nations,
our brethren in race at peace,--with America developing into a mighty nation, and Greater Britain beyond
the seas? Preposterous. The actual result was inevitable; and our foreign trade must be shared with
these, our competitors and whilom pupilso28
26 Jeans, England's Supremacy, 160-61. See generally
Leonard H. Courtney, "Migration of Industrial Centres," Fortnightl;r, XXIV n.s.(December, 1878), 801-20, which echoedBerkeley's "Westward the Course of Empire" and anticipated
the writings of George Bettany and Brooks Adams, both of
which are discussed below.
2 7Jeans, En~land's Supremacy, 160-61. In the Introduction to this wor Jeans insisted that "no apology is needed-certainly none is offered--fcr the prominence assigned to the
great American Republic in the course of the present work."
He believed America's agricultural and industrial development
were likely to be controlling factors in the future of England
and Europe; xvi-xvii.
28Joseph G. Horner, "Technical Education and Foreign
Competition," Quarterly, CLXVII (October, 1888), 470.
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Another aspect of the new economic world of the late
nineteenth century was the transportation revolution, without
which the United States would not have loomed so large as it
did on the British economic horizon.
~ttention

It was called to British

chiefly by the writings of the American economist,

Edward Atkinson, though subsequently his ideas were put to
considerable use by English writers also.

Atkinson's central

theme was that the railroad had greatly extended the agricultural area of the United States and had tied together the
agricultural and industrial areas into a single economic unit.
The creation of this large market fostered the mechanization
of agriculture and the growth of manufacturing and led to a
more rapid exploitation of America's rich mineral resources. 2 9
This American transportation system, described by an Englishman as being "as perfect and complete as it is possible to
imagine, being, in fact, unsurpassed • • • ,"30 had not only
led to the mechanization of continental America but had also
made available the markets of the world.3l

Particularly

important from the British point of view was the fact that
rail connections had brought American textile mills closer
to the cotton fields.

Even the cotton destined for Liverpool

2 9Edward Atkinson, "The Railroads of the United States:

Their Effects on Farming and Production in That Country and
in Great Britain," Fortnightly, :XXVIII n.s. (July, 1880), 93100.
30James Keii;h, "Our Great Competitor," Nineteenth Century, :XXI (June, 1887), 793.
31 Atkinson, "The Railroads of the United States," 93-100.
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now frequently went first by rail to New York.

This gave

New England manufacturers a price advantage over their English competitors equal to the cost of transatlantic shipment
and related charges.

Such advantage enabled American manu-

facturers to pay higher wages and still meet the
foreign competitors in neutral markets.3 2

~rice

of

In Atkinson's view, the transportation revolution was
the most significant development of the recent past.
When the time shall come for the history of
the last half of the nineteenth century to be written, it will be no tr~e record if it omits from
among the chief factors more potent than almost
all beside, the American railroad and the English
steam-ship; and, from among the greatest names, the
names of those who organized and developed them.33
The easy accessibility of world markets, made possible by
American railroads and English steamships, was to play a
major role in the growth of British concern about the American economic challenge.
In the 1880s British journals were crowded with articles
celebrating what a bountiful nature had accomplished across
the Atlantic.

That America's natural resources were immense,

as Atkinson had pointed out, no intelligent person could deny.
They were so much greater than the resources of Britain that,
if only the United States could produce as cheaply as Britain,
she was bound to be a successful competitor.34 Atkinson had
32 Edward Atkinson, ''An American View of American Competition," Fortnightly, XXV n.s. (.March, 1879), 391.
33Atkinson, "Railroads of the United States," 104.
34 F. Bulkeley Johnson, "English Supremacy in the East,"
Nineteenth Century, XVI (September, 1884), 493-94

30
pointed to the vastness of agricultural America: Texas had
as much farm land as Britain and Germany combined.35
noted the rapid growth of the American population.36

Others

It was, however, especially the abundant and accessible
industrial resources of America which attracted most attenti on.
The prosperity of a nation depends largely,
if not entirely, or. its natural advantages and the
extent to which its people avail themselves of them.
Until recently our insular position, our supplies of
coal and iron, and our climate have been advantages
which have been unrivalled, and our people availed
themselves of them with energy, ingenuity, and judgment enough to place them at the head of the commercial world. Now the United States are demonstrating
that in some respects their natural advantages are
equal to our own, and in others superior, and they
are developing them with a determination to make the
most of them • • • • Under such conditions it is not
surprising that competition is keen and the struggle
for supremacy severe.3'1
At least as early as the mid-1860s, during the debate whether
Britain might some day exhaust her coal supplies, there had
been men who
pointed out that foreign countries were rivalling
us in this or that branch of industry hitherto our
own, and that the United States were beginning to
realize the value of their extensive and apparently
illimitable coal and iron fields, which, as soon
as the growth of population should render them practically available, must give our most formidable
rivals an irresistible and constantly increasing
advantage.38
35Atkinson, "Railroads of the United States," 93-100.
36see, among many examples, Robert Giffen, "The Foreign
Trade of the United States" (1881) in Robert Giffen, Essays in
Finance (Second Series; New York: G.P.Putnam's Sons, 1886),
130-31.
3?Thomas Whitaker, "The Proposals of the Fair Trade
League," filneteenth Century, X (October, 1881), 62?.
38Percy Greg, 11 Fina..11cial Prospects," Quarterly, CLVII
(January, 1884), 61.
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Vivian Hussey, a member of the Royal Commission appointed
to inquire into the future of Britain's coal supply, had visited the United States in 1877•

He was greatly impressed by

the magnitude of the coal fields, the quality of the coal,
and the cheapness of mining it.

Since these were among the

major controlling factors of nearly every manufacturing industry, Hussey predicted that the United States would become
"not only entirely self-supporting in all branches of manufacture, but also a largely exporting country . . . . . . 39
The chapter devoted to coal in Jeans' book on English
supremacy opened with this quotation:
Other countries--notably, our most formidable rival,
the United States--have supplies of coal incomparably
larger than our own and can raise that coal at a
decidedly lower cost; and coal is at once so indispensable, so primary, and so bulky an article that
it transfers the industrial sceptre of the world to
the land where it is found in the greatest abundance
and at the lowest price.
Jeans was in full agreement; he remarked that the nation with
the most and the cheapest coal "is undoubtedly the best
equipped for the industrial race, and is the most likely to
excel therein." 40 Blessed with so rich a supply of the
primary ingredient of industry, blessed with the complementary resource of iron ore in sufficient quantities as to make
the United States independent of Britain for iron and steel, 41
and blessed more than any other area of the world with facili39Quoted .in Leonard H. Courtney, "Migration o:f Industrial Centres," 817-18.
4 0Quoting W.R.Greg; Jeans, England's Supremacy, 358-59.
41 vi vian Hussey, quoted in Le.onard H. Courtney, "Migration of Industrial Centres," 817-18.
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ties for producing the third major ingredient of the nineteenth century industrial economy, cotton, 42 the United States
presented an awe-inspiring sight to British observers.
The resources of America represented her potential,
~hich

all agreed was enormous.

But the discussions which

took place in England during the Great Depression quite
properly focused primarily on performance.

In this case,

too, the American record was impressive, though the implications proved to be ambiguous enough to support a vigorous
debate which lasted for more than two decades.
ca's

resour~es

Given Ameri-

and her growing population, it was nearly

universally admitted that some day the scale of American
foreign trade would surpass that of Britain.

Robert Giffen,

one of the most respected economists in England and a staunch
defender of the soundness of the British economy in the late
nineteenth century, could see clearly that
at a point, it is plain, the United States can
hardly fail to overtake us and export more, aggregate for aggregate. • •• In the international trade
of the world it is becoming a larger factor • • • •
The next few years at the recent rate of progress
must witness in this way a great change in the
international position of the United States.4~
The rate of American progress to which Giffen referred
was nowhere better illustrated than in Jeans' study of
42 F. Bulkeley Johnson, "English Supremacy in the East,"
493-94.
>A.,..'.
4 3Giff en, "The Foreign Trade of the United States," 13031. Giffen, however, consistently denied that the United
States would ever surpass Great Britain on a per capita
trade basis.
·
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English supremacy.

Examining the period 1850-1880, and basing

his study on United States census figures, Jeans calculated
that the

numbe~

of American manufacturing establishments had

doubled; the capital invested in these establishments had
increased by more than 423%; the number of hands employed
had increased by more than 185%; and the gross value of
American manufactures had increased by more than 426%0 44
To his book on English progress, written in honor of Victoria's 1887 Jubilee, Michael G. Mulhall appended a brief "Conclusion" in which he wrote that "the growth of the United
Kingdom in the last 50 years is unprecedented in Eu.rope, but
much less than that of the United States."

In support of

his statement he offered the following figures:
1850
Population • • • • l?,0?0,000
Wealth (millionso<)
1,686
Trade (millions ~)
64
Steam, horse-power 2,020,000
Banking (millions ~)
212

1880

Increase (%)

50,156,000
9,495
309
10,600,000
530

195
458
383
425
150

Even when Mulhall compared these figures with their British
counterparts on a per capita basis, as Giffen and other confident Englishmen always did, he found that the United States
surpassed Britain in the accumulation of wealth and in the
production of energy.

The United States produced 77,7''*"0,000

foot-tons daily (1,430 per capita) while the United Kingdom
44 Jeans, England's Supremacy, 411, 436, Appendix III.
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4

produced 49,870,000 (l,380 per capita). 5
Jeans and others studied those American industries which
might compete with the basic industries of Britain, textiles
and iron, and they found the record no less impressive.
World consumption of cotton had risen very
since 1860.

subst~ntially

"The lion's share" of that increase was taken

by the United States and Continental Europe.

The European

rate of increase was three times, and that of the United
States was four times, as great as that of Britain.

In

1870-71, Britain had consumed 48.8% of the world's cotton

while the United States had consumed only 18.1%.

By 1882-

83, British consumption had declined to 37.7% and American
consumption had risen to 23.6%0 46 In the woolen industry,

the number of hands employed in the United States had risen
~rom

21,342 in 1840 to 161,557 in 1880.

increased £rom sixteen to

thirty-t~o

Invested capital had

millions sterling, and

the value of the products £rom twenty to fifty-three millions
sterling. 4 7 Finally, Jeans noted that while the silk industry had increased the number of factories by more than 460%
and the number of hands by more than 1700%, "a rate of progress rare even in the industrial annals of America," he
4 5Michael G. Mulhall, Fifty Years of National Pro~ress,
18~-1887 (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1887), 6 , 65,

12 26.

46Thomas Ellison, The Cotton Trade of Great Britain

(London: Effingham Wilson, 1886), 102-04.
4 ?Jeans, England's Supremacy, 213.
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dolefully concluded that "it is by no means cheering to consider the remarkable progress of the United States in the
light of our own unquestionable loss of ground." 48
The comparative growth pattern in the iron and steel
industry was, if anything, even more alarming.

Lowthian

Bell, a leading British ironmaster and frequent spokesman for
the industry, became alarmed when American imports of British
iron declined from 1,224,144 tons in 1872 to only 608,923
tons in 18?3.

In 1874 he travelled to the United States to

inspect the coal fields, the ore mines, and the- manufacturing establishments.

He obtained further first-hand evidence

in 1876 when he was in the United States as a British representative to the Philadelphia International Exhibition.
Since he had first become concerned about American production, Bell had seen the relative positions of Britain and
the United States change drastically.

In 1870 Britain had

produced 51.6% of the world's pig-iron and the United States
14.4%.

By 1884 the United States was producing 20.2% and

Britain 38.4%.

Put in terms of relative growth (as Bell did

put them), these figures represented an American increase of
more than 40% and a British decline of more than 25%.

In

absolute figures, Britain produced 5,963,000 tons of pig-iron
48 Ibid., 225-31. It should be pointed out, however, that
in none~these branches of the textile industry did the
British note much serious competition from the United States
except in the American market itself (see below); the point
was that British industry seemed stagnant when compared with
the American during the seventies and eighties.
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in 1870 and the United States 1,665,000 tons.

In 1884 Bri-

tain produced 7,812,000 tons and the United States 4,097,000
tons. 4 9 If more recent figures had been available to Bell,
the results would have been considerably more startling; in
1889 American production of pig-iron surpassed the British
output.

The case of steel was similar.

In 1840 the produc-

tion of the United Kingdom and of the United States were
respectively 245,000 tons and 64,000 tons.

In 1884 the respective figures were 1,780,000 tons and 1,540,000 tons. 50

By 1889 it could be said that "we do not monopolize the
steel trade of the world.

The annual production of Bessemer
steel in the United States already exceeds our own. • • • n51
Even before Atkinson had pointed out ·to his English
readers the role of the railroads in the creation of a single,
enormous American economic unit, there was some recognition
in England that the scale of the new industrial economy of
the United States was of considerable significance.

One

writer noted "the extent to which manufacturing of every
kind is monopolized by huge companies or corporations" in
the United States.

He speculated that there might be a

4 9Lowthian Bell, "The Iron and Steel Trade," Fortnightl;y:,
XLI, n.s.(January, 1887), 88 and 90-91. Comparable figures
appeared in Mulhall, Fifty Years of National Progress, 56,
though here the comparison was taken back to 1840 and hence
was even more dramatic. Mulhall was a prolific celebrator
of the material accomplishments of the United Kingdom; the
title of the work above is typical and indicative of his style.
50ibid.
51 Joseph G. Horner, "The Age of Steel," Quarterly, CLXIX
(July, 1889), 161. The United States produced 2,936,033 tens
to 2,012,794 for Britain.
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connection between American business organization and American competition.

"It would be interesting," he thought, "to

know how far the isolated efforts which are now being made,
both in our own and foreign markets, to obtain a foothold by
the manufacturers of America, are to be traced to the same
systematic determination to beat down opposition at whatever
cost" which marked the operation of the large corpo!'ations
in their own home market.5 2
By the mid-1880s several other English writers were also
expressing concern over the respective scales of the British
and the American economies.

Jeans called attention to the

advantages of large-scale production and noted that the
largest watch and textile factories in the world were in
Massachusetts.

His study demonstrated generally that Ameri-

can manufacturing establishments were growing both larger
and more profitable, and he concluded that "manufacturing on
a large scale has a great deal to do with economy of working."53
If manufacturing on a large scale served to reduce the
cost of production, distribution on a large scale was the
necessary corollary.

Therefore, "the cardinal aim and condi-

tion of success in modern commerce is the acquisition of an
extended market."

Germany, and above all, the United States

already possessed extended markets at home which, furthermore,
52Henderson,"England and America as Economic Competitors," 468-69.
53Jeans, England's Supremacy, 133 and 230; see also
generally Chs. IX and XXV.
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were protected by high tariffs.

With such assurance, manu-

facturers there could produce on a very large and efficient
scale and, should there be any product left over after home
demand had been satisfied, they could "dump" their excess at
or below cost price without suffering.

English

~anufacturers,

on the other hand, were unable to adopt the new and more
efficient techniques of large-scale production, for their
home market was small and even that small market was unprotected against foreign dumping.54

Two abortive movements

resulted from observations such as these: the attempt to form
industrial trusts and the attempt to secure an extended and
protected market for British manufacturers through the formation of an imperial customs union.

Both attracted consider-

able attention in the nineties and later, but in the early
years of the Great Depression the question of scale was a
rather fresh revelation.
That a new economic world had come into being since
mid-century was, then, an inescapable fact for the British.
As the American, Edward Atkinson, wrote:
The time has gone by for anyone to dream of relegating the people of this country to the single pursuit of agriculture • • • or even to the crude forms
of manufacture. Foreign nations can never again
supply us with any large proportion of the staple
goods or wares that constitute the principal part
of our use of manufactured articles • • • •
It is beginning to be perceived that not only
the g~eat moral curse of slavery has been removed,
but that in that removal perhaps the greatest
54Roper Lethbridge, "Is an Imperial Fiscal Policy Possible?" National, V (March, 1885), 34-37·
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industrial revolution ever accomplished has
happened.55
Though the British perspective regarding the prodigious
growth of industrial America might have been different, the
conclusions that were drawn could be quite similar, as the
following remarks show:
We do not attach importance to the mere circumstance
that America is sending to this country a small
quantity of cotton goods. It is not the displacement
of a certain proportion of our manufactures in the
home market, that is the serious feature in this
fact. But it is the indication conveyed by it, that
the United States market is no longer wide enough
for the United States manufacturer; that he is compelled to seek an outlet in neutral markets for his
surplus production, and that he understands, but
does not quail before, all the consequences of the
new position in which he finds himself placed.56
Far from quailing, the American demonstrated an audacious
expansiveness.

Nowhere was it better illustrated than in

the exhibition of American manufactures which was staged
in London in the Jubilee Year, 188?.

This was the first

such exhibition ever put on in a foreign country without
any government ass:i:tance, but financed solely by private
individuals.

As an Englishman admiringly commented:

The mere fact that such an exhibition, solely composed of our great competitor's wares, should take
place in the capital of the commercial world, and
in the heart of our empire, shows the pluck of the
Americans and their determination to cut us ultimately out of the running, even in our own country, if
they possibly can.57

395.

55Atkinson, "An American View of American Competition,"
5611 The Lancashire Cotton-Strike," 501-03.
5?Keith, "Our Great Competitor," 798-99·
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British Supremacy Reasserted
However impressive the American record might have been,
few in Britain were prepared to despair for the future.

On

the contrary, the dominant view was that Britain was still
far ahead of the United States.

A combination of industrial

growth and high tariffs was costing the British the loss of
part of the rich American market, but as for competition
anywhere else, most people in Britain would have sneered.
The optimistic view of British trade which had angered
the Fair Traders in the late 1870s continued to find frequent
expression in the 1880s.

British trade statistics proved

that "an immense market is still open to our productions and
that British energy has hitherto surmounted opposition."58
Giffen never tired of asserting that the decline of export
statistics since 1873 reflected a reduction of prices but
not of the volume of goods sold abroad.59

In 1881 Mulhall

claimed that "this little island of ours is the most productive spot on the globe; it is a vast workshop," and his statistical compilations were sufficient to prove it "foolish,
if not criminal, for people to go about with lamentations
for the decline of British industry • • • • 1160 Jeans, after
58T.E. Cliffe Leslie, "The History and Future of Interest
and Profit," Fortnightly, XXX n.s.(November, 1881), 650.
59see, for example, the portion of his report to the
Board of Trade quoted in Brassey, "Depression of Trade," 788-90.
60 Michael G. Mulhall, "Two De<!ades of Industry," Contem~orary, XL (November, 1881), 823-4.
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his detailed survey of the British economy in 1885, believed
that "the present condition of England, although not perhaps
relatively so pre-eminent as it has been, is positively as
good as, if not better than, at any former period."
was making "real progress. 1161

Britain

As the 1887 Jubilee drew closer, such views were expressed with some frequency.

Mulhall's Jubilee book demon-

strated that Britain surpassed the United States on a per
capita basis in most categories. 62 Many others were written
in the same vein.

According to one of these, it was true,

as the Fair Traders were insisting, "that we stand alone in
the wide world of commerce, but where?

Why, at the very

head of the nations.

In the international race there is not
even a good second to us. 116 3
America might have splendid resources but Britain pos-

sessed certain advantages also.

Following a tour of American

manufacturing centers, James Henderson cited six advantages
which British manufacturers possessed over their rivals:
61 Jeans, England's Supremacy, XIX, XXII.
62 Mulhall, Fifty Years of National Progress,. 125-26.
6 3George W. Medley, "The Lion's Share of the World's.
Trade," Nineteenth Centurz, XIX (June, 1886), 8080 See also
Leone Levi, "The Material Growth o.f the United Kingdom from
1836 to 1886," Fortnight!~, XLI n.s.(June, 1887), 913-27; and
the shallow article by Si ney c. Buxton, "Fair Trade and Free
Trade: A Dialogue," Contemtorar:v, XL (December,1881) in which
"Faithful" lectures "P!iab e 11 with such statements as: "I
have some official figures at home which show that during
the last twenty years England has experienced a greater progressive increase than America in imports and exportso • • • "
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(1) lower rates of interest; (2) lower costs of buildings and
machinery; (3) lower wages; (4) a sounder system or national
finance and taxation; (5) lower cost of fuel and light; and
(6) readier access to markets.

With such advantages, British

manufacturers "have no need to sit down in despair, under
the idea that it is hopeless to strive against American competition, and that the industrial strength of the old country
is played out. 1164
In the late 18?0s, Henderson went on, England had been
rife with rumors that ''our markets were to be swamped with
American iron and steel" and reports "that the American cotton
manufacturers are far outstripping their Lancashire competitors, not only in foreign markets, but also in Manchester
herselfo"

But it was foolish to assume that because a few

shipments of American calicoes may have sold to advantage in
this country, therefore we must assume ourselves beaten. 1165

The amount of manufactures shipped by the United States to
Britain was insignificant compared with what she accepted in
return.

Thomas Whitaker demonstrated that in 1880 Britain

exported to the United

States~25,ooo,ooo

worth, and received

64Henderson, "England and America as Manufacturing Competitors," 460. That American producers faced higher costs
or all kinds--usually attributed to the tariff--was a constant theme in the British press. But, though American
governmental methods of getting and spending often appalled
the British, it was probably more frequently asserted that
the tax burden in the United States was lighter than in Britain; see below, passim.

G5Ibid., 458-61.

43
in return less than.t3,ooo,ooo worth.
~l0,980,360

Britain sent America

worth of iron and steel goods

worth of cotton goods.
respectively~403,234

and~3,653,237

American exports to Britain were
and

~04,291.

'When the total exports

of the two nations were compared, it was clear just how far
behind Britain the United States was.

In 1878 United States

exports amounted to 5377,837,040; those of Britain Sl,08?,
358,000.

And, whereas the British total included a large

percentage of manufactured goods, the American exports consisted chiefly of food and raw materials; 66 only 15% of the
American tctal represented manufactured goods and only 2%
of the total manufactured product of the United States was
exported. 6 7 Whitaker seemed justified when he remarked that
American exports "are but a drop in the bucket of the
world's trade when compared with ours. 1168
Jeans compared the exports of 1880 on a per capita
basis and found that the United Kingdom figure (in pounds,
shillings, and pence) was 6 9 5 while the figure for the
United States was only 3 8 O.

"American trade, as tested

by exports," he wrote, "has not been so flourishing as that
of England. 1169 Mulhall claimed that on a per capita basis
66Whitaker, "Proposals of the Fair Trade League," 61~,
625-26.
6 7Jeans, .England's Supremacy, 960
68 Wb.itaker, "Proposals of the Fair Trade League," 626.
6 9Jeans, England's Supremacy, 117.
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American foreign trade increased by 50% between 1850 and 1880,
but that of the United Kingdom increased by 200%.?0

Like

Jeans and Mulhall, Giffen could recognize the amazing growth
of the United States and. still remain confident that "a
proper comparison shows

~he

progress of the [United Kingdom]

to be by far the most remarkable."

Citing the same per capita

export figures, he concluded that "by far the most striking
illustration of increase is still represented by the United
Kingdom, the great free-trade country, and the United States
are really nowhereo"?l
Furthermore, the English expressed some doubts about the
soundness of American economic growth.

Jeans suggested that

it was to some extent artificially fostered and therefore
unhealthy.7 2 Giffen went so far as to make the growing
American exports a symptom of weakness.

While Britain's

wealth was augmented by "invisible exports" and especially
by shipping, the increase of American exports was required
to pay foreigner carriers who transported both the exports
and the imports of the United States.73
If the American lack of shipping was looked upon as a
disadvantage by some English observers, still more so was the
American tariff.

12?.

It was that which really kept the United

?OMulhall, Fifty Years of National Progress, 125-26.
71 Giffen, "The Foreign Trade of the United States," 122,

72 Jeans, England's Supremacy, 412.
?3Giffen, "The Foreign Trade of the United States,"
125-29.
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states from competing with Britain for the trade of the world.
For all their adoption of labor-saving machinery and up-todate methods, under a tariff the Americans could not produce
as cheaply as their British counterparts.

"They may revel

in the monopoly of their home market, but they cannot compete
in neutral markets with a country which adopted a free-trade
policy. 1174
The Americans might be prospering, so went a widely-held
British view, but they could hardly be considered serious
rivals.

Thomas Whitaker presented the view quite vividly:

We can send 3,000 miles across the sea for her raw
cotton for our artisans to work up, and for her corn,
beef, and bacon to feed them on while they are doing
it; and when it is manufactured into piece goods we
can send it back again 3,000 or 4,000 miles, and
sell it to every country surrounding the nation from
which we got the raw material and the food. It is
only by imposing heavy duties that they can keep us
out of their own territory, and even then they cannot
prevent us from selling some of our goods to the very
people who grew the material from which we made them.
Outside their own boundaries, where they cease to be
pro2~ed up by duties, they are not in the race with
us. '1.?
A surprising denial of American competition or even the
possibility of such competition came from Andrew Carnegie.
Carnegie, who frequently visited Britain and had begun to
contribute to the leading British journals, insisted that it
was unnecessary "for England to trouble herself about any
serious competition from America in the markets of the world
74 Brassey, "The Depression of Trade," 788-90; Jeans,
f1gland's Supremacy, 96, 203-04, 214; Ellison, The Cotton
rade of Great Britain, 105, 111-15, 3170

.

~.

I

75Whitaker, "Proposals of the Fair Trade League,"
624-250
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for many generations to come, tariff or no tariff."

Carne:..

gie's argument was that only very high wages could keep
American workers from moving to the fertile and unsettled
prairies.

Until the land was gone and the United States

was as densely populated as Britain, there could be no cheap
labour and thus no American competition.7 6
In the 1870s and 1880s, during the depths of the Great
Depression, the British became aware that they were living
in a new economic world, a world that was considerably
idyllic than the one which had passed away.

l~ss

It was no

longer a world inhabited solely by customers; formidable
rivals had appeared, none more awesome than the United
States.

And, while there was a substantial confident reac-

tion to the unsettling onset of the Great Depression, there
also appeared an excited awareness of the American challenge,
which now will be discussed more fully.

7 6 Andrew Carnegie, "As Others See Us," Fortnightly, X:XI
n.s.(February, 1882), 162-63. Carnegie, of course, was instrumental not too many years later in making the United States
an occasionally serious competitor; see below, passim.

CHAPTER II
THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE IDENTIFIED
The American Challenge
In 1879, at the nadir of the Great Depression, Edward
Atkinson offered British readers this thought-provoking
statement:
The competition between the United States and
the manufacturing nations of Europe, and especially
Great Britain, for the leading places in supplying
with machine-made fabrics those nations that do not
as yet use modern machinery is a subject that now
excites great interest. It is not important in
reference to the particular circumstances of the
present time, but much more important when we consider the momentous consequences that might follow
the establishment on the part of the United States
of a permanent manufacturing supremacy.l
British interest in such questions as the relative
wealth and prosperity of Great Britain and the United States
might have been little more than tea-time chatter had it not
been for this fear of American manufacturing -supremacy.

An

America prospering amidst its abundant natural resources was
a perfect complement to industrial Britain; the pattern of
exchanging American food and raw materials had long been a
fundamental part of the British economy.

But an industrial

United States beginning to look beyond its borders, and the
slightest hint that America might establish permanent

383.

1Atkinson, "An American View of American Competition,"

4?
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manufacturing supremacy, were sufficient to cause the British to look at American wealth and resources and even occasional forays into the world market in a totally different
light.

Considered in its broadest form, the American chal-

lenge comprised all these questions and more.

British alarm,

some of which has already been noted in the above sections
of this study, appeared in two distinct waves between 1873
and 1889.

The first of these coincided with the low point

of the Great Depression.

Atkinson's statement was among the

earliest expressions of the American challenge, but was far
from being the only one.
Yorkshire and Lancashire were called the "Brain of England" but if an Englishman "were to look for an

a~tivity

of

industrial intelligence rivalling that of our older northern
counties," wrote Mark Pattison, "I suspect we all think of
one • • • and that is the United States. 112

"I think," he

continued,
there is evidence of an inventive genius at work
in the new world more alive and more keen than in
the old country • • • • Time was when all the new
discoveries in practical science, and improvements
in machinery and engineering, were first made in
this country. This is not so now. It is from
America that all the new inventions, as all the
new jokes, come to us.3

I
I

I

The sewing machine and the washing machine, now indispensable

I

in English households, came from the United States.

I

A

I
'

2Mark Pattison, "Industrial Shortcomings," Fortnightly,
XXVIII n.s. (December, 1880), 739.

. . . 3ill2:,. t. ?43.
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Scotsman invented the reaping machine but it required the
.American McCormick to show the English how to make it work.
What a length of time we went on quite content
with the old smooth-bore muzzle-loading musket!
The American took the matter in hand, and in a few
years the weapon was totally transformed. From
American brains issued the revolver and the Winchester repeating-rifle while Birmingham workshops were
vying with each other as to which could turn out
the greatest number of guns exactly to pattern.
The English may make more machines and better finished ones,
but the Americans invent new ones while the English are
quite content to copy the old models. 4
Thirty years earlier Britain nearly monopolized the
industrial world, but by this time Belgium, France and the
United States had British machinery, and workmen, and capital "and they are sending us a yearly increasing surplus
that is driving our own goods out of our own markets • • • • "5
But some saw that it was "not France, or Belgium, or even
Germany, whose competition is likeiy to urge us close, but
America. 116 When there was talk of foreign industrial threats
in the late 1870s, it was most frequently the United States
".from which the most serious and dangerous rivalry is to be
.anticipated."7

By 18?9, according to the Quarterly Review,

4 Ibid., 743-44.
5sullivan, "Isolated Free Trade," 162.
6Pattison, "Industrial Shortcomings," ?42.
?Henderson, "England and America as Manufacturing Competitors," 458.
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"the model Republic of America, having successfully fostered
her industries against our competition, has become our rival
in foreign markets, and is even unde,rselling us in our own."8
The allegations were frequently general, but there were
specific concerns behind them.

Atkinson's comment above had

been sparked by Anglo-American textile competition.
~arterly

When the

Review insisted that foreign competion was the real

cause of depression, it offered as proof declining British
textile sales not only in protected markets but in neutral
ones, while "the United States are already engaged in active
rivalry with us for the supply of neutral markets, after
having virtually driven us out of their own • • • • "

Just

at the time when the markets of industrial nations were
being closed to Britain by tariffs, the United States "threaten us with a keen struggle for those portions of our cotton
trade [neutral markets] which alone show signs of future expansion."

Since American goods were being purchased even

in England, it was apparent that American textile manufacturers could produce as well and as cheaply as the British.9
It was also during these early years of the Great Depression that several other issues emerged which later were to
become quite controversial.

The first was the question

whether America's "favorable" balance of trade and Britain's
"unfavorable" balance proved American superiority.

L. J.

811 Princlples at Stake," Quarterly, CXLVIII (October,
1879) ' . 591.
9"Lancashire Cotton-Strike," 510.
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Jennings answered in the affirmative.

In 1880 the United

Kingdom purchasedo{'90,000,000 worth of American goods of all
kinds while selling to the United States less
worth.

than~23,ooo,ooo

This obviously established an indebtedness.

it paid?

How was

"We have about 2000 millions invested in American

and other foreign bonds, and with this we are paying for a
large part of the difference between our imports and our
exports."

The remainder was paid for by the export of Bri-

tish gold.

English capital was thus being drained away to
the United States. 10
There was also a different kind of drain on British

resources, however; one that could not be denied.

British

manufacturers and workers were migrating to the United States,
the former so as to be able to sell inside the protected market and the latter to find employment.

The textile town of

Bradford was perhaps more seriously affected by the Great
Depression than any other major British manufacturing center.
Bradford is nearly ruined, and both manufacturers and operatives are emigrating to America;
and, as far as our political economists are concerned, Bradford, say they, "must be patient and
watchful, and must look out for new markets and new
produce for her looms." But • • • • whilst our manufacturers are patiently looking out for new markets
our starving operatives are emigrating to America.ll
The English were shocked and dismayed at such news as the
important dress-goods manufacturers, Messrso Priestly and
10
Jennings, ".English Trade and Foreign Competition,"
290-910
11
sullivan, "Isolated Free Trade," 170.
12Jennings, "Fair Trade and British Labour," 552.
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Sons, establishing mills in Philadelphia in 1881.

When the

firm crossed the Atlantic it took with it its equipment and
12
its workmen.
There was a very considerable decline of alarmist artieles in the British press after 1881, the result perhaps of
the upward movement of the British economy after 1879.

Even

the return of bad times from 1883 to 1886 and the appointment in 1885 of the Royal Commission on the causes of the
depression of trade elicited no substantial debate about the
American challenge.

In 1885 only Jeans' book, England's

Supremacy, brought important information about A.!Jerican
industrial growth before the British public. 1 3
Jeans believed that America deserved considerable attention in any study of the British economy.

"In the whole

range of politico-economic inquiry, there is perhaps no more
interesting subject of study than that of the competition
for manufacturing and industrial supremacy between England
and the United States. 1114

Though he took some pains to make

clear the heavy preponderance of food and raw materials
among the United States exports, 1 5 he also pointed out that
America's rapidly growing industry already considerably
12 Jennings, "Fair Trade and British Labour," 552.
1 3r am basing this remark, of course, only on my examination of the journals of opinion used for the dissertation
and those books published during the period that I was able
to consult.
14Jeans, England's Supremacy, xvi-xvii.
l5Ibid., 85.
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exceeded the value of American agriculture.

England's manu-

facturing interests may have outstripped the growth of every
other modern country, but not that of the United States. 16

By way of illustration he offered the following figures
(expressed in millions sterling):
England

Commerce
Manufactures
Mining
Agriculture
Carrying Trade
Banking
Sundries
Totals

United States

1870

1880

1870

1880

547
642
46
260
78
80
34

692
758
65
240
121
108
40

172
677
38
415
115
40
17

301
1074
72
525
141
52
25

1687

2024

1474

2190

Thus, during the decade 1870-1880, the increase in the annual
value of the various economic activities.of the United States
was i716,000,000; that of the United Kingdom was ~337,000,000. 1 7
We have already seen that Jeans was quite confident concerning Britain's ability to hold its own under the new economic conditions.

Nevertheless he was able to write that

America, for example, has recently proved that she
can produce certain leading articles, and has actually produced and sold them as cheaply as they can
be made in England, notwithstanding that those same
articles continue to be burdened, as regards their
import, with duties varying from 40 to 70 per cent.
of' their value. Nay more, America has been able to
sell in Canada, in competition with English manufacturers, commodities that are excluded from her
16

Ibid., 377.

l?Ibid., 340 and n.2, 341.

own shores by the prohibitory tariff already referred to • • • • If the nations that we have been
the means very largely of educating up to their
present proficiency in manufactures once preeminently our own, succeed in beating us in neutral markets, our position will indeed be beset
with great peril.18
The controversy over the American challenge remained
alive during 1886.

Ellison mentioned the "great deal of

fuss" that was being made over the competition of the United
States. 1 9 And Lord Penzance, contemplating Mulhall's statistics of industrial growth, commented that Britain was about
to be overtaken and by none other than "our own keen-witted
cousins the Americans." 20 It was, however, in the following two yea.rs that the American challenge was most strongly
presented.
In 1887 there was information that the pattern of direct
Anglo-American trade continued to shift in favor of the United
States, 21 and further warnings that America and Germany were
"the growing competitors of England."

Lowthian Bell, the

iron and steel magnate, announced that "the recent progress
of industry in the United States of America excels that of
any other nation in the world." 2 3 An 1887 article was devoted
18 Ibid., 160-61.
l9Ellison, The Cotton Trade of Great Britain, 114.
20 Penzance, "The Free-Trade Idolatry: Parts I and II,"
Nineteenth Century, XIX (March, 1886), 380-81, and (April,

1886), 593.

. .

21 George Howell, "The State of Our Trade," Fortnightly,
XL! n.s.(February, 188?), 202.
22 c. ·A. Cripps, "Competition and Free Trade," National,
X (November, 1887), 342.
2 3Bell, "The Iron and Steel Trade," 88.
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to the American challenge.

"Our Great Competitor" was dedi-

cated to the proposition that, with all the advantages enjoyed
by the United States, it was a tribute to Great Britain that

she was still in the running.

Still, the author's words were

somber enough, as seen from the English point of view:
It need not surprise us to find that a country possessing such advantages, and under such conditions,
should at the present time be at least twenty years
ahead of Great Britain in invention, and in commercial and political advancement.
It will, I think, be at once seen where we have
to look for our rival, in commerce and in arts and
sciences, in the present as well as in the future;
and that, if we can by any possibility keep ahead
of or even abreast with the people of the United
States, we can quite well afford to ignore all the
other older and slower nationalities of the world,
and still hold our own in progress and prosperity.
On our present lines, however, it is utterly
impossible for us to keep pace with our great competitor, and it behoves our people, and especially
our statesman, to be stirring.
For him, Britain was too encumbered by tradition, too prone
to look to the past instead of to the future.

Such lethargy

could prove fatal to Great Britain.
Our great competitor--being the greatest agricultural manufacturing, and mining nation in the
world, with unlimited credit, and being besides
"essentially British," and having eight thousand
daily newspapers--is no unworthy foeman; we must
therefore be up and doing while there is yet time 24
to clear the decks of all unnecessary dead-weight.
However, Prince Peter

Kropot~in,

who was at this time

living in England and a regular contributor on scientific
matters to the Nineteenth Century, suggested in the strongest
possible terms that the American challenge was unavoidable
and irresistible, British efforts notwithstanding:
f

Il

24

James Keith, "Our Great Competitor," Nineteenth Centurl, XX! (June, 1887), 792-93, 798-99.
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a terrible competitor to all European manufacturing
countries has grown up of late in the United States.
In proportion as their immense territory is more and
more appropriated by the few, and free land of any
value becomes as difficult to get as it is in Europe,
manufactures must grow in the States; and they are
growing at su'C'h""a speed--an American speed--that in
a very few years the neutral markets will be invaded
by American goods. The monopoly of the first-comers
in the industrial field has ceased to exist. And it
will exist no more, whatever may be the spasmodic
efforts made to return to a state of things already
belonging to the domain of history. New ways, new
issues, must be searched: the past has lived, and
it will live no more.25
~
British Loss of the American Market
The most tangible aspect of the American challenge was
the loss of substantial portions of the American market by
British producers.

When the establishment of the Fair Trade

movement led to a renewal of fiscal controversy in England,
this was one of the few things upon which both sides could
agree.

According to Thomas Brassey, an ardent advocate of

Free Trade:
As the United States had long been the most important consumer of British goods, our exclusion from
that market, by the combined operation of the prohibitory tariff and the diminished purchasing power
of the American people, was a grave, and it has thus
proved a permanent, disaster.26
W. Farrer Ecroyd, the father of the Fair Trade movement,
2 5Prince Peter Kropotkin, "The Breakdown of Our Industrial System," Nineteenth Century, XXIII (April, 1888), 503.
26Brassey, "The Depression of Trade," 790. Brassey
pointed to the 52% growth of American manufacturing since
1860 as evidence, not of America's ability to match England
industrially, but of reckless overproduction which led to
the reaction which caused a worldwide depression of prices
and purchasing power; 788-90.
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wrote that
The nations from whom we chiefly purchase our
supply of food [that was, overwhelmingly, the United
States], and who, until the past five or six years,
took large quantities of our manufactures in payment,
will now take them from us no longer. They have
shut out our goods by heavy duties, and, by thus
excluding us from competition, have encouraged the
extension of their own manufactures till they can
supply themselves.27
Though the British fiscal debate naturally led to the
emphasis of the American tariff as a cause of bad British
trade, the British also recognized that American manufacturing competition was an equally important factor behind reduced British sales in the American market. 28 Some were prepared to write off the American market as already lost, consoling themselves with the thought that colonial demand was
growing so strong that, by itself, it could keep British
trade in a prosperous condition for a century or more. 2 9
2 7Quoted in Jennings, "English Trade and Foreign Competition," 302-03. Ecroyd believed the situation far worse than
most people realized. Recent bad weather and harvests in
Europe had led to greatly swollen imports of American food.
But, since the American tariff prevented Britain from paying
for the additional food by exporting manufactures to the
United States, Britain had to give up capital by transfering securities to the United States. Thus, to the initial
loss of .;{-30.million--his estimate of the cost of British tariffs to Britain--must be added a second-*30 million--the
amount of British manufacturing which, except for the American tariff, would have been engendered by the increased food
purchases. Everybody lost, British manufacturers, British
farmers, and the British nation through the transfer of capital. Ecroyd, "Fair Trade," 589-91. Jennings also emphasized
the American tariff as the cause of the "crippled trade" of
G:eat Britain. Jennings, English Trade and Foreign Competi~' 303-05.
28stephen Williamson, "Bad Trade and Its Causes," Contemporarz, XXXV_(April, 1879), 121.
. ~
29George Baden-Powell·, "New Markets for British Products,"
Nineteenth Centurz, X (July, 1881), 43-55.
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British exports to the United States were in fact declining substantially.

The most recent figures available when

the Fair Trade controversy began showed that British exports
to the United States had dropped from ~25,170,000 in 1865
to o("19,9a5,ooo in 1877. 30 In the period 1870-74! which included both the peak years of British trade and the first year
of the Great Depression, the United States took 14.1% of Britain's total exports.

In the period 1880-84, when the total

value of British exports itself had declined considerably
from the previous decade, the United States took only 12.2%.3 1
"The hard fact that stares us in the face," in the mid-1880s
even more so than in the late 1870s, an Englishman concluded,
"is that we cannot expect any very large expansion of our
export trade to those [the protectionist] countries, for
they are now able to manufacture goods for their own consumption, and even to cultivate an export trade. 11 32
Britain's basic industries, textiles and iron and steel,
were both badly hurt by the loss of the American market.
The textile industry had once found its American trade amply
satisfying.33

In 1870 the British had sold to the United

States J2,674,697 worth of cotton manufactures.
amount was only .;("1,275,788.

In 1876 the

Though the economists of Britain

talked of a revival in 1880, cotton exports to the United
30Albert J. Leffingwell, "Free Trade, From an American
Standpoint," Contemporary, XXXYIII (July, 1880), 60.

3lHoweil~ "The State of Our Trade," 202-03.
32

~.' 265.

33However, the textile industr~ was among the first to
confront American tariffs and competition in the American market; the situation could be tracea back to pre-Civil War days.
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states in that year still amounted only to ctl,748,645.
woolen industry was even harder hit.

The

In 1872 Bradford, the

center of the trade, had shipped to the United States woolen
and worsted goods valued at ct'5,627,575.
ments were only

~2,210,231.

In 1880 the ship-

The British Trade Journal dis-

patched a man to the United States to discover why the demand for British textiles was falling off so badly.

He

attributed it not so much to the tariff as to the increased
production of American mills and the fa.ilure of British manufacturers to consider the wants of their customers: "the
English will not change their old ways and methods to suit
t he

. f as h"ions an d s t y 1 es. • •• 11 34
c h anges in

Ellison, in his study of the British cotton industry,
lamented the American situation.

"We have lost not only

two-thirds of the business we did with them twenty-two years
ago, but the vast amount of trade [that is, the natural increase] we should have done with them if they had been satisfied to keep on the old lines •• • • 1135

Though the improve-

ment in trade conditions between 1879 and 1883 had been accompanied by much larger American purchases of cotton goods,
Ellison dreamed of what might have been.

In 1853, when the

American population had been only twenty-three million, Britain had sold them t4,273,000 worth of cotton goods.

By

1883 that population had nearly doubled, but British exports

34 Jennings, "English Trade and Foreign Competition,"
274-81. ;

-

.

35Ellison, The Cotton Trade of Great Britain, 105.
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amounted only to

~3,474,000.

There was no doubt, Ellison

wrote, that if the United States were to return to a preCivil War type tariff, there would occur a very large increase in British cotton exports to America.
that the increase would come almost

But he noted

ex~lusively

in the

finer types of goods and that
in all probability this gain to English cotton manufacturers would be in a great measure counterbalanced
by a large increase in the imports of the lower medium and coarser descriptions of American cotton products into Great Britain. Lancashire can beat Lowell
in the production of the finer makes of goods; but
Lowell, if permitted to purchase her machinery in
the cheapest market, would be able to beat Lancashire
in many of the lower medium and coarser sorts.36
In the woolen industry, the plight of Bradford has already been mentioned.

Bradford producers were leaving to

establish factories in the United States.

The plight of the

other centers of the industry was no better.

From Liverpool,

from Hull, and from other woolen towns came reports that exports had fallen by fifty percent.

The drop was particularly

disastrous because, stimulated by the boom which ended in
1872, such textile areas as Sheffield and South Yorkshire
had invested enormous amounts of capital in preparation for
increasing trade.

Instead of increasing, trade had nearly

disappeared "owing to various causes, particularly the American tariff," and the prospects of the British woolen towns
was "gloomy: 11 37
36 Ibid.: 157-58.
3?jennings, "English Trade and Foreign Competition,"
274-81; Jennings,_ "Fair Trade and British Labour," 575.
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All branches of the trade were suffering, none more so
than the carpet trade.

Not too many years earlier, America

had depended almost entirely on imported carpets.
1879, while the United States was importing less

But in
than~OO

worth of ingrain carpets, the city of Philadelphia alone
manufactured more than twenty million yards of carpeting,
mostly of this type.

"Some idea of the growth of American

competition may be had," it was said, "from the statement
that the entire production of Great Britain was less than
fourteen million yardso"

In other grades of carpeting the

advance had been equally rapid.

In 1873 the United States

had imported nearly three million square yards of tapestry
carpet.

But that market had steadily dwindled until the
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879

• • • 2,958,000 square yards
II
II
• • • 2,099,000
II
• • • 1,454,000
"
II
546,000
• • •
"
II
279,000
• • •
"
II
II
94,000
• •
II
23,000
•
•
"

.

0

foreign trade in these carpets had been nearly destroyed.
American production had increased correspondingly.

Present

production was about 8,500,000 square yards annually, but
enough additional looms were in the process of construction
and installation that the United States would soon be producing thirteen million yards.38
The British silk and ribbon industry had faced serious
38Le1'fingwell, "Free Trade, from an American Standpoint,"
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competition before, chiefly from Continental manufacturers,
but by 1879 the American nemesis was the focus of attention.
Jeans' comments on the growth of the American silk industry
have already been noted.39

The impact of that growth on the

British industry was widely discussed.

Towns such as Coven-

try, Macclesfield, Bethnal Green, and many others had derived
their prosperity chiefly from this tradeo
fering terribly.

Now they were suf-

In 1861 there had been eighty-four ribbon

manufacturers in Coventry.

And in the past "its silk goods

were annually exported to the United States to the value of
tens of thousands of pounds; now little or nothing is sent
there. 1140 As one manufacturer told Jennings:
Hostile tariffs o •• have driven us out of the
field. We have sold the Americans our machinery;
our goods we cannot sell them. I have never exported anything to the States since hostile tariffs came into operation.
In 1881 there were fewer than a dozen of the former eightyfour ribbon manufacturers left in Coventry.

Coventry had

been fortunate enough to acquire a new major industry, bicycle-making (which experienced its own "American invasion" in
the nineties), but most of the other silk towns were slowly
.
41
d ecaying.

An 1875 American governmental report showed that the

American silk trade had quadrupled since the passage of the
39see above, 34r35.
40J enrungs,
.
"Fair Trade and British Labour," 566-67.
41

Ibid.
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new tariff in 1864.

In 1875 the United States produced silk

goods to the value of more than $20,ooo,ooo.

The growth since

18?5, said Jennings in 1880, had been even more rapid.

In

the silk, just as in the other trades, lamented Jennings,
the story was the same: "progress under Protection in the
United States; decline under so-called 'Free Trade' in England."

The silk-weavers of Coventry, who had had their

wages cut by from thirty to fifty percent, "are at a ,loss to
understand how it happens that their fellow workmen across
the Atlantic earn more money than they do, live in more comfortable homes, and are altogether better fed and cared for,
and yet have never known the blessings of Free Trade. 1142
In 1872 the United States imported 1,224,144 tons of
iron and steel and their products, most of it from Great
Britain.

By 1875 these imports had declined to 141,079 tons. 4 3

In 1872 the United States had imported nearly 600,000 tons
of iron and steel rails; in 1877 a mere twelve tons. 44 This
reduced importation was partially the result of slackening
demand; the importation of rails, particularly, fluctuated
wildly in correspondence to the periodic railroad "booms."
But another major factor was the amazingly rapid growth of
the American iron and steel industry. 4 5 Vivian Hussey, after
42

60.

Ibid., 567-68.

4 3Bell, nThe Iron and Ste.el Trade," 89.
44Leffingwell, "Free Trade, from an American .Standpoint,"
4 5see above, 35-36..

64

touring the United States in 1877, reported that it was impossible that America should ever again rely on English iron
or stee1. 46 The iron-producing centers of England had,
according to the trade journal which spoke for the industry,
"lost foreign markets so effectually that our manufacturing
supremacy has well-nigh become a thing of the past."

Compe-

titors, European as well as American, were at work everywhere.
The British "see our legitimate markets in British colonies
encroached upon, and foreign works supplying railways, &c.
abroad, in competition with us, at far lower rates than they
supply their home railways, where our competition is nonexistent."
The United States was forcing out of its home market
not only British iron and steel in its basic state but also
the iron and steel products of certain skilled trades.

The

cutlery and hardware trades had brQught fame and prosperity
to Sheffield.

The Great Depression brought steadily rising

unemployment.

One of the causes: "Formerly, not a knife or

a pair of scissors could be found in the United States without the Sheffield stamp upon them.

Now such articles may

bear the Sheffield mark, but they are not made in Sheffield.
They are turned out of American workshopso" 4 ?
The great ironmaster, Lowthian Bell, was led by the
rapidly altering relation between the British and American
industries to raise the question:
4 ?Jennings, "English Trade and Foreign Competition,"
274-810

I
'

"
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If these rich and powerful States have placed themselves in a position to dispense from time to time,
in a great measure, with our assistance in supplying
the iron they consume, may we not fear that the day
may come when they will meet us in all the neutral
markets of the world, or even extinguish the furnaces of Cleveland and Cumberland, of Scotland and
of Yales?
Bell was consciously exaggerating; he believed that no such
thing was likely to happen so long as Britain was able to
obtain the raw materials of the industry at their present
cost.

But he did expect that in the future the United States
would command the markets of Canada and South America. 48
The English pottery industry, though less important
than textiles or iron and steel, was suffering a no less
serious depression caused by the loss of foreign markets.
At the same time, Jennings wrote,
In the United States, the manufacture of pottery
and porcelain is making rapid strides, and English
workmen will no doubt take an interest in learning
that the average remuneration of American pottery
operatives is fully one hundred per cent. in excess of the wages paid in Europe for the same class
of labour.
Even the young children employed in the American industry
earned wages that would seem attractive to Englishmen.
Protection was the national policy of the United States because, among other reasons, "the working men find that under
it they are much better off than English workmen are under
single-handed Free Trade. 1149
48 Bell, "The Iron and Steel Trade," 88.
4 9Jennings, "Fair Trade and British Labour," 574.
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The American policy of protection, according to Ecroyd,
affected Britain beyond reducing her exports and thus her
prosperity.

In effect, it allotted only the meaner labor

tasks to the British workman while his American counterpart
got the pleasanter and more artistic and higher-paid branches
of trade, since finished goods were charged a heavier duty
than semi-finished or unfinished ones.50
Even more important was the fact that the American policy led to harmful fluctuations in the British economy.
American iron duties were high enough to guarantee the growth
of American ironworks sufficient to meet ordinary American
demand.

When, however, American demand outstripped domestic

production as it frequently did during prosperous times,
large quantities of British iron could be sold in America
despite the heavy duties.

These exports stimulated British

capital investment, plant expansion, and wages not only in
the iron industry but in another basic British industry,
coal, as well.
short-lived.

But excess American demand was frequently
When demand fell again to the level of Ameri-

can production and British exports declined or disappeared
entirely, a very injurious reaction occurred throughout the
entire British economy.51 American protection, then, was a
major concern to the British even before the days of the
McKinley and Dingley tariffs.
50Ecroyd, "Fair Trade," 598-99.

51~.' 59?.
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-Canada

and the American Challenge

Canada played an important role in the British discussion
of the American challenge.
Britain were close.

Ties between Canada and Great

Canadian nationalism had a fairly long

history but the Act of Confederation of 1867 whic:1 set the
seal upon that nationalism was still a very recent event
when the Great Depression began.

Certain major events of

1879 served to make Canada a significant topic in the British
press.

That year brought the low point of the depression,

the emergence of the heated debate over British fiscal policy
which gave birth to the Fair Trade movement, and the passage
by Canada of a protective tariff which was

ai~ed

chiefly at

the United States but which affected Great Britain as well.52
Anthony Trollope had written that when one traveled from
the United States to Canada he passed "from a richer country
into one that is poorer, from a great country into one that
is less."

And, he continued (in Goldwin Smith's paraphrase

of his words), "You pass from a country embracing in itself
the resources of a continent, into one which is a narrow section of that continent cut off commercially from the rest;
you pass from a country which is a nation into a country
which is not a nation."53

Here, in this brief passage, was

52 For details of the interaction of the three countries,
see John Bartlet Brebner, North Atlantic Trian le: The InterElay of Canada, the United ta es and
ew ork:
Columbia University Press, 1945).
53Goldwin Smith, "The Political Destiny of Canada,"
Fortnightly, XXI n.s. (April, 1877), 454.
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the epitome of Canada's plight as it was seen by Goldwin
Smith.

In frequent articles in British and American (and

presumably Canadian also) periodicals, Smith carried on a
campaign for the union of Canada and the United States.

In

a Britain desparately concerned with the loss of external
outlets for its products, such talk was anathema.
Canada, Smith argued, could never become a nation in
the fullest sense.

As a political dependency of Great Bri-

tain, Canada was excluded from that which she most needed:
"free access to the markets of her own continent • • • • "
Since Canada was thus economically retarded, and since there
was no

mea.~ingful

outlet for Canadian nationalism and patri-

otism, most British emigrants went to the United States.
Even those who went to Canada often migrated eventually to
the United States, as did many native-born Canadians.

But

Smith professed to see that all this was changing and that
the ultimate union of Canada with the United States
appears now to be morally certain • • • • The filaments
of union are spreading daily • • • • Intercourse is
being increased by the extension of railways; the ownership and management of the railways themselves is
forming an American interest in Canada; New York is
becoming the pleasure, and, to some extent, even the
business, capital of Canadians; American wateringplaces are becoming their SUillliler resort; the periodical literature of the States, which is conducted
with extraordinary spirit and ability, is extending
its circulation on the northern side of the line;
and the Canadians who settle in the States are multiplying the links of family connection between the
two countries.
Smith justified the unification of the two countries on two
grounds: first, that it would be a great economic advantage
for Canada; and, secondly, it would be a great diplomatic
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advantage for Britain by introducing into American councils
an element quite friendly to Britain and thus offering the
greatest guarantee against Anglo-American waro54

However

much the British might have favored the rather intangible
benefits of the latter ground, they were only too well aware
that any economic advantage conferred upon Canada by the
unification of North America would be also a boon to the
United States and a disaster for Britain.
Canada's reciprocity agreement with the United States
had terminated in 1866.

Subsequently Canada was deluged

with the output oT America's burgeoning industrial system
while the United States closed its doors to certain of the
foods and raw material which made up the bulk of Canadian
exports.

The system of protective tariffs which Canada adop-

ted in 1879 was thus aimed chiefly at the United States.

But

the British were concerned that it would impede the flow of
British goods into Canada at a time when Britain needed all
the outlets she could find.

And British Free Traders were

greatly disturbed that Canada was setting so bad an example
at a time when the British Government was working diligently
to promote Free Trade throughout the world.
Canadians felt that, given the American economic invasion which they were facing, they had no choice but to adopt
protection.

~ney

found some support among those in England

who did not believe that protection was an economic heresy.
~ Ibid.,

458-59.

?O
As one of these Englishmen explained, industry grew and Canada prospered as never before during the American Civil War
when inf lated war-time prices served to keep Canadians from
buying American goods.

When the price deflation came, fol-

lowing the panics of 1873, the Americans attempted to maintain domestic prices while still disposing of the increasing
volume of products by one or both of the following devices.
They offered their wares in Canada at or below cost, at
prices as much as thirty percent below the prices charged
in the United States.

Some American manufacturers simply

demanded an outright payment, determined as a percentage of
Canadian sales, as the condition for their remaining out of
the Canadian market.

Canadian producers were helpless since

the American tariff kept them from entering the United
States on similar terms.55
Between the beginning of

depr~ssion

in 18?3 and 1878,

total Canadian foreign trade declined from $217,304,516 to
5170,523,244.
decline.

But imports from the United States did not

Notwithstanding the reduced purchasing power of

the Canadians and the lower prices of American goods, both
of which were the result of the depression, the value of
Canadian imports from the United States actually increased.
But since the Canadians were forced to reduce their purchase
of foreign goods by some means, the situation resulted in a
serious loss for British manufacturers.

The process can be

55n. :McCulloch, "Canadian Protection Vindicated," !2!:!nightly, XX.V n.s. (May, 1879), 756-57·

..
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seen clearly in the following set of figures:

Canadian Imports from
Great Britain ($)
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878

•••
•••
•••
•••
•••
•••

Canadian Imports from
the United States ($)
47,735,678
54,283,073
50,805,820
46,0?0,033
51,312,669
48,631,739

68,522,?76
63,076,437
60,347,067
40,734,260
39,572,239
37,431,180

The British did not need to worry that a Canadian tariff
might check British business.
"cleaning it out."

The Americans were already

In 1873 Britain contributed 54.52% of

all Canadian imports; by 1878 her share had fallen to 41.04%.
The American share of the Canadian trade meanwhile had risen
from 37.43% to 53.32%.

"If free trade England can no longer

compete with protected America in the Canadian market,"
asked one Englishmen, "why should anybody feel angry if
Canadians take measures to do it themselves? 11 56
It was not only the magnitude of American-Canadian trade
relations which worried the British but also the manifestations they saw, or professed to see, of the truth of Goldwin
Smith's assertions that the Americans were insinuating themselves into the structure of the Canadian economy.

In 1880

the Canadian Government was searching for a foreign loan
amounting toci{20,ooo,ooo in order to complete the Canadian
Pacific Railway.

According to George Anderson, London

56Ibid., 757-58.
~

...-'
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financiers were hesitant since Canada's national debt was
already too large in their estimation.

But there was fear

that the Americans, who had "a keen appreciation of possible
contingencies in the future," might be willing to advance
the money.

Among Americans, the "Monroe doctrine is not by

any means dead, and their hankering after the possession of
Canada is a desire that only waits for its opportunity. 11 5?
Anderson was greatly distressed by what he believed the
Garfield administration might undertake with respect to Canada.

He believed that "American statesmen of no mean influ-

ence" were preparing to persuade Canada by appropriate means-such as a loan of twenty millions--"to join in a Zollverein
with the United States, the effect of which, if indeed not
the chief object, would be still further to shut out British
trade from British territories."
Anderson cited letters, subsequently published as pamphlets, written to Garfield and others by Wharton Barker,
prominent Philadelphia banker and a major Garfield supporter.
Barker had written to Garfield that
we surely have a right to expect, in entering upon
closer commercial relations with [Canada], a substantial guarantee that she feeJ..s herself a part
of the great American continent, and is not ready
to lend herself to such glittering imperial schemes
as recently found favour in the Ministerial councils of the United Kingdom.
To Senator Brown of Canada Barker had suggested that "if the
two countries had a common tariff of duties, with the sea5?George Anderson, "The Future of the Canadian Dominion,"
Contemporary, XXXVIII (September, 1880), 401.
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board line as the only customs frontier. • •• it would make
us one people in the great work of developing the resources
of a new continent, and building up free, prosperous, and
happy communities in a new world."

"All far-seeing and

practical men on both sides of the border must see that
Canada cannot long remain in a state of commercial dependency
upon England, and that all her interests draw her to close
relations with the continent of which she is a part."

If

such quotes were not sufficient to alarm his readers, Anderson recalled for them the history of the German Zollverein
and charged that Barker had in mind that "Uncle Sam should
play the role of Prussia, and the Canadian provinces that
of the lesser German States. 11 58
Though a Canadian responded to these charges, branding
them exaggerated and dangerously misleading,59 Goldwin Smith
immediately re-entered the fray to insist that nothing should
please Great Britain more than a strong and prosperous Canada.

Such a condition could only be accomplished by the pur-

suit of natural economic operations.

Canada's natural com-

mercial relations were, and could only be, with the United
States. 1160
When, seven years after his observations of 187?, Smith

58ill£., 402-04.
59F. Hincks, "Commercial Union from a Canadian Point of

View," Fortnightly, XXIX n.s.

(May,

1881), 618-33.

60 Goldwin Smith, "The Expansion of England," Contem~orarz, XL (September, 1881), 378-?9, 389-98.
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once again surveyed the Canadian situation for British readers,
he believed that tendencies toward the unification of Canada
and the United States had grown even stronger.

The two

North American branches of the English-speaking race "are
actually fusing before one's eyes."

There were :i.ow more than

?00,000 Canadians in the United States.

They went there

to push their fortunes with just as little compunction as a Scotchman goes to England. When Canada
sets up a military college for the training of officers to command her troops against the Americans,
the first cadet who passes takes himself off to
practice as an engineer at Chicago.
Montreal, Canada's greatest commercial city, was closely
linked with the United States.
money market, replacing London.

New York was becoming Canada's
.American bank notes passed

so freely in Canadian commerce that "in fact, there is almost
a monetary uni on. 1161
It was sufficiently clear from such articles in the
British press, even if one makes allowances for rhetorical
exaggeration, that the economic expansion of the United
States militated against Britain's finding in Canada any
solution to her economic difficulties.
American Competition outside of North America
Speaking at Sheffield in 1878, Arthur Mundella told his
audience that "America is not only supplying her own country
with goods, but exporting her manufactures to such an extent
!..~,
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Goldwin Smith, "The Expansion of .England," ContemporXLV (April, 1884), 538.

75
that she had become a power.ful rival to England. 1162

In a

letter to The Times in 1879, a Colonel Wrottisley warned that
"the Americans have obtained the start of us • • • and unless
our manu.facturers stir themselves, the Americans will completely command the markets of Europe. 1163 In 1885, in a lecture at Southwark, Professor Thorold Rogers admitted that
American manufacturers could undersell the British in Africa
and the Germans in Belgium.

And to his charge that this was

accomplished through tariffs that meant higher prices for
American consumers came this reply from still another British observer of America:
The American tariff has almost killed the English
export trade to that country. Yet, Minnesota blankets are cheaper than the same quality of blankets
in England; steel rails are at this moment selling
there at 50s. a ton less than the Americans, a year
ago, paid for English rails; a few months ago the
great contract for steel rails for the Canadian
Pacific Railway was taken by an American firm (the
Scranton Company), over the heads of every English
competitor; and Colonel Wheatley writes, a .few
weeks ago, to the Pall Mall Gazette, that the
American farmer can buy a self-binding reaping
machine for ~33, while the English farmer has to
give .for the same thing (possibly a su~erior article, but he cannot get it more cheaply) no less
than .t60. 64

By the late 1870s the Americans were competing with British
manufacturers not only in the American and Canadian markets
but in the rest of the world as well, including Great Britain
62 Quoted in Leffingwell, "Free Trade, from an American
Viewpoint," 59.
6 3Ibid.
64
Roper Lethbridge, "Is an Imperial Fiscal Policy Possible?" 35-36.
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itself.
As noted earlier, Americans and others had found it easy
to establish the unsophisticated mills required to turn out
the cheaper grades of textiles.
~1so

But the Americans now were

competing, often successfully, with the British in the

more skilled manufacturing lines.

In 1877 the British Govern-

ment issued a Blue Book which contained the reports of the
British commissioners at the Philadelphia International Exhibition of 1876.

John Anderson, chairman of the judges of

machinery and tools, reported that
even among ourselves, at Philadelphia, it was impossible to resist the conclusion that a great change
is going on in the relative positions of different
countries at these machine gatherings • • • • One collection of (American) machine tools was without a
parallel in the history of exhibitions, either for
extent, money value, or for originality and mechanical perfection. The impression left upon the minds
of European visitors is that American competition in
machine tools will soon be upon us • • • • There is no
time to be lost if we mean to hold our own in the
hardware trade of the world.65
David McHardy, in his report on edge tools, said that
for years Sheffield supplied not only our own country but nearly all the world [with saws]. This monopoly remains with us no longer. • • .The American axe
has for many years displaced the axes imported from
Britain. They are now imported into this country.
It must be allowed that in table cutlery, tools, and
safes, America was before Great Britain. It would be
foolish not to recognize the fact that at Philadelphia, Great Britain was in face of her most powerful
rival in manufactures. A strenuous effort will be
required from Sheffield to hold its own in the race
of progress.66
6
5Quoted in Leffingwell, "Free Trade, from an American
Viewpoint," 59.
66 Ibid.
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American manufacturers continued to amaze the British
at the Paris Exhibition of 1878.

In a paper read before the

Royal Colonial Institute on the Paris Exhibition, Frederick
Young said that
in what they saw at Paris, British manufact11rers
must have acquired a keener appreciation of the
difficulties they have to encounter in main~ain
ing their former control of the markets of the
world. A leading manufacturer expressed himself
startled and alarmed by what he saw of the proofs
of successful rivalry on the part of the Americans, in the branches of his own trade.67
In 1887 the Americans boldly opened their industrial exhibition in London. 68 And Edward Atkinson reported that the
Americans were importing steel from Britain and exporting
the finished product to Sheffield. 6 9

However, Atkinson

warned his British readers that "the greatest danger to the
manufacturers of England will not be in our competition in
the sales of goods" but in the competition for skilled workers.

He believed the rapidly increasing American economic

demand would serve constantly to widen the gap between British and American wages and standards of living.70
The longer established American competition in textiles
continued to be a concern for the British.

American textile

exports increased from only £480,000 in 1872 to
in 1877.

~2,132,000

.America had become a significant factor in the

G7Ibid.
68 For a British comment on this, see above, 39.
6 9Atkinson, "An American View of American Competition,"
395. 70
Ibid., 3860
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international textile trade and was even selling goods in
Britain.71 "The competition of the United States is certainly, then, real.

It has not only virtually deprived us

of its 40,000,000 of people as customers, but it threatens
us with permanent active rivalry in outside markets."

A

concrete illustration is contained in a letter from a New
Orleans merchant who formerly had acted as a middleman in
the British trade with Mexico: "The manufacturers of cotton
goods in the United States have established for themselves
a monopoly of supplying the Mexican markets with their manufactures, to the exclusion of those made in Great Britain,
whezxethe supply had heretofore been derived. 11 7 2
The American Atkinson also had much to say to the British concerning textile competitiono

He offered as evidence

of the American industry's parity with the British the ability of the Americans to sell their wares in the markets of
Asia, Africa, and South America.

He denied British allega-

tions that this American competition was the result of lower
American wages in the industry73 or of American dumping.
The exported goods were made for the most part by strong and
prosperous corporations which paid regular dividends.

They

were produced by workers who received, at least in most
departments of the trade, wages equal to or above those paid
7l"The Lancashire Cotton-Strike," 501-03.
7 2 Ibid., 509.
73The author of "The Lancashire Cotton-Strike" had made
the charge; 509.

,
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in England.

The goods were sold in China, Africa, and South

America in payment for tea, silk, ivory, sugar, guns, hides,
and wool.

"This competition had been fairly begun before

the late war in this country, but it is now continued under
better conditions. 11 74
One obstacle to the global expansion of American commerce and industry was the woeful state of American shipping.
The Civil War had put an end to the American merchant marine
which had been one of the glories of the United States.

In

the post-war period, little or nothing had been done to revive it.

The situation is clearly expressed in the follow-

ing figures:?5

Percentage of World Maritime Carrying Power

Great Britain
United States

1850

1870

. 1880

41

44

49

15

8

6

However, there was constant discussion in American political circles of various schemes for the revitalization of
the American merchant marine.

The British realized that if

74 Atkinson, "An American View of American Competition,"
390-91.
75Michael G. Mulhall, "The Carrying-Trade of the World,"
Contemporary, XL (October, 1881), 611. For the rapid decline
of American shipping in Chinese ports between 1872 and 1879,
see Herbert Gil es, 11 The Present State of China," Fortnightly,
XXVI n.s. (September, 1879), 364-65; and Rutherford Alcock,
"China and Its Foreign Relations," Contemporary, XXXVIII
(December, 1880), 1018-19.
. ·
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this should occur American competition would become a still
greater challenge.

Moreton Frewen, a frequent visitor to

and sometime resident of the United States and a promoter of
grandiose but unprofitable American schemes, presented an
alarming report on the prospects and significance of an American shipping revival.

Reminding his readers that the British

sugar trade had been virtually destroyed as a result of
French and German governmental bounties to their native beet
sugar industries, Frewen predicted that the United States
would use its enormous and embarrassing surplus to subsidize
American industries which would compete directly with those
of Great Britain.

According to Frewen, Samuel J. Tilden had

recently suggested to his Democratic colleagues
that the surplus revenue could be most profitably
expended in bonusing the construction of a mercantile marine. Ten millions sterling thus invested
would transfer all the skilled labour of the Clyde
and the Tyne to the Hudson, and would destroy all
the fixed capital invested in British ship-yards;
and when this branch of native industry has succumbed, the next departure will be a heavy export
duty levied on American raw cotton, and a handsome
export bonus on all manufactured cotton goods.76
In the context of American industrial expansion and the
possibilities of the revival of American shipping, the completion of a Central American canal was a matter of some
importance for the British.

De Lesseps declared that

he had been struck with the immense advantages which
would accrue to the United States by the opening of

76 Moreton Frewen, "Displacement of Nations," quoted in

Penzance, "Collapse of the Free Trade Argument," 338-39.
Frewen did_not appear to believe that the constitutional
prohibition of export duties would stand in the way of his
predictiono
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an inter-oceanic canal. The first and most indisputable would .be the restoration, in a very short
time, of the supremacy to the American mercantile
marine which it possessed before the waro •• 77
Jeans, in his book on English supremacy, considered the
piercing of the Isthmus to be perhaps one of the great deterr..inants of the American future.

"No other equally limited

section of the world's surface," he said of the Isthmus,
"has held, or is likely to continue to hold, so great an
influence over the destinies of nations and the commerce of
mankind."

The completion of a canal would be of considerable

benefit to Europe which sent a "colossal and portentous"
amount of trade by way of Cape Horn, despite the fact that
the Suez Canal was open.

But it was to the United States

"that the opening of a water-way across the Isthmus of Panama
is likely to be of the greatest advantage and importance. 11 78
The length of the Cape route had retarded American trade
with Australasia, India, China, and Asia generally.

Yet,

despite such a disadvantage, American trade with those areas
had been advancing "with remarkable strides."

He noted that

the canal would link the United States and Australia, which
were "the countries of the future" because they possessed
unlimited resources and were populated by Anglo-Saxons with
energy and enterprise.

He noted the "rapid expansion of the

77Quoted in Edward Whymper, "The Panama Canal," Contemporarl, LV (March, 1889), 336. It should be noted that these
words were spoken when de Lesseps was in the United States
attempting to raise funds for his project.
78 Jeans, England's Supremacy, 189, 198.
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J.merican trade with the whole o:f the Paci:fic" and with those
Central American nations adjacent to the canal.

He concluded

that there was no "measurable limit to the possible growth
of trade in these regions."79
The completion of the canal, he predicted, would lead
to "the quicker and more substantial development of both the
continents of America and Asia, by abridging the distance
that now divides them."
At the present time England has the lion's share
of the world's trade • • • • It is, however, impossible, in the course of nature, that this supremacy can endure for all time • • • • The past was for
Greece and Rome, the present is for England, Germany, and France; the future is undoubtedly for
those countries that offer facilities for the development of commerce and industry, with which the
limited areas of Europe and the redundant population of these islands cannot successfully compete •
• • • The battle of the future must be to the strong,
and the time is not likely to be far off when the
sceptre of empire, of commerce, of wealth, and of
industry, will be largely, if not wholly joined
together by one or the other of the water-ways
that are 8ow being projected across the American
isthmus.8
The United States was already paramount in one of the
stepping-stones to the far Pacific.

According to one Bri-

tish observer, the Hawaiian Islands were "practically Americanised, and the dollar is the standard coin."

Hawaii was

of some importance since Honolulu was the only coaling station on the mail route between Auckland and San Francisco
and it was on a direct line between Vancouver and Fiji. 81

79ill£., 199.
80Ibid., 204, 206. C:f. the section below on the American
future,.especially the preaiction of George Thomas Bettany.
Blc. Kinloch Cooke, "Europe in the Pacific," Nineteenth
Century, XX (November, 1886), 742, 745.
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According to another, Britain's Pacific possessions had suddenly found "themselves face to face with the Great Powers
of the world.

The United States in Samoa, France at the

New Hebrides, and Germany in New Britain, have, in a few
months, come to physical touch of our Australian Colonies.a82
Year by year Australia did less business with England
and more with America, because American manufacturers were
careful to accomodate the needs of their customers and the
British were not. 8 3 In 1884 New South Wales had experienced
a considerable increase in foreign trade.

But, whereas

imports from Great Britain increased by 117%, those from the
United States increased by 389%. 84 A resident of the Empire
wrote that British
manufacturing supremacy has been shaken. She is
now suffering from foreign competitors. Even in
those "lines" that were considered pre-eminently
her own--iron manufactures--rival nations are encroaching on her. An American contractor can obtain the erecting of the largest bridge south of
the Line--the Hawkesbury bridge in New South Wales
--at something like 37,000i below the English tenders. He can take some of the steel from Scotland
to the United States, manufacture it there, erect
it at the Antipodes cheaper than English engineers. 85
The same kind of competition was occurring in New Zealand.
82 George Baden-Powell, "Our National Future," National,
IV (February, 1885), 767.
8 3Robert J. Griffiths, "New Markets for British Industry," Quarterl;z, CLXIII (July, 1886), 170-71.
-84Quoted in Leth.bridge, "Is an Imperial Fiscal Policy
Possible?" 34.
8 5Robert Stout, "A Colonial View of Im:perial Federa··
tion," Nineteenth Century, XXI (March, 1887), 357.
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The United States Consul at Auckland reported that "American
implements and American machinery are everywhere superseding
86
English. "
Such reports,"and scores more might be collected within
a few months" it was said, all seemed to indicate "a contrac-

tion, more or less serious and permanent, of our trade" with
the neutral markets of the world where the United States and
Great Britain competed on an equal basis. 8 7 The British
were facing the American challenge not only in the United
States, where American manufacturers enjoyed a protected
market, and not only in Canada, where the Americans had the
advantage of proximity, but all over the globe.
The American Future
The discussion of already existing American competition
in the British press between 1873 and 1889 provided a basis
for even stronger predictions of the American challenge of
the future.

Many of the viewpoints already considered con-

tained strong implications, explicit or implicit, that the
American challenge could only become more severe.

Serious

doubts about the future of American competition were rare
and these came chiefly from Americans.

We have already en-

countered Carnegie's assertion that En.gland need not fear
real competition for many generations, not until the United

35.

86Lethbridge, "Is an Imperial Fiscal Policy Possible?"
8 7Ibid.
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states was as densely populated as Europe and wages declined. 88
But Jeans thought it likely that there would be a labor glut
in the United States in the not-too-distant future.

If

that should occur and if, as a result, wages did decline,
he wrote, "then it is more than probable that we shall have
to accomodate ourselves to a very much keener rivalry in
neutral markets, on the part of our American competitors."
Such intense rivalry would be a most serious thing for Britain because the United States was "the most important industrial nation after England herself. 1189

But the American

Atkinson wondered, as Carnegie did, whether Britain really
needed to be alarmed:
May it not perhaps be in the order of things
that our competition with England in supplying neutral markets with manufactured goods, will be warded
off by the home demand on our mills and workshops to
supply the needs of one of the great tidal waves of
population that seems about to b~ directed upon our
shores from foreign lands •• ~ .~o
The typical British view of things, however, did not
minimize the extent of future competition.

There were those

who insisted "that it would indeed be rash to place a limit
upon her capabilities in the remote future • • • • [But] so
long as the United States adhere to a strictly protective
commercial policy we are safe."9l
88
8

396.

Such a view was quite

see above, 45-46.

9Jeans, England's Supremacy, 187-88, 213.

90A.tkinson,

11

An American View of American Competition,"

91Henderson,"England and America as Manufacturing Com-

petitors," 460-61.
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common during the fiscal debate initiated by the Fair Trade
movement.

Even in the middle and latter part of the 1880s,

by which time substantial evidence of competition had been

publicized, the view continued to be expressed, by Jeans and
others, that England had to fear a really dangerous competition only when the United States abolished protection.9 2 As
late as 1888 Lyon Playfair felt able to write: "If the United
states alter its Protection policy, and become a Free Trade
nation, it will be our great competitor in the world, though
the time is not close at hand. • • • "

Though he pointed "to

the United States as the great industrial nation of the future • • • • Luckily, her Protection policy is an incubus upon
her industry, and gives us breathing time to prepare for the
coming struggle. 119 3
But others, prominent Free and Fair Traders alike, were
not so complacent.

The Cobdenite Brassey insisted that

It is not from the cheap labour of Belgium, as the
writers of the manifestoes from time to time issued
by the associations of employers would have us believe, but from the dear, yet skilful and energetic
labour of the United States, that the most formidable
competition will hereafter arise.
Gladstone had been correct when he had predicted that commercial supremacy would pass from the United Kingdom to the
United States.

"That the United States must hereafter command
a dominant position is certain," Brassey concluded.94
92Jeans, England's Su~remacy, 97-98; F. Bulkeley Johnson,
"English Supremacy in the .t;ast, 11 493-94.

··
93Lyon Playfair, "The Progress of Applied Science in Its
Effect upon Trade," Contemporary, LIII (March, 1888), 371.
94Brassey, "Depression of Trade," 801-02.
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The Fair Trader Ecroyd wrote of the United States exulting in "its future industrial and commercial greatness,"95
while his ideological colleague, Jennings, was more specific:
Foreign competition will not become less keen as
years go by, nor will the world be disposed to leave
a monopoly of its markets to English manufacturers.
Trades which we once controlled will fall into
other hands, and t~ere will again be that "shifting
of industries" which the philosophers assure us is
all that is going on.96 But it is to other lands
that the industries will be shifted. Cotton manufactures will be cultivated asiduously by Germany
and the United States, and the day will certainly
come when the only transport of cotton required
will be from the fields where it is grown across
the road to the mills where it is worked up. Already
the Americans have erected cotton-mills at Chicago,
and nothing but the temporary want of capital prevents
the extension of the industry to the south and southwest. Manchester and Oldham will find out, as Bradford has done, that there is a form of foreign competition against which, with open ports here and clQsed
ports everywhere else, it is impossible to fight.~?
Jeans, despite his belief that America's protective system hampered its ability to compete, could not forget "the
infinitely greater resources of America," in terms of agriculture, mineral wealth, and population.

"The American Repub-

lic has, taking the capacity of her land into view, as well
as its mere measurement, a natural base for the greatest continuous empire ever established by man. • • .The development
which the Republic has effected has been unexampled in its
rapidity and force."
95Ecroyd, "Fair Trade," 604.
9 6 The reference is to Courtney, "The Migration of Centres of. Industrial Energy."

9?Jennings, "Fair Trade and British Labour," 584-85.
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America has increased her wealth fully tenfold within
the forty years under review. England has little
more than doubled her wealth in the same interval.
Basing our expectations for the future on the analogy of the past, it is evident that, as regards
wealth, England will soon cease to be in the running with her precocious offspring. And not England alon~~ but the whole of Europe must be so overshadowed. "'J
More strongly worded, and perhaps the most alarmist
analysis of the American challenge to appear in the British
press between 1873 and 1889, was George Thomas Bettany's
article, ttEurope versus the United States: A Darwinian Forecast."

Its thesis was that Bettany's generation was witness-

ing two great struggles, one for supremacy, and in fact for
separate political existence, on the continent of Europe;
the other between Europe and the United States for world
supremacy."

w"hile the dramatic aspects of the armaments

competition kept attention focused on the Continental struggle,
we forget, or do not believe in, the future probable transfer of supremacy to the United States. We
do not imagine that any open struggle can ever take
place between the Old and the New World Powers • • • •
The struggle may be slow, silent, unseen in its larger aspects, but it is inevitable; and one day it
is very possible that Europe--nay, even Great Britain--may awake to realize that the destinies of
the world no longer depend on this quarter of the
globe, but on the younger, stronger, more vigorous
United States.99
He made it clear that he did not necessarily mean military
conflict, but he was convinced that some kind of struggle
98 Jeans, .England's Supremacy, 408-09, 418.
99George Thomas Bettany, "Europe versus the United States:
A Darwinian Forecast," Contemporary, LIII (March, 1888), 39596. Cf. the much more benign view of The Americanisation of
the W'Orld which Stead wrote in 1901, below, 353-3~.
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was bound to occur.

And it made no difference whether Europe

grew moderately or declined in numbers, wealth, and skill.
In any case "a keen struggle of some kind in the f'uture must
result from the extraordinarily rapid growth of the United
states in population and wealth, with every sign of long
continuance.

In less than a century it appears probable

that the United States will number as many inhabitants as
non-Russian Europe.

Its future wealth we can hardly guess

at; but in a century it may not improbably exceed that of
the whole of Europe."
Courtney's "The Migration of Centres of Industrial
Energy" had demonstrated clearly, contended Bettany, that
as the appearance of new sources of energy, new ideas, and
new techniques had given the advantage in the past first to
one people and then to another, so it would be in the future.
At the present point in time it was the United States which
'·

was expanding its capabilities at the greatest rate.
whelp of former days has become a lion.
claim to be treated as a lion • • • • "

"The

It will certainly
Europeans are compla-

cent, believing that the vastness of the United States will
absorb American energies.
I believe that when the popula.tion of the United
States has increased for another century, there
will have arisen a struggle for existence which will
put past struggles into the shade. The Americans
will be swarming everywhere, not merely on their
own continent, but all over the world, seeking to
establish themselves, demanding rights and privileges, and in the end perhaps gaining the mastery
over portions of the Old World.
Should his readers think that he exaggerated, let them look

90
at what the Americans were already doing.

The American de-

mand for the annexation of Canada was heard again and again.
Look at the influence of American protective tariffs on British and European manufactures. Look
at the spreading influence of the United States in
the Pacific Islands. Look at the exclusion of
pauper immigrants, which is in itself a remarkable
evidence of strength, and may easily be changed
into a regulation that every immigrant shall possess
a certain amount of property; thus establishing a
most disastrous influence to make the European
States poorer, and to extract from them the richer
and more vigorous people.100
Was there any remedy?

At this point his readers rea-

lized that Bettany was making a plea for imperial

federatio~.

If there were any remedy, it lay in the establishment of
some new countervailing power.

A European federation he

placed even farther into the future than American supremacy,
though he recognized that in time common danger might produce
European union. 101 "But the most valuable and influential
answer to the whole question would to my mind be the development of a British confederation • • • • Thus, and thus only,
can a second Power arise capable of balancing the United
States." 102
"The old giants are becoming worn out, and the young
giant is growing yet more gigantic • • • • "

But, "while

Europe may go to decay, and may even become almost the vassal

f
[

lOOibid., 396-402.
lOlThis interesting forecast was nearly realized; at the
turn of the century there were discussions by continental
states of a pan-European economic union against.the United
States.

102~.' 404.
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of the United States," a confederated British Empire could,
by wise legislation, establish the necessary conditions for

prosperity and grow as rapidly as the United States in population and wealth.
such a

confederatio~

Yet Bettany held out little hope that
could be established in the near future.

Reading history aright, we see how the cent1·e of
gravity of human affairs has again and again shifted
.from the East westwards .from Assyria, Phoenicia,
and Egypt, to Greece and Rome, .from Rome to Paris,
.from Paris to London; and it may be destined to
shift yet farther west to Washington, unless some
more remarkable change than we &t present foresee
should keep it on this side of the Atlantic.103
This note of struggle which Bettany sounded so strongly
was to find many echoes in Britain in the years from 1890
to 1906.

The years 1890-1897 were associated in the minds

of those who kept careful watch of American activities with
the names of McKinley and Dingley, and there were frequent
references to the tariff "war" which the United States was
waging against its competitors.
{

And from 189? to 1906,

during which time American global influence spread more
rapidly than ever, there were many in Great Britain who believed they were experiencing on their own soil an "American
invasion."

405.

PART

II

THE CHALLENGE OF THE AMERICAN MARKET, 1890-189?

CHAP.rER III
THE CHALLENGE OF "MCKINLEYISM"
Introduction
The depths of the Great Depression had been reached in
1879·

Then, after some years of improvement, another low

point was reached in 1885.

From 1886, however, the British

economy seemed to be making progress once again.

The barom-

eter of that progress continued to be the movements in foreign trade.

As Gladstone had maintained in 1880, so The

Times professed in 1893: nFor English trade the best measure,
after all, is the table of annual exports and imports." 1
British exports in particular had shown very satisfactory
growth, increasing from .t213,600,ooo in 1886 to nearly
t264,000,000 in 1890.

This 1890 figure was a record for

Great Britain, exceeding by some

~6

millions the previous

record which had been set in the last pre-Depression year,
18?2. 2
1 The Times, leading article, January 25, 1893, 9.
2 sources for such readily available figures as total exports will not generally be given. Along with much other
useful information, these data were published each year in
1he Economist's "Conunercial History & Review" (hereafter cited
as Com. History [yearJ), published annually as a supplement
to The Economist in mid-February. The Times published a comprehensive but much briefer account during the first week
of the new year. Such important data as total export figures
were also, of course, widely referred to in the British press
throughout the year.
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A significant factor in this improvement of British foreign trade was the increased purchase of British manufactured
goods by Americans.3

Both The Times and The Economist acknow-

ledged and frequently reminded their readers of the interdependence of the British and the American economies.

The Times

pointed out previous economic recoveries which had been caused
by increased American demand for British products 4 and ~
Economist, in commenting on the improved export situation,
noted that "we find the United States again figuring conspicuously. "5
customer. 6

The United States was, in fact, Britain's best
British exports to the United States were growing

faster than total British exports in the late 1880s; in 1890
they exceeded

~32,000,000.

Into this Great Britain of 1890, hopeful that the Great
Depression was finally over and keenly aware of the important
role which the United States played in maintaining British

.

prosperity, came the threat posed by the McKinley Tariff Act •
This piece of

legislat~on

ican tariff.

It not only raised many duties which the Bri-

was more than simply another Amer-

tish already considered quite high still higher, but it
3The Times, January 24, 1890, 13.
4 Ibid.
5The Economist, "Monthly Trade Supplement" (hereafter
cited as MTS), February 1, 1891, 1. The MTS was published
the second Saturday of each month.
6 This was frequently commented upon; see, for example,
The Times, June 7, 1890, 8; and April 20, 1891, 5; J. Stephen
Jeans, 11 The American Tariff--Its Past and Future," Fortnightlz,
LIII n.s. (December, 1892), ?55; and the Com. History annua~ly.

l.
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contained provisions for establishing reciprocity treaties
with foreign nations and it gave the American President
broad discretionary powers of retaliation against countries
whose economic policies he considered inimical to the interests of the United States.
A new word, "McKinleyism," entered the English language.
As it was used by many in the British press, "McKinleyism"
connoted a new American posture, one of supreme economic confidence, of independence, and. perhaps of defiance toward
England.

It continued in use long after the McKinley Act

itself had been replaced in 1894.

McKinley himself stated

the challenge clearly enough in his American speeches which

..

were widely reported, frequently verbatim, in the British
press following the passage of the Act.

"Thirty years of

protection have brought us," claimed McKinley in 1891, "from
the lowest to the highest rank of industrial progress."

Pro-

tectionist America had the lowest per capita debt in the
world, having reduced it from $76 to $20 in twenty years.
The taxation of the American people had declined by nearly
10% between 1870 and 1880 while that of the British, under
Free Trade, had increased by more than 24%.

Opponents of

protection charged that it enriched the few and impoverished
the many, yet wealth in England was far more concentrated in
the hands of the few than in the United States.

The purpose

of· the new tariff was, according to McKinley, to foster still
greater industrial expansiono

American "free trade builds

factories in Europe, protection builds factories in the United

,,..--
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states."

Under a protective system which encouraged Ameri-

cans to manufacture what they had previously imported,
McKinley believed the United States was destined to lead the
world.?
There were Englishmen who found the McKinley Act admirable and worthy of emulation. 8 Most Englishmen thought it
unwise and some considered it dangerous as well.
could ignore it.

But no one

As one interested observer of "McKinleyism"

wrote:
The passage of the McKinley Tariff Act by the
United States Congress, the efforts which are being
made by [Secretary of State] Blaine to bring the
South American States and Canada into a commercial
federation with the Republic, the "Retaliation Act,"
and a variety of other circumstances, have all combined to summon the English people once more to
consider the conditions under which the trade of
their country is being carried on.9
Passage of the McKinley Act set off a great wave of discussion in England similar to that which had taken place at
the end of the 1870s, when the Fair Traders had first begun
to measure Britain's progress against that of protectionist
America.

This chapter will examine several different aspects

?The Times, February 14, 1891, ?; August 24, 1891, 3;
November 2, 1892, 5; and leading article, June 22, 1891, 9.
8 see the letter praising the results of American protection written by the prominent protectionist C. E. Howard Vinc~nt, to The Times, October 15, 1890, 7.
Many of the authors
cited below also noted low American taxation, high wages and
standard of living, etc. This was an important aspect of
British protectionist comment on the United States both before and after 1890 but space does not permit any detailed
examination.
··

9L. J. Jennings, "The Trade League against England,"
!_ineteenth Century, XXVIII (December, 1890), 901.
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of the more immediate British response to the McKinley Act.
But long after the initial wave of debate diminished after
1892, "McKinleyism" continued to occupy a central role in
British discussions of the American challenge.
It is the thesis of Part II that the aspect of the American challenge which most alarned the British between the
McKinley Tariff of 1890 and the Dingley Tariff of 189? was
the actual or threatened loss of substantial portions of the
lucrative American market.

This loss, which will be exam-

ined in Chapter IV, the British attributed primarily to"McKinleyism" in the form of protective tariffs, constant disruptive talk of tariff revision, and tariff-aggravated depressions.

By the latter 1890s, however, the British could no

longer ignore the fact that another significant cause of
British losses in the American market was the increasing
ability of the

Unit~d

States to satisfy its own industrial

needs, and this will be examined in Chapter V.

The influence

of "McKinleyism" will be apparent in these chapters and further ramifications will be seen in Part III, which deals
with the emergence of American global competition.
Grim Expectations
In the latter part of the 1880s, the theme of international
struggle and competition had received prominent attention
in the British press.

At that time the notion may or may

not have been taken as seriously as analysts such as Kropotkin and Bettany may have wished.

It is quite possible that
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many readers dismissed such notions as pessimistic fantasies
or as at least exaggerations.

How.ever, when the McKinley

Act was passed, many in England were in fact quick to interpret the American action as one of aggression, as the launching of an international struggle in the form of commercial
~arfare.

Those who in the past had predicted a coming strug-

gle might well have felt justified as they turned the pages
of the British press between mid-1890 and mid-1892.
English Cobdenites were accustomed to emphasizing the
capacity of international trade for bringing about cooperation and peace.

Hence, Lyon Playfair and others blamed Amer-

icans for re-introducing the reactionary notion that international trade was in fact a form of competition or even of
belligerency.

They publicly deplored speeches given in

defense of the McKinley Bill such as that of William Evarts
which contained the following passage: "Sir, let us understand that with us, in our system and age of civilization,
trade between nations stands for war in a sense never to be
overlooked, and never to be misunderstood. 1110
The Americans, however, had no monopoly of such notions.
Fair Traders had long been trying to convince fellow Englishmen that trade and fiscal policy were elements of the international competition for supremacy.

Outside the ranks of the

Fair Traders similar views could be found.

Lord Salisbury,

lOPlayfair's speech which contained the Evarts quote
was reported in The Times, November 14, 1890, 3-4.
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speaking before the Manchester Chamber of Commerce at the
low point of the Great Depression, had referred to foreign
commercial treaties which acted as impediments to British
trade as acts of "fiscal war."

"War is a bad thing;• he had

said, "but it is our only way of defending ourselves against
this wrong.

\.1hy

is it wrong to do it in dealing with your

fiscal matters, as well as in any other international relation?"ll

Again after the passage of the McKinley Act, this

time speaking at the Guildhall, Salisbury identified trade
with war and charged that the protectionist nations of the
world used tariffs as weapons. 12 The Free Traders in England, too, were quick to accept pronouncements such as that
of Evarts at face value and to believe that America had declared economic war.

According to The Times, for example,

there was no doubt that the new American legislation was an
act of hostility:
The new tariff is a war measure • • • • Nor is its
character in this respect disguised by its promoters. It is within the power of the American government to carry out such a measure, just as it is
within its power to declare war on a friendly
State, but let there be no mistake about the nature
of the former policy any more than about the latter. 13
This intensity of the British reaction was attributed
by A. N. Cumming, one of the controversialists in the debate
which the McKinley Act provoked, to the fact that Britain
llQuoted in A. Williamson, British Industries and ForCompetition (London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Ken t
o., Ltd., 1894), 215.
12 The Economist, November 15, 1890, 1439.

ei~n

l

l3The Times, leading article, October 3, 1890,

?.
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had "again been rudely

awakened~:f'rom

her dogmatic slumbers"

following a brief period of prosperity and complacency.
Since the very depressed year 1885, Britain's foreign trade
had increased appreciably and, he claimed, "the average man
has been content to let sleeping dogs lie.

To that is really

due the seeming indifference of the press and public" to the
new policy that had taken shape in the United States. 14
It was simply not true that the British press had ignored
the McKinley Bill until it was passed and that the British
people had been presented with a fait accompli, as Cummings
charged.

The Economist had kept its readers regularly and

thoroughly informed from the time the House Ways and Means
Committee had begun to hold hearings on tariff revision.
Its United States correspondent had provided a weekly commentary on the Bill as it passed through Congress and The
Economist had devoted a substantial portion of its April
"Monthly Trade Supplement" to summarizing the alterations
thus far proposed in the most important tariff scheduleso 1 5
Neither had The Times ignored the impending tariff
changes.

In leading articles, in reports from its corres-

pondents in the United States, and in a multitude of news
reports, it had warned its readers of the harm the proposed
14A. N. Cumming, "America and Protection," National, XVI
(October, 1890), 370.
1 5see The Economist, MTS, January, 1890, 9; MTS, April,
?-11; and the reports filed each week (with only occasional
exceptions,) by the American correspondent between January and
October. The Economist printed, in parallel columns, the full
text of thP- McKinley ~ariff alongside the old rates in the
MTS, October, 1-13.
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tariff was capable of causing.

The following extracts from

leading articles published prior to the passage of the Mc
Kinley Bill illustrate The Times' concern:
British industry will have small reason to be
thankful for the new tariff if it is passed. It
will press with special heaviness upon some localities, such as Shiffield. That is the intention
of its authors.16
In 1889 manufactured goods were imported into the
United States to a total value of $52,681,482, and
paying a duty of $35,373,627. The new rate is calculated to yield revenue of more than fifty-eight
million dollars, the average rise being 67.15 per
cent. to upwards of 91 per cent. Yorkshire will
suffer [from the increased duties on woolens] by
the curtailment of American demand.17
It is clear, then, that the British had no reason to
be taken by surprise by the McKinley Tariff.

Nevertheless,

as Cumming more correctly alleged, Great Britain had been
"rudely awakened."

To the typical Englishman, Cumming wrote,

protection in the guise of Fair Trade had in the late 1880s
seemed a "mere foible, the fad of a few directly interested
or sorely hit."

Then suddenly, with the enactment of the

McKinley Tariff, it dawned on him that protectionist America
"is now established as the most prosperous of nations," the
American workingman is blessed with a higher standard of
living than his British counterpart, and America is "competing
with England for the industrial supremacy of the world • • •
[and] in many departments they are already ahead of us."
That Free Trader, he concluded, "has little grasped the facts
16The Times, leading article, August 19, 1890, 7.
1 7The Times, leading article, September 29, 1890, 9.
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of the situation who does not see that a wholly new set of
problems, undreamt of by Bright and Cobden, are now presented
to his view. "18
The new problems mentioned by Cum.ming and the re-examination of the conditions under which British trade was carried on requested by Jennings filled the British press with
controversial writings for nearly two years.

The early evi-

dence of the effects the new tariff was having on British
trade was anything but conclusive 1 9 and much of the literature was stroigly opinionated and rhetorical.

The strongest

and most dramatic theme to appear was the notion, alluded to
above, that the McKinley Tariff was an act of hostility, the
opening gambit of a commercial war.

In addition to the unam-

biguous statements of Lord Salisbury and of The Times already
mentioned and the similar statements which continued to
appear in that newspaper, British periodicals published articles bearing titles such as "The American Tariff \Jar" and
"The Trade League against England."

Even essays with the

soberest of titles said of the McKinley Act that "its operation must be equivalent to a commercial war. 1120
There was no doubt in most British minds that the McKinley Act had been aimed directly at them.

As The Times edi-

torialized:
18cumm.ing, "America and Protection," 370-71, 373-740
1 9see the following chapter.
20w. H. Hurlbert, "The Fiscal System of the United States,"
F.dinburgh, CLXXIII (January, 1891), 292.
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Ye are entitled to say, then, that the blow aimed
at British industry by the M'Kinley Tariff is an
entirely unprovoked act of unfriendliness, which
must be recognised as such. • • .No reason can be
assigned for it except a desire on the part of
politicians in power to inflict injury on British
interestso21
Not all British observers believed that the new tariff
indicated that Americans were personally hostile toward the
British, but it was nearly universally seen as a tactic in
the American bid for world economic supremacy.

Great Britain

was the acknowledged great power of the economic world and
it was necessarily at Great Britain that the American challenge had to be hurled.

An English critic of "McKinleyism"

wrote of the tariff that "there is no doubt but that it was
specially directed at England--America's largest customer
and her greatest competitor. 1122 Protectionists shared this
view.

One wrote to The·' Economist that the McKinley Tariff

would clearly do more hRrm to Britain than to any other
country. 2 3 Another insisted that "to damage our industrial
interests" had been one o:f the objects of those who :framed
the tarif:r. 24 The Fair Trade leader, W. Farrer Ecroyd,
wrote to The Times that "the M'Kinley Tariff is a heavy blow
21 The Times, leading article, October 3, 1890, ?.
22Robert Donald, "McKinleyism and the Presidential Election," Contemporary, LXII (October, 1892), 492.
2 3William J. Harris, letter to The Economist, March 28,
1891, 409-10; additional letters from Harris appeared April
11 and 18.
·
24Frederick Greenwood, "Free Trade, a Variable Experiment," National, XX (November, 1892), 318.
'
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struck alike at our home industries and at the prosperity
and independence of Canada--an unprovoked aggression, an
attempt at conquest by fiscal warfare. 02 5 The Canadian protectionist, Sir Charles Tupper, complained that, while in
1890 the British purchased .t97,000,000 worth of .American
products, allowing them to enter free of any duty and in
competition with British products, the United States purchased in return a mere ;/;32,000,000 worth and took the balance
in cash.

But, he continued, they were not even satisfied

with this immensely favorable trade balance.

"They sat down

and constructed the McKinley Tariff to see how much they could
reduce the

~32,000,000,

and by one stroke of the pen they

knocked off, by that tariff, 10 per cent. of that ~32,000,000." 26
The grim forebodings for the future which the McKinley
Tariff evoked in many quarters in England amounted to a sort
of siege mentality.

The silent weapon of protective duties,

operating from afar, was going to wreak havoc in Great Britain.

As The Times editorialized:
The more the anticipations of its authors are realized
the more will it restrict the demand for skilled labour in the industries of this country. If it does
not throw British artisans out of work and permanently
cripple the manufactures on which they depend, no
thanks will be due to the majority of the Congress
at Washington. 27

,,
~'

~.

2 5w. Farrer Ecroyd, letter to The Times, October 20,
1890, 3. For Canada and "McKinleyism 11 see Part III.
26 charles Tupper, "The Question of Preferential Tariffs," Fortnightly,LIII n.s. (August, 1892), 141.
2 7The Times, leading article, October 3, 1890, ?.
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"throws new and serious obstacles round the attempts of our
manufacturers and traders to get their goods into the United
states" by establishing troublesome and complex regulations
for labeling, invoicing, and related matters and setting
costly penalties for their violation.

While Britain freely

accepted all that America offered, "at the same time, all
the ingenuity of the Americans is devoted to the work of
keeping our goods out of their markets."3 2
Above all, of course, it was the level of protection
established in the various tariff schedules which was the
greatest concern to British observers.

"No such revolutionary

fiscal law enacted by a great commercial power could have
been without its effect on the trade of the world.

It was

an obstruction in the avenues of commerce which had to be
overcome, or compensating outlets found."33

It was directed

not only against England but "against any country which produces and desires to exchange for the products of the United
States commodities which can possibly under the stimulus of
legislative bounties be produced in the United States."34
Some saw the McKinley Tariff as not really protective
at all, but as "practically prohibitive."35

Its intent "un-

doubtedly was, and is, to exclude Europe as a producer and
3 2Jennings, "The Trade League against England," 909-10.
33nonald, "McKinleyism and the Presidential Election," 492.
34 Hurlbert, "The Fiscal System of the United States," 2920
35Cumming, "America and Protection," 377.

i: •.
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vendor from the American markets • • • • It is a Non-Intercourse
Bill."3 6 The McKinley Tariff "must inevitably have the effect
of cutting off some classes of our exports altogether. 11 37
There was fear that such English staple exports as jute, cotton goods, and woolen goods could no longer be shipped to the
United States just as

so~n

as the Americans could expand their

own mills, for. the duties on such articles represented "complete prohibitiono" 38
Even when the new tariff was considered to be less than
prohibitive there was extensive concern that the decline of
British exports to America would be substantial.

"It is safe

to anticipate as the result of the increased tariff under
discussion that we shall for the future sell more British goods
to Australia than to the United Stateso"39

There were those

who believed that tariffs generally and very high tariffs
particularly impaired a nation's purchasing power.

These

feared that "through the diminished consuming power of the
American people every branch of industry in Great Britain
will be affected, even those which produce articles uninfluenced directly by the McKinley Bill. 1140

The Economist pro-

fessed to care less whether the Americans had a higher tariff or a lower one than that they should have a stable tariff.
36 Hurlbert, "The Fiscal System of the United ·states," 285-86.
37Jennings, "The Trade League against England," 903.
3BA. Egmont Hake and O. E. Weslau, "The American Tariff
Yar," Fortnightly, XLVIII n.s. (October, 1890), 5680
39Moreton Frewen, "The National Policy of the United
States," .!,ortnightly, XL VIII nos. (November, 1890), 677.
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American correspondent provided ample evidence that the
lengthy Congressional debates over the McKinley Bill had
badly disrupted the import trade.

While awaiting the legis-

lative outcome, merchants hesitated to make new commitments.
Then, once it was clear that duties would be raised substantially, there was a frantic rush to accumulate the largest
possible stocks of goods before the tariff should take effect.
Neither constant hesitancy nor violent fluctuations was good
for healthy commercial relations and The Economist deplored
the fact that in the United States the tariff was such a constant public question.

It interpreted the Democratic victo-

ries in the Congressional elections of 1890 as a repudiation
of "McKinleyism," yet The Economist was not elated for it
saw these elections as merely prolonging a state of suspended
animation in the United States until fiscal policy lines
become clearero

The period 1890-1897 provided The Economist

with one continuous opportunity to preach to the Americans
the gospel of stability. 41
The new tariff was expected to have an especially severe
effect on Britain's basic industries, textiles and metals.
There were predictions that it would hurt the Belfast linen
industry so severely that it would lead to the closing down
of many firms. 42

Yorkshire anticipated a serious decline in

41 For illustrations of these points see particularly
§he Economis·t, MTS, June, 1890, 759; MTS, October,l; November
, 1407-08; and MTS, November, 4-5. Similar examples can be
found appearing with great frequency between 1890 and 1897.
42Th e T.imes, June 2, 1890, 11.
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the export of its woolens to the United Stateso 4 3

The numer-

ous textile industries which centered around Bradford expected to be hard hit.

One Bradford manufacturer estimated

that the American trade in Bradford goods would decline by
44
from 20 to 33%.
The McKinley Tariff, predicted The Times, would reduce
British exports of iron and steel and their manufactures
generally and would "almost annihilate the tin-plate industry of South Wales," since three-fourths of all the tin-plate
that Britain produced was shipped to the United States,
chiefly for the canning of foodso 4 5 Birmingham, perhaps Britain's premier manufacturing center, worried considerably
over the new tariff "which threatens to inflict a heavy blow
on more than one local industry.
trade will be serious and

far-reaching.~'

stated that the American trade in
sented

~2,000

Its effect on the local gun
One manufacturer

~irmingham

guns had repre-

a week but that, since the new tariff had come

under consideration, the trade had "fallen off completely."
Another gunmaker expected the McKinley Tariff would cost
Birmingham i60,000 a year.

The Birmingham trade in metal

bedsteads with the United States had grown rapidly in the
late 1880s despite a 35% tariff.

Five or six firms had been

sending nearly.i30,000 worth of iron and brass bedsteads a
4 3The Times, leading article, September 29, 1890, 9.
44 Jennings, "The Trade League against England," 903-04.
4
5The Times, June 2, 1890, 11.
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year to America.

It was expected that most of this would be

lost.

"In the pearl industry nearly half the orders will be
lost by the virtual closing of the United States market. 1146
No town, however, had more to fear than Sheffield. 4 ?
The Sheffield cutlery trade with the United States amounted to
~30,000

a month and nearly 2,500 people were employed solely

in the American branch of the trade.

Sheffield manufacturers

were particularly irate because they knew that the American
producers could not satisfy the very large American demand,
especially in high quality goods.

They accused the United

States of seeking not protection but the complete exclusion
of Sheffield goods and planned a town meeting to consider
what action might be taken. 48
From the very beginning, however, there were two schools
of thought as to the eff ects--as opposed to the intentions-of the McKinley tariff.

While it was being debated, Andrew

Carnegie gave a reassuring speech before the Liverpool Reform
Club in which he asserted that Britain's economic position
had never been stronger and predicted that the tariff would
not reduce British exports to the United States. 4 9 Joseph
Chamberlain, James Bryce, and the president of the Manchester
Chamber of Commerce all stated that the significant effect
46The Times, October 7, 1890, ?.
4
?see The Times, leading article, August 19, 1890, ?; and
the brief comment in Jennings, "The Trade League against England," 903.
48
The Times, June 23, 1890, 11; October 9, ?o
4
9The Times, September 20, 1890, 9.
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of the tariff would be to raise American prices to such an
extent that American goods would no longer be competitive
in world markets, an argument that frequently appeared also
in periodical essays on the tariff .50

Even The Times,

despite the pessimism and dismay which frequently appeared
in its pages, insisted that the United States must sooner
or later realize that trade is "bilateral" and that, if
America were to shut out British products from its market,
some equivalent of American trade must be shut out of Great
Britain.

It went so far as to predict that "if prices rise

as they are now rising on the other side of the Atlantic • • •
the competition even in the States lies open to us."5l

In

a rather ambiguous leading article on "The M'Kinley Tariff
and its Effect on British Trade," The Times noted that of-16.8
millions of the .t30o3 millions worth of British exports to
the United States consisted of items that would be affected
by higher duties.

In 1889 Britain had sent to the United

States .i6.2 millions worth of iron and ironware, .i5o8 millions
50chamberlain quoted in Hurlbert, "The Fiscal System of
the United States," 273; Hurlbert himself amplified and restated
this characteristic argument, 297, which continued to appear
as late as 1892; see Henry George, Earl Grey, "Protection-Free Trade--Fair Trade--Colonial Trade," Nineteenth Century,
XXXI (January, 1892), 38-60 generally and especially 50; for
Bryce and the Chamber of Commerce president, see The Times,
October 8, 1890, 9; and October 28, llo
5lThe Times, leading article, August 19, 1890,· 7;· and
leading article, October 9, 9o See also the report of Lyon
Playfair's speech on the tariff, which The Times called "the
most complete exposure that has yet been made public on either side of the Atlantic of the.futility and absurdity of
the M'Kinley Tariff"; The Times, leading article, November
14, 9 0
··.....
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worth of wool and woolens,

~209

millions worth of linen yarns

and manufactures, .;f.1..5 millions worth of jute yarn and manufactures, and .f400,000 (or one-seventh of the total exported)
worth of hardware and cutlery.
the increased rates.

All were to be affected by

In addition, in mid-1891 the new rates

would go into effect for tin-plate, of which the United States
took in

1889~4.6

tion).

Nevertheless, The Times concluded that the alarm over

millions (or 80% of total British produc-

the effects of the tariff was "exaggerated.

It will divert

and disturb trade pro tanto, but it affects only a part of
the United States foreign trade, and a still smaller part
of the foreign trade of England after allo 11 52
In addition to the numerous confident statements that
the tariff would have little adverse effect for Britain,
there were those in England who predicted that the new tariff would prove so onerous, that prices would rise so drastically for the benefit of the few, and that customs revenue
would decline tremendously and thus require additional truces,
that the passage of the McKinley Act was really a prelude to
an era of Free Trade in the United States.

In the words of

the authors of "The American Tariff War," its evils would be
so enormous that "it may prove to be the herald of Free Trade
in the United States."53

The Democratic victories in

52 The Times, leading article, December 29, 1890, 10.
53Hake and Weslau, "The American Tariff War," 567. They
went beyond this not unusual assertion, however, to the fan~
tastic notion that McKinley intentionally had made the tariff
so intolerable as to assure the adoption of Free Trade; they
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November, 1890, and especially the victory of Grover Cleveland in 1892 raised the hope in many English hearts that the
United States was on the verge of adopting Free Trade.54
The.more overconfident statements in the press became
easy targets for cri tic5.sm.

Enough evidence appeared not

long after the new tariff went into effect to support, at
least tentatively, the position that Britain was indeed to
suffer because of the McKinley Act.

The first effect of the

new duties was that greatly increased prices were charged in
the United States for British woolens, linens, cottons, buttons, cutlery, guns, tools, and machinery; hence they found
a more limited market.55

Only two weeks after enactment of

the tariff "we hear rumours of 'short time,' of three days
a week [in Sheffield], of reduction in hands, of reduction
in wages."

The American representative of one firm reported
that orders were off by 80%.56 So general was the damage
done to the Sheffield trade that even those firms with eminent reputations for quality goods were hard hit.5?

But no

recommended, should their conjecture prove correct, that Mc
Kinley be commemorated by "a statue of gold--or better, perhaps, of the superfluous silver piled up in the Treasury
vaults"; ibid.
54The Economist found it necessary constantly to remind
its readers that the Americans were committed to protection in
one form or another, no matter which party was in power. See
any of the issues during and immediately after these two elections and during the American debate of the Wilson Tariff Bill
in 1894; some examples can be found in Chapter IV.
55see the lengthy article in The Times, February 2, 1891, 3.
56 c.E. Howard Vincent, prominent protectionist, letter to
The Times, October 22, 1890, 3.
5?The Times, January 15, 1891, 80
\
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major industry escaped early damage at the hands of the Mc
Kinley Tariff; iron, steel, tin-plates (after that duty took
effect July 1, 1891), cutlery, hardware, textiles, all were
affected.58 Two months after passage· of the tariff "ship-

.,

~

ping agents all report a diminution in the quan.tity of goods
sent to the United States.

One agent has stated that 'the

difference between this year and last is at least 50 per cent.
The volume of the reduction is chiefly in cotton and woollen
goods and upholstery materials.'"59

After eleven months of

"McKinleyism," The Times reported that "the trade in lowerclass goods, both metal and textile, has very sensibly declined, and in some cases been annihilatedo"

In other

bra~-

ches of industry "the normal course of trade has been wantonly
and injuriously disturbed. 1160
Under such circumstances Free Traders' claims that Britain would be unaffected left them open to scornful retorts.
From their seats "on our only Olympus," wrote one critic, the
Free Traders smiled at the alarm which the new tariff aroused,
but there was scant reason for amusement: "Ravage set in
almost immediately on some of the largest industries in the
i.

,.

United Kingdom.

First the tin and iron trades suffered;

then it appeared that enormous damage had been inflicted on
Sheffield:industries; and it is not long since the crash at
58Donald, ''McKinleyism and the Presidential Election,"
492-93.
.
59Jennings, "The Trade League against England," 911.
;·~-
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· Greenwoo d , "Fr ee Trad e, a 'ti'.vari•
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Saltaire [a major textile producer] illustrated the ruin that
had been wrought in other trades. 1161 u'The dawn of Free
Trade in America,'" wrote another, "was distinctly perceived
by Sir Robert Peel over forty years ago.

Since that time

the tendency has always been in one direction, to increase
the duties on foreign goods, and to adopt every measure that
ingenuity can devise for the purposes of hampering English
trade."

As for the contention "that foreign tariffs cannot

seriously interfere with our prosperity," it was "as great
a fallacy as it is to contend that great industries cannot
grow under a Protective system. 1162
Doctrinaire Free Traders had a response even for this:
capital and labor diverted from one field of endeavor simply
moved into another.

However, came the rebuttal, there is

nowhere in England any evidence of such compensation but
rather "a deeper gloom is settling.over most factory business"; there was no such diversion but only the reduction of
wages and profits which reduced the spending power of men
and masters and prolonged the depression. 6 3
The only American contribution to this controversy in
the British press was Andrew Carnegie's essay on "The McKinley Billo"

Though it was intended, in part, to placate Bri-

tish readers and though it went even beyond his speech to
tbe Liverpool Reform Club by predicting that British exports
61 Greenwocd, "Free Trade, a Variable Experiment," 318.
62 Jennings, "The Trade Lea~e against England," 904-05, 907.
6 3Greenwood, -"Free Trade, a Variable Experiment," 318-19.
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to the United States would increase, Carnegie nevertheless
made it clear that nMcKinleyism" did in fact represent a
challenge to Great Britain.

He claimed that the new tariff

had "a neutral tint, nei.ther Protective nor Free Tradish,"
for it enacted many reG.t ctions as well as increases.
1

Enough

duties had been abolished "to give joy to every member of the
Cobden Club; but whether this application of the doctrine
which the club preaches will prove for Britain's interest I
know some sagacious thinkers in Britain who will gravely
doubt. 1164
The reductions in the new tariff, Carnegie pointed out,
had been made chiefly in duties on raw materials used for
manufacturing.

Furthermore, Section 25 of the McKinley Act

provided that rebates, equal to the duty levied, should be
paid to American manufacturers who exported goods of which
the raw material had been dutiable.

This clause, he claimed,

would naff ect Europe more ln the future than any increase of
duties under the Billo"

With a protected home market, with

cheaper raw materials as the result of tariff reductions or
rebates, with the possibilities for increased trade arising
from the reciprocity clauses, and with the development of an
American merchant marine by means of the recently enacted
shipping subsidies legislation, the new law not only did not
place American manufacturers at a competitive disadvantage
in world trade but placed them "in a highly favourable
64Andrew Carnegie, "The McKinley Bill," Nineteenth Cen~. XXIX (June, 1891), 102?-28.
l

116
position both for the home market and for the foreign. 1165
Carnegie reminded his English readers that the United
states was still the most important consumer of British products in the world and he offered them the consoling statement
that "the fear that the new Bill would reduce the foreign
trade [of Great Britain] seems, so far, to be proved groundless."

He even anticipated that British exports to the United

states would "steadily increase."

But it was clear that he

believed that such increased trade in the future would be
on American terms.

And, while "the Briton will search in

vain through all his colonies and possessions for such a
great and constantly expanding markets for his products as
that furnished by his children under the Stars and Stripes,''
the entire New World and even beyond would be the province
of the almost unlimited economic development which became
available ·to the United States by virtue of the McKinl.ey Act. 66
So the controversy continued.

ly and was not always clear.

The evidence came in slow-

But there were few people in

England in 1891 or 1892 who would have disputed Hurlbert's
statement that the passage of the McKinley Tariff marked "the
opening of a new chapter in American history--a chapter full
of immediate commercial and financial interest to the manufacturing and commercial nations of Europe. 116 ?

65 .l....b"d
1 •

And, while

Reciprocity and shipping are treated
' 1029-31 •
in PartllI.
66 Ibid., 1034-35.
6 7Hurlbert, "The Fiscal System of the United States," 296.
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the English continued to watch the export statistics in the

hope of finding what the future held in store for their American trade, there was one significant trend that was quite
beyond dispute.

The Queen's subjects were leaving for Amer-

ica in large numbers and many took with them va.luable skills
or large amounts of capital.
Hands across the Sea
Ea.ch year well over 100,000 people left Great Britain
to emigrate to the United States.

No longer did Ireland

provide the major contribution to this exodus; in most years
the majority of America-bound emigrants were from England,
Scotland, and Wales.

Few of them ever returned.

"They look

for higher wages and comfort, and presumably find them."
Many of these emigrants, claimed

t~ose

who favored an imper-

ial customs union, would have emig1·ated to Canada if only

/

the economic conditions there had been as favorable as they
were in the United States under "McKinleyism. 1168
It was not, however, the emigration of the population
at large which most concerned most of the disputants in the
press.

It was the skilled hand and the industrial employer

who left for the United States as a result of "McKinleyism"
whose departure was interpreted as a great asset for the
United States and a grave threat to the British economy.
68cumming, "America and Protection," 375; Tupper, "The
Question of Preferential 'rarif fs," 143. Cumming and Tupper
gave widely different and eoualJ~ inaccurate emigration fig~res.
The peak year of the 1880s (1888; saw 108,692 leave Great Britain and 73,513 leave Ireland for the United States. The figures for 1890 were 69,730 and 53,024 respectively. After 1892
this emigration declined significantly and remained well below
1890 figures (except for 1905) throughout the period 1893-1914.
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The impact of the new tariff on the
skilled labor was immediate.

emigr~tion

of highly

Already, wrote Moreton Frewen,

"while the ink of the Presidential signature is scarcely
dry on the McKinley Bill, we are being told that the skilled
labourer of Birmingham--the button-maker, the brass-worker,
the gunmaker--is getting ready to transfer himself to the
Great Republic of the West."

If in the past an able-bodied

slave had been worth.;f250, he remarked, "I ought to apologize for asking how much per head this coming exodus from
Birmingham, from Bradford, from Manchester, and Middlesborough [the iron center] will be worth to the United States." 6 9
Only a few months after passage of the tariff Carnegie called
attention to cables from Liverpool

~eportiug

emigration bound for the United States.

a large adult

According to the

cables, they were "of a superior class, accustomed to the
comforts of life, many of them mechanics who had been induced
to settle in America in connection with the establishment of
British mills and factories" in the United St.ates. ?O

Skilled

laborers were also being lured from England by American employers:
The shortest way of obtaining the best skilled labour
in many processes of manufacture is to seek it in
England; M'Kinley tariffs throw thousands of good
artizans out of work altogether, lower the wages of
thousands more, deepen whatever fear there may be
that trade is leaving the country, and so make it
6 9Frewen, "The National Policy of the United States,"

676-77.

?Ocarnegie, "The McKinley Bill,;, 1034.

'1~·
.
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easier to draw off to America first-rate men. It
is the best who go, and those who are most capable
of helping to found competitive factories in the
shortest time.?l
The linen trade? 2 and the tin-plate trade were infant
industries in the United States which relied particularly
on skilled British labor.

When the delayed tariff increase

on tin-plate took effect in mid-1891 and the Welsh producers
thought it .Clight be necessary to go to half-time production,
The Economist warned them that "it is quite possible that
any serious stoppage of production in South Wales might tempt
the men to of fer their services to producers on the other
side of the Atlantico"?3

At the same time the British consul

at Chicago reported that the Americans were already tinning
imported sheets with the help of foreign skilled labor.7 4
Enough English tin-platers had emie;rated to the United States
that in 1894 the Welsh manufacturers launched a campaign to
have them return.?5

The emigration of such workers to the

United States, claimed Edwin Burgis, was one of the "perils
to British trade."

American competition, he wrote in 1895,

had led to "the exportation of the flower of the working
class. 11 76 This departure of skilled labor was still being
lamented in 1897 when the American challenge intensified.??
71 Greenwood, "Free Trade, a Variable Experiment," 319.
72 see "Ultonia," letter to The Economist, April 22, 1893, 48.
?3The Economist, MTS, June, 1891, 4.
74 Ibid., 9.
?5The Times, October 1, 1894, 9.
?6.Ed.win Burgis, Perils to British Trade: How to Avert Them
(London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Coo, 1895), 196-98.
??see JoBoCo Kershaw, "The Future of British Trade,"
Fortnightly, LXII n.s. (Nove~ber, 1897), 740.
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The engineering strike of that year caused a great commotion
in England and there were reports of widespread talk among
British mechanics of going to America if the engineering
trade went there.78
Of even greater concern than the loss of skilled labor
were the numerous mills and factories which British capitalists established in the United States after the McKinley
Act was passed.

British capital investment in the United

States was nothing new, of course.

What alarmed and angered

many British observers was the large number of British firms,
including some very prominent ones, which transferred their
works or built branch plants in the United States in order
to manufacture behind the McKinley Tariff walla?9

"It is

said that the mere mooting of the :McKinley Act has sent many
~··.

of our capitalists and manufacturers across the Atlantic to
make inquiries as to starting busir..ess there, .. Cumming declared.

Before the end of October the American correspondent

of The Economist reported excitement over "the frequent announcements of late of manufacturers in England and elsewhere,
7 8 Acccrding to Angus Sinclair, editor of the American
journal, Locomotive Engineering, quoted in The Times, December 4, 189?, 11. For more on the effects of the engineering
strike, see Part III.
79see, however, the discussion of the "American Invasion"
in the Epilogue. This alleged invasion consisted not only of
products and of sales offices but also of American manufacturing establishments. Granting that the migrations of capital
took place under rather different circumstances, British public
opinion nevertheless seems to have been rather inconsistent
in seeing both the P.stablish.n!ent of British factories in the
United States and the later establishment of American factories in Great Britain as threats to British well-being.
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who intend, or contemplate, transrerring their industries to
the United States."

As the Earl of Du.nraven noted:

"If we

cannot manufacture goods here and export them to the United
States or some foreign country, capital invested in mills in
the United Kingdom is withdrawn and devoted to manufacturing
those goods in the United States or in that foreign coun-

t ry.

n80

In the following months there continued to be wide-

spread talk of British capitalists attempting to save their
American markets by moving their businesses to the United
States.

"Symptoms of such a movement have already appeared
in some quarters of manufacturing England •1181 One English-

man even argued that British investors had contributed to
the problem; Samuel Plimsoll claimed that the American trusts
had been the chief architects of the new tariff and that
British capital had been involved in the establishment of
some of them. 82
It was not long before specific and prominent examples
were being widely noticed in the British press.

Most cases

occurred in the textile industry, whose woolens, plushes, and
silks were especially hard hit by the new rates.

Two months

before the McKinley Act was passed, The Times, citing a recent

80 Cumming, "America and Protection," 375-76; The Econo-

mist, November 1, 1890, 1.387; Earl of Du.nraven, "Commercial
Union within the Empire, 11 Nineteenth Century, XXIX (March,
1891)' 518.

81 Hurlbert, "The Fiscal System of the United States," 297.
82samuel Pliruso11, "'Trusts': An Alarm," Nineteenth Centur~, XXIX (May, 1891), 944.
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issue of Bradstreet's, reported that in anticipation of
higher duties British thread manufacturers had established
factories in the United States.

A new town was to be built

in Pennsylvania grouped around cotton mills financed by British capital from the textile center of Oldham.

New Oldham

was to be located in Ct.ester County on the main line of the
Pennsylvania Railroad and the cotton mills were to be staffed
by English operatives. 8 3 It was perhaps this same group to
which Jennings referred when he wrote that unnamed English
capitalists were planning to build "extensive cotton mills"
in Pennsylvania.

The manufacturers were quoted as saying

that since they could not break down the wall of protection
they would get inside and take advantage of it.

They proposed
"to take over their factories instead of their products. 1184
Other branches of the British textile industry were simi-

larly motivated.

A Scotch gingham manufacturer announced

that he was negotiating for a factory site in Connecticut.
"The gentleman in question explains that, owing to the new
tariff, the removal of the business is necessary. 118 5 Messrs.
83
.
The Times, August 1, 1890, 3. Its correspondent, perhaps in something of a pique, commented that the English owners
of Pennsylvania mills could not expect their operatives to
remain satisfied for long with English-level wages; thus
their goods could not be produced more cheaply than American
goods and no one would be better off except "the people in
old Oldham who will have more room to breathe"; ill£.•
84Jennings, "The Trade League against England, 11 903.
8 5The Globe, quoted in Earl of Dunraven, "Commercial
Union within the Empire," 518.

12:5

Lister and Company of

Yorks~ire,

makers of velvets and plush-

es and apparently a bellwether of the industry, so widespread
was the attention given their plans, announced that if the
new duty levied on its products was to be 90%, as proposed,
they would have to establish factories in the

U~ited

States.

Other textile makers of the North would be similarly injured
by the new rates and "many of our prominent dress-good manufacturers contemplate similar action. 1186
Once the tariff had passed, Lister sent agents to Philadelphia to acquire a site for American operations.

"The

gentlemen, on being interviewed, said that under the M'Kinley Tariff it was impossible for them to retain the American
trade.

America was once their chief market.

Now, however,

the increase of the duty on the lower grades of silks brought
prices to the point at which English firms could not compete
with American houses."

Lister plaIJ.ned a major American esta-

blishment employing a thousand workers or mdre.

American

manufacturers were overjoyed; they saw the action as evidence
that the new tariff would make them prosper, for their major
competitors would no longer. be able to produce goods more
cheaply because of lower European wages. 8 7
By June, 1891, less than a year after passage of the
tariff, Carr.egie could present English readers with a long
86

st.

JE.Illes Gazette, quoted ~·

8 7The Times, October 28, 1890, 5; October 29, 5; the same
reports were noted in Jennings, "The Trade League against
England," 904.
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list of British firms which were already manufacturing in
the United States or which had purchased land for the erection of plants.

One of the largest makers of Bradford goods

was establishing a factory in Rhode Island.

Messrs. Smith

& Kaufman, makers of plush, were operating in New York.

The

'belebrated" textile manufacturers, the Saltaire Company,
were producing goods at a factory in Bridgeport, Connecticut.
The Notthingham textile firms of Messrs. Wilkin3on had purchased a large factory near Hartford, Connecticut, for the
manufacture of plushes and shawls.

The Reddish Spinning

Company of Lancashire was ready to start production at its
factory in New Jersey.

Messrs. Ingram., a large calico manu-

facturer, and Messrs. Nairn, the principal linoleum producers
of Scotland, were also about to establish works in the United
States. 88
The same process of transferring British factories to
the United States took place in the metals gnd related industires, though on a much smaller scale than in the textile
trade.

The British trade most seriously injured by the Mc

Kinley tariff was without doubt the Welsh tin-plate indus-

try. 89

In mid-1890 The Times carried reports from Pittsburgh

that a large Welsh-financed tin-plate factory would be established there if the new tariff increased the tin-plate duty.90
88

carnegie, "The McKinley Bill," 1033-34.

8 9see Chapter V,

11

Coal, Iron, and Steel."

90The Times, May 21, 1890, 5.
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such reports continued to circulate and by 1892 they were
d • 91
.
con f irme
Under the impact of the McKinley Tariff other British
metal trades crossed the Atlantic.

Within two weeks of its

enactment, a leading Sheffield firm was making plans to move
its plant and its skilled workers to the United States.

A

major Lake Michigan ship-building firm was purchased by British interests.

An English syndicate purchased one of the

principal type foundries of the United States with a view
toward establishing a trust.9 2
The industrial growth of the American South attracted
considerable attention in the British press.93

The steel

industry of the South had been started on the premise that
low-cost competitive steel could be made by the basic-hearth
process, together with the advantages of nearby ore and fuel
in abundance.

A number of English firms had

est~blished

plants

using the basic-hearth process in Birmingham, Alabama, at
Middlesborou~h,

Kentucky (the names of both carried overtones

of national industries for British readers), and elsewhere
in the South.

Glasgow, Virginia, an iron ore and coal cen-

ter, was operated by an Anglo-American company.

Middlesbor-

ough, Kentucky, was "strictly an English enterprise.

It is

9lThe Economist, MTS, July, 1892, 3-4; November 19, 1445.
9 2 c.E. Howard Vincent, prominent protectionist, letter
to The Times, October 22, 1890, 3; The Times, July 3, 1890,
5; January 8, 1892, 3.
93see Chapter V, "American Industrial Growth."
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far an English town in the Southern States, built and run

with English money."

The Duke of Marlborough anticipated

the success of these Southern steel ventures and their stimulation of other manufacturing operations, particularly textiles.

Before long, he predicted, Southern cotton, "instead

of crossing the seas to Liverpool," would be consumed by an
immense Tennessee cotton industry.

The Duke solicited addi-

tional English capital to finance a Southern railway combination capable of preventing Jay Gould's rail interests from
adversely affecting the substantial British investments in
the industrial South.94
9 4 Duke of Marlborough, "Virginia Mines and American
Rails," Fortnightl;y, XLIX n.s. (May, 1891), 780-97, especially
785-86 and 794-96; similar information appeared in an article
by the President of the British Iron and Steel Institute:
James Kitson, "The Iron and Steel Industries of America,"
Contemporary, LIX (May, 1891), 635-38. There is no direct
evidence in either of these articles that the establishment
of such English-owned and -operated ventures was considered
as anything other than an excellent investment opportunity.
However, appearing as they did at a time when many in England were seriously disturbed at the loss of British capital
due to "McKinleyism," they could only intensify such fears.
The whole question of the transfer of capital is complex and
information is scanty and tentative. Many companies were
formed to "boom" American land investment in England. Middlesborough, Kentucky, was one of the areas so developed.
The Economist frequently found it necessary to warn its readers of the speculative nature of such ventures and the inflated prices of American industrial shares. See The Economist, May 31, 1890, 691-92; June ?, 725; June 21, 789; and
June 28, 825-26. Moreover, the transfer of capital was a
two-way proces~. A British company was formed to acquire the
entire assets of "the well-known firm of Fraser and Chalmers,
of Chicago, U.S.A • • • • and to extend the business by the
erection of wo~ks in England, where mining and other machinery will be constructed."; The Economist, January 11, 1890,
49. And there were occasional reports that, due to the highly
favorable American balance of trade, American securities were
returning to the United States from England and elsewhere in
large quantities. See, for example, The Economist, January
20, 1894, 81-82.

12?
Carnegie had no doubt that these early transatlantic
ventures were but the first of many to come.

Others would

follow, "led by the wise conclusion that it only requires a
few years in the United States for them to earn most of
their profits upon this side if they begin to manufacture
here, for it has been the experience of several branch establishments on this side that they have soon outgrown the
main business at home."95
The Chicago Exhibition
When the United States decided to commemorate the discovery of the New World by displaying American achievements
at a World's Columbian Exposition to be held in 1892, New
York City confidently expected to be designated as the site.
It was the heart of commercial and financial America, great
entrepot for the world trade of the United States, and adjacent to the major American industrial centers.

In the minds

of Americans, and of the English as well, New York City was
the capital of economic America.

Yet, despite the efforts

of New York politicians, the prize went to Chicago.

In the

eyes of many Englishmen (and of some irate New Yorkers as
well), Chicago and still more so St. Louis, which also had
made a serious bid to host the Exposition, were but one
remove from Indian country.

The selection of Chicago, a

thousand miles from the Atlantic, dramatically called attention
95carnegie, "The McKinley Bill," 1033-34.
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to a significant tendency.

f:

11

Westward the course of empire,"

commented The Times, was just as applicable in 1890 as when
the dictum had been uttered in the eighteenth century.

Indus-

trial America continued to expand at a tremendous rate; it
could no longer be contained on the Eastern

sea~orad.

The

competition which British manufacturers faced in the American and other markets no longer originated exclusively in
the original colonies but across a great continent.

As The

-

Times recognized, the American Midwest was rapidly coming
into its own as a manufacturing center.

Chicago was the

heart of this new industrial area as New York was of the
.country at large.9 6
The World's Columbian Exposition, more commonly known
in the United States as the Chicago World's Fair and in England as the Chicago Exhibition, was planned as a mighty display of American growth and achievement.

It was designed to

be a major international event, attracting visitors and exhibitors from all over the globe.

The Americans wished to

impress them all, but they desired especially to bring to
the attention of those nations with which they shared the
New World that the United States was eager and more than able
to supply their need for manufactured goods.97
The Chicago Exhibition was being planned at the same time
9 6 The Times, leading article, February 27, 1890, 9.
97see the letter of Henry Trueman Wood, Secretary to the
British Royal Commission for the Chicago Exhibition, to The
Times, September 4, 1890, 4.
~
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that the United States Congress was debating the McKinley
Bill.

It was held in 1892-1893.

It took place, therefore,

at a time when Anglo-American commercial relations had been
exacerbated for more than two years by the effects, real and
alleged, of the McKinley Act.

In Great Britain there was

considerable opposition to recognizing or participating in
the Exhibition.

However, neither the Exhibition itself nor

the hostility toward it attracted much attention in the British periodical press.

National newspapers such as The Times

and The Economist, especially the former, published news
reports during the planning and construction stages of the
Exhibition and occasional articles on it once it had opened,
but they seldom editorialized on the significance of the Exhibition.
Yet discussion of British participation was apparently
extensive.

It was carried on within

organizat~ons

the Society of Arts, which the British

such as
had desig-

Gov~rnment

nated to serve as the British Royal Commission for the Chicago Exhibition.

It was carried on in the local press of

Britain's great manufacturing cities and in the trade organs
of Britain's great industries.

It was at these levels that

resistance to British participation was strongest.

At the

center of many of these discussions were two individuals,
both of whom had the responsibility to encourage
British participation at the Chicago Exhibition.

~aximum
On~

was

the Englishman, Henry Trueman Wood, Secretary to the British
Royal Com.mission for the Chicago Exhibition.

The other was
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the American, Robert .McCormick, official United States representative to Great Britain for the Exhibition.
Wood and McCormick spent much of their time dealing
personally with directly concerned individuals and organizations such as local chambers of commerce and trade associations.

But both of them also managed to bring their arguments

in favor of full scale British participation before a wider
audience.

Wood did this by means of an essay in The Nine-

teenth Century.

McCormick delivered a vigorous address on

the Exhibition and Anglo-American trade before the Society
of Arts which was immediately published in pamphlet form.
This address, and other similar speeches, elicited considerable response in the British press, extracts of which, published as addenda to the McCormick pamphlet, amply testify
to the fact that his arguments were well known and widely
discussed throughout England.
Even in their more public appeals, Wood and McCormick
were addressing themselves particularly to that group in
England which was most strongly concerned about the effects
of "McKinleyism."

They were attempting to persuade a some-

times indifferent but more often a hostile British industrialcommercial community of the prudence of making a good showing
at Chicago.

To accomplish this Wood and McCormick had to

deal with that community on its own terms and to provide
effective counterarguments to its objections.

Thus their

appeals provide valuable insights into the state of British
opinion regarding "McKinleyism" and the American challenge.

131
The·re were a number of reasons for British reluctance
to exhibit at Chicago.

It was a great distance from England.

Displays had to be shipped across the Atlantic and then transferred to railway cars for the final stage of the journey.
Consequently the cost of exhibiting was higho9B

Very little

financial assistance was provided by the British Government,
in contrast to the handsome subsidies provided German, French,
and other exhibitors.

Furthermore, during the early stages

of construction and preparation, a number of :foreign workmen
had been dismissed from the Ex:hibition grounds in Chicago.
British exhibitors feared that American federal and state
alien labor legislation might force them to rely on American
workmen, who were not familiar with the equipment and the
goods they would be required to handle.99
But the real obstacle, as Wood recognized quite clearly,
"is, of course, the McKinley Tariff."lOO

As the British

trade journal Engineering noted two days after McCormick's
address:
The tempest of anger and alarm which • • • the
McKinley tariff excited in Europe about eighteen
months ago has died away, but it has left behind it
a feeling of resentment among manufacturers on this
side of the Atlantic, which bids fair to be permanent, and in this country, at least, to do far more
damage to British trade on account of prejudice and
misconception than from any actual restrictions it

98 Henry Trueman Wood, "Chicago and Its Exhibition,"

Nineteenth Century, XXXI (April, 1892), 561.
99The Economist, March 21, 1891, 372.

lOOWocd, "Chicago and Its Exhibition," 561.
'

ti\

132
has set on our export business with America. The
volume of our export trade has decreased, it is
true; the Bill was intended to foster foreign
rthat is, Americjn] industries • • • and this it is
!oing • • • • [Yet we have a vast, and what should
be, an increasing export trade to America.101
Over and over again in his negotiations

wi~h

potential

exhibitors, Wood was asked why English manufactui·ers should
display their products before a people who were doing their
utmost to exclude them.
query was two-fold.

Wood's response to this persistent

He first tried to persuade his audience

that the McKinley Tariff was not the formidable threat that
many Englishmen believed it to be.

He maintained that it was

"by no means certain that the new tariff will have the effect
expected of it" and, for confirmation, he cited Carnegie's
article in The Nineteenth Centuri which had anticipated the
maintenance of British exports to the United States.

Wood

commented on the tariff that "large classes of our goods are
not touched by it; the duties on

s~me

others are reduced.

Very many can stand the increased rate, which is paid by the
American consumer in higher prices, while for others, again,
no duty is protective, since they cannot be made in America
at all."

Furthermore, he reminded them that Britain was not

a Free Trade nation because she loved other countries, but
because most Englishmen believed that Free Trade was the
policy best suited to serve their interests.

"America is

lOl"English and American Trade," Engineering, April 8,
1892, reprinted in Robert McCormick, The ~uture Trade Relations betwEen Great Britain and the Unitea States and the
';iorld' s Columbian Bxnosition to .J::.e Held at Cnica o in 18'713
London: W. B. Trounce, 18
, 27-cB.

~··.
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of the tariff in American politics, there always was the
chance that it might be altered.

However, he speculated,

"wrether this will be to our advantage remains to be seen;
those who are entitled to express their opinion on the question do not hesitate to state their belief that the day when
America becomes a free-trade country will be a disastrous
one for British commerce."

But even if the tari.ff were as

potent in excluding British manufactures from the American
market as some English critics insisted, Wood declared it
to be "the interest of British manufacturers to fight it in
every way, to destroy it if possible, to render it nugatory
if it cannot be destroyed."l03
If one part of Wood's calculated appeal to potential
British exhibitors was to dismiss many of the allegations as
to its harmful effects, he did not ignore or minimize the
reality of the serious challenge which American industry and
the Chicago Exhibition posed for the British.

To see the

Chicago Exhibition only in terms of the American market was
to take too narrow a view of things, he claimed.

The Exhi-

bition was not merely an American but an international event.
It would attract visitors from every part of the world and
all of them were present or prospective customers.

In parti-

cular
the Chicago people expect of have large numbers of
visitors from South .America, and they regard the
l03Ibid., 562-63. Much of Wood's argument paralleled
that of ~Economist and, to a lesser extent, that of The
Times. See the following chapter.
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exhibition as offering a most favourable opportunity
of getting our South American trade away from us.
If they are correct, it is essential that our manufacturers who make for the South American market
should be prepared to keep themselves in the minds
of their customers from that continent who visit
the exhibition.104
wood's conclusion was a dramatic appeal to English pride and
self-interest.

"Are we to lie down supine before the barrier''

which our best customer by far "has erected to protect her
own industries, wringing our hands in distress because it is
difficult to pass?"

British commercial greatness had not

been created that way and it could only be maintained if the
British strenuously exercised every legitimate means to surmount such difficulties.
We must show the Americans that, in spite of all the
artificj.al obstacles they can place in the road, we
can still make our way into their markets. We must
prove that in certain classes of manufactures we can
still beat them. We must seize every opportunity of
showing them--where we can--how much better our wares
are than theirs, and so long as-we can do this, we
need not fear hostile tariffs. wnen we fail to do
so, we may admit ourselves beaten, get rid of seveneighths of our population, and set the rest t8 grow
cheese and butter for their own consumption.l 5
The case which Robert McCormick made before the British
public was similar: the United States was Britain's best customer and could be expected to continue as such for some time
at least; nevertheless, in the near future the United States
would be a very serious competitor.

For both reasons Great

Britain should make every effort to mount an effective display at Chicago.

But, whereas Wood particularly emphasized

l04 Ibid., 561.

105~., 563.
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that fears of "NcKinleyism" were exaggerated, McCormick laid
heavy stress on the theme of American competition.

His Soci-

ety of Arts address, published as The Future Trade Relations
between Great Britain and the United States and the World's

-

Columbian Exposition to

B~

Held at Chicago in 1893, was per-

haps the strongest detailed statement of the American challenge offered to the British public between 1890 and 1897.
To the present time, according to McCormick, Great Britain had experienced relatively little serious American com-

petition "and her manufacturers are inclined to smile at the
United States, 80 per cent. of whose exports are food products
and raw materials, entering the field • • • with their manufactured goods."

But there were ample reasons, said McCor-

mick, for the British to expect that situation to change
drastically and soon.
The United States already surpassed Great Britain in
the production o.f iron and steel.
the export .field.

She was already active in

Notwithstanding the worldwide depression

of trade which followed the Baring crisis of 1890 and which
caused British exports to shrink, the United States had increased its manufactured exports by

7.3% in 1891.

Impressive

gains had been made in glassware, hardware and tools, sewing
machines, general machinery, and especially locomotives and
railway cars.

In addition, British manufacturers no longer

held the competitive edge over their American rivals which
once they had enjoyed in a crucial factor for industrial
·production: the United States now produced coal more cheaply
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than Britain could.

Therefore, though it was true that pre-

sently food and raw materials constituted the preponderant
portion of American exports, that would not continue to be the
. d e f.1n1·t e 1 y. 106
case in

The great American growth area for more than half a
century had been the West.

It continued to grow and to that

growth the decision to locate the Columbian Exposition at
Chicago was eloquent testimonyo

But the United States now

had still another area which was being rapidly developed.
The discovery of coal and iron in the South had led to the
opening of steel mills.

The railroads, which long had

shunned the South as unprofitable, were building thousands
of miles of new track there.

Such facilities encouraged the

expansion of the already important Southern textile industry.
Since no other sector of the British economy, not even
woolens,and iron and steel combined, approached in value the
product of the British cotton industry, which represented
22.5% of total British manufactures, Great Britain had legi-

timate cause for concern.
~58,000,000

The United States presently exported

worth of raw cotton and only i2,700,000 worth of

cotton manufactures, but in time those figures would come together and even reverse themselves, and then "you must divide
with us, at least, the trade in cotton manufactures" in the
neutral markets of the world.

It was not the tariff, said

McCormick, but natural economic causes which would first
106McCormick, Future Trade Relations, unnumbered pages
of the Preface and ~~-23.
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eliminate British textile exports from the United States and
then "bring the United States to the fore as a competitor in
this line of manufacture in your other foreign markets, prominently in South America, China, and Japan."
It is no more in accordance with natural lawc for
you to bring the cotton from the United States, and
send the manufactured article to countries in closer
proximity than you yourself to the cotton fields,
than it was for you in the 16th century to send your
wool to Flanders to be manufactured and distributed
from there to the consumers. The place for the cotton
mill is in or adjoining the cotton field, and there
the next generation at the latest will find it in
its most prosperous condi~ion.107
Other factors than the McKinley Tariff were bringing
closer the time when the United States would be a serious
rival.

American manufacturers were going to be materially

assisted by the reciprocity treaties already signed or being
negotiated under the McKinley Act.

Even more important than

these treaties was the projected Nicaraguan Canal.

When com-

pleted, it would provide American East Coast ports with a
2,700 mile advantage and Gulf Coast ports with a 3,700 mile
advantage over British ports in reaching the markets along
the western shores of North and South America. 108 It would
also give New York an advantage of several thousand miles
over Liverpool in reaching much of Asia, so that the United
States would be a competitor for the lucrative textile markets
of that area.

This would in turn stimulate American shipping;

though it was German shipping which currently concerned the
l07Ibid., 20, 22.
108

~., unnumbered pages of the Preface.
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British, "we will soon be in a position to take the field as
.
competi"t ors. 11109
Nevertheless, McCormick believed, a proper appreciation
of the competitive potential of the United States should not
make the British overly apprehensive for Anglo-American trade.
Presently the United States was Britain's best foreign customer by far, buyir.g half again as much as her second most
important foreign outlet, Germany.

Despite the McKinley Tar-

iff, despite the large stocks of British goods which the Americans had accumulated in anticipation of that tariff, and despite the slackening of trade

~orldwide,

many classes of Bri-

tish exports to the United States had in fact been increasing,
most notably iron and steel manufactures, woolen and worsted
goods, and drugs and chemicalsollO

McCormick saw the Ameri-

can market for British products expanding for some time into
the future.

"For while our resources are such as to point to

our becoming in time such competitors, we have too much else
to do in the way of what might be called 'opening up the country' to enter for the present vigorously upon that career which
will be ours in due time."

Therefore, he concluded, "the ex-

ports of Great Britain to the United States must continue to
be large, increasing for a time at least from year to year. • •
[but] as it reaches its maximum you must expect to find us
running you close in markets of the world foreign to both,
l09Ibid., 20-21, 23.
llOibi,i., 18-200
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for we will then be powerful competitors in other fields." 111
As for Anglo-American trade relations of the future, McCormick suggested, much depended on such things as the readiness of British producers to adopt new machinery, to change
their business methods, and to respond to changing tastes and
requirements.

It was their failure in these areas, far more

than the McKinley Tariff which the British were so prone to
blame, which really accounted for the recent slowness of the
British export trade.

The Americans were far more aware of

the importance of such things; they were constantly seeking
to keep up to date in their line of business.

They bought

samples of new products manufactured anywhere in the world
so that they could copy and produce them, a practice which many
British manufacturers very strongly resented.

But, if Bri-

tish manufacturers should stay away from Chicago so as to
avoid having their products copied, as a member of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce had suggested, they would soon find
out that the Americans had not only already copied their
newer products and begun to manufacture them, but they would
in fact be exhibiting and selling them at the Chicago Exhibition.

The present capabilities of the United States which

McCormick had vividly described were, he said, merely the
"thin edge of the wedge. 11

If that wedge were not to be dri-

ven farther and faster, .the British would need to make a good
showing at Chicago. 11 2

111~.' 24-25.
112

Ibid., 23-25.
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In the wake of Wood's article in The Nineteenth Century

and McCormick's address, the Society of Arts sponsored a
meeting at the Mansion House to encourage maximum British
participation in the Exhibition.

The meeting was presided

over by the Lord Mayor and attended by Wood, McCormick, representatives of the London Chamber of Commerce, and other interested parties.

In opening the meeting the Lord Mayor insisted

that it was "of immense importance to England that she should
be well represented • • • • trade competition was never greater
than at the present moment, and having regard to the keen
rivalry of the Americans, Germans, and other nations," Great
Britain could not afford to be overshadowed at Chicago. 11 3
The notion of economic competition as a form of warfare
which, as we have already seen, so permeated the initial British reaction to the McKinley Act, was equally apparent in the
discussions of British participation in the Chicago Exhibition.
"An Exhibitor" called the Exhibition "a great commercial battlefield, in which the hosts of the United States, of Germany,
and of England, will be drawn up to struggle for supremacy in
the markets of the world. 11114 The same theme pervaded the
Mansion House meeting.

Wood, after repeating the substance

of his recent article, concluded with the admonition that
English manufacturers must remember that the competition of other countries was becoming, day by day,
ll3"l"Ieeting at the Mansion House," Journal of the Society
of Arts, reprinted in McCormick, Future Trade Relations, 30.
114
"Correspondence," Engineerin,g, April 1, 1892, reprinted ~·, 36.
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more intense • • • • The Americans themselves looked
upon this exhibition as a magnificent opportunity for
robbing us of our South American trade, and they were
doing their best, quite legitimately from their point
of view, to take it awa~ from us, and we must do our
best to prevent them.11>
McCormick referred to the Exhibition as a "war of friendly
commercial rivalry."

He insisted that the Americans were

quite willing to enter into "a friendly contest" with England
to obtain what they felt to be their fair share of the South
American market.

"They would try," he warned, "to undersell

the old country and would be able to supply quite as good a
quality of goods. 11116 Sir Owen Tudor Burne, a member of the
Royal Commission, said that the Chicago Exhibition might be
England's "last struggle to maintain her pre-eminence in the
commerce of the world. 1111 7 Sir Philip Cunliffe-Owen claimed
that "they would push us out of the market if we would allow
it, but if we did it would be our own fault."

He called the

Exhibition "the final effort" where the British had "to show
our relatives in America" that the British were still alive
and "not going to be superseded by any other nation."

Cun-

lif fe-Owen also hopefully predicted that the Americans would
be aroused to abolish the .McKinley Tariff once they had seen
the lower price tags on British goods at Chicago. 118
ll5".Meeting at the .Mansion House," reprinted
116 Tbid., 32.

117~.' 33.
118 Ibid. , 32.

!lli•,

31.
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At the same Mansion House meeting, Sir Douglas Galton
recalled attending the Philadelphia Exhibition in 1876 and
that even then "American manufacturers ran their English competitors very close indeed, especially in machinery."

Unless

they wished to lose their trade to the Americans, he said,
British machinery manufacturers needed to make a particularly
good showing.ll9

That industry's trade journal, Engineering,

was quite alert to the American challenge and strongly promoted adequate British participation at Chicago on the grounds
that "it is not perhaps so much the prospect of doing new business, as of saving existing trades from pillage that should
form the main motive."

Britain's trade and wealth were envied

on every side, according to Engineering, "and will be snatched
from us by our foreign competitors whenever the opportunity
occurs."

Britain's chief weakness it pronounced to be "the

national belief in our own superiority and our contempt of
the competing foreigner. 11120
Engineering described at great lengths the evils of "the
wicked and foolish McKinley tariff that prevents so many millions of United States citizens from enjoying the benefits
that could be showered upon them from this country."

Never-

theless, it argued, whatever valid reasons there might be
against British participation in the Exhibition, the tariff
was not one of them.

Ger~any's

grievances against that tariff

11 9Ibic_., 30.
12011 En.glish and American Trade," reprinted ibid., 29.
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were as strong as Britain's, but Germany was planning a lavish
exhibit at Chicagoo
~

;.,

Such German activity at Chicago was, in

fact, seen as still another major challenge to Great Britain. 1 2 1
But Engineering's real concern for the futUI·e was American competition.

"It has often been stated in

th-~se

columns

that the United States Government is making a carefully organised attack upon our South American trade and • • • the campaign is being pushed forward with energy."

It expected Bri-

tish trade to remain preponderant in South America, but "it
is very different in Central America" where railway systems
were being established
with incredible repidity, affording rapid and direct
connection between the manufacturing centres of the
States and purchasing districts of large commercial
value. The completion of the ~icaraguan Canal-which may be looked for in a few years--will also
help to shift centres of trade, and to bring American
and foreign ports, where the British merchant flag 122
is now more or less supreme, much closer together.
The greatest immediate threat, according to Engineering,
was American competition with British cotton goods.

In this

trade, which was Britain's most valuable by far, "we are within
measurable distance of a great revolution in our industrial
relations with the United States."

It was only a question of

time, "and possibly of a comparatively short time," when the
great surplus of American wealth would be invested in placing
the cotton mill near the cotton fields of the South "and the

same revolution we have seen in India [whose cottons were
121 Ibid., 28.

-

122 Ibido

-
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seriously competing with those of Britain in Asia] will be
repeated, only on an indefinitely larger scale."
Already this movement is on foot, and an astounding
impetus will be given to it when the Nicaraguan Canal
will be opened, and America will possess a shorter
route to India, to Australia, and to the extreme East
than ourselves. Mr. McCormick does not doubt that
what is probable fo~ one great industry may readily
be possible for many others, and he evidently dreams
of seeing the United States commercial mistress of
the world in the future.123
Despite such grave warnings of the dangers of non-participation, resistance remained strong in England.

In April,

1892, just a few months prior to the opening of the Ex:hibition, so important a manufacturing center as Manchester had
still not arranged to have a single representative at Chicago.
McCormick and others who had been at the Mansion House meeting travelled to Manchester to addrass a public meeting at the
town hall.

Manchester manufacturers voiced the common com-

plaint: it would be folly to pay the cost of shipping articles 4,000 miles only to have them copied by American competitors.124
Henry Trueman Wood professed not to be seriously concerned about such public displays of reiuctance:
There seems to be no reason to fear that the country
will fail to keep the leading position it has always
held since the first Exhibition was held in Hyde Park
in 1851. It is to be remembered that we have a character to maintain. The British Section has always
been the best at foreign exhibitions.
123Ibid., 29 ..
12411 Public Meeting in Town Hall," Manchester Guardian,

April 9 and 11, reprinted

~·,

38·-40.
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British manufacturers, he maintained, "generally seem quite
alive to the importance of the occasion and preparations are
now being made in various parts of the country for a display

of certain classes of British goods which promise to eclipse
even the fine collections shown before on similar occasions."
"Should it prove otherwise," he said, "it would be disastrous"
and among Britain's rivals it "would justly be held a symptom
of the decadence of our commercial powers. 11125
Wood, however, had underestimated his countrymen's hostility to the McKinley Tariff or their commercial apathy or
both.

When the Exhibition Catalogue was published in the

spring of 1893, The Economist commented that, though the British section seemed to be strong in fine arts, electricity,
mining, motive power, transportation, and women's work, it
was weak in many respects, especially in manufacturing.

"Too

many of our firms," it said, "allowed an unreasonable fear of
the McKinley Tariff to prejudice them against sending their
products to Chicago. 11126
The campaign to promote an adequate British display at
Chicago seems to have generated considerably more discussion
than did the Exhibition itself.

When Chauncey Depew formally

opened the Exhibition with a mighty speech celebrating American achievements, The Times took editorial notice of the event
and its significance.

It spoke of the "many services" which

12 5wood, "Chicago and Its Exhibition," 564-65.
126
The Economist, May 6, 1893, 540.
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the United States had rendered to Europe and to England.

"Not

least among them is the spectacle they have given of a material prosperity greater than had been known before, and of an
energy and resolve which have done much to make the powers of
nature subservient to the benefit of man."
The fact remains that the United States have done
what has never yet been done elsewhere, and have
given proof to the world of what wonders can be brought
about by industrial enterprise and skill, animated by
a patriotic spirit and by a resolve to take the lead
in everything. It is a splendid spectacle.127
Once the Exhibition had been inaugurated, however, it
received for the most part only terse coverage in the form of
news reports of day to day events.
cause surprise.

Perhaps this should not

The British had little reason to take any

great pleasure from the competition at Chicago.

Many of the

British exhibitors were unhappy with the inadequate space and
inefficient administration provided for them by the Royal Commission.128

The United States, on the other hand, took full-

est advantage of its role as host country to put on quite impressive displays.

Among foreign participants it was the Ger-

mans who took the lion's share of the awards and who could
expect as a result a relative improvement of their position
in the American market. 129 Though Great Britain won a respectable number of awards and was by no means humiliated, the
12 7The Times, leading article, October 22, 1892,

io5

9.

128See the letter to the British Home Secretary signed by
British exhibitors in The Ti.mes, August 27, 1894, 7.
i29 8 ee The Times, November 13, 1893, 5.

147

world's Columbian Exposition was certainly not the decisive
display of British pre-eminence which so many Englishmen
hoped to make it.

CHAPTER IV
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE PROTECTED AMERICAN MARKET
Having seen several different forms which the British
reaction to "McKinleyism" took, it is time to survey the
record of British exports to the United States following the
passage of the McKinley Tariff.

As we noted at the beginning

of the previous chapter, the British economy had recovered
from the depressed conditions of 1885 and by 1890 there was
hope in Great Britain that the Great Depression was over.
The United States had contributed demonstrably to the British
export expansion of the late 1880s, prompting both The Times
and The Economist to acknowledge once again British economic
dependence on the United States market.
The British optimism of 1890, however, was premature.
That year brought what The Economist called "exceptional
obstacles to trade," the most significant of which were the
political and financial troubles in Argentina which led to
the collapse of the prestigious financial house of Baring
Brothers and the McKinley Tariff and the Sherman Silver Purchase Act in the United States which "combined to paralyse
business for a time." 1 The combined effects of these obstacles to trade was to launch Great Britain into the last half1 com. History 1890, 1-2.
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decade of the Great Depression.
~·

r,·,

British exports had reached

a record high in 1890, "the United States again figuring conspicuously" in the improvement as it had in the preceding
year.

But "that growth took place entirely during the first

nine months of the year, and was not continued after the new
McKinley tariff regulations came into force at the beginning
of October." 2 The McKinley Tariff thus marked another turning
point for British exporters.

Just as it had figured conspic-

uously in the recovery of the late 1880s, so the United States
was a major factor in the highly unsatisfactory and difficult
conditions which faced British exporters during the first
half of the 1890s.

The extent of the decline can be seen in

the following figures:

British Exports (millions sterling)
1888

1889

1890

1891

189.2

1893

1894

1895

1896

1897

Total
235
To U.S. 28.9

249
30.3

264
32.1

247
27.5

227
26.5

218
24.0

216
18.8

226
28.0

240
20.4

234
21.01

It was indisputable that the British were losing a considerable portion of their American trade in the years following
the passage of the McKinley Tariff.

But the economic conditions

between 1890 and 1897 were so complex and unstable as to allow
for a multitude of explanations.

That such a loss was antici-

pated by at least some British observers has been demonstrated
2 The Economist, MTS, February, 1891, 1.
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in that section of the preceding chapter which examined the
"grim expectations" of 1890-18920

These early analyses,

however, were far from unbiased; they were, rather, controversial elements of the British domestic debate over fiscal
reform.

Even the most objective of them was nece3sarily spec-

ulative and tentative, for the real effects of the McKinley
Act could only be gauged after it had been in effect for a
reasonable length of time.

But, instea.d of clarifying the

issue, the passage of time brought a bewildering sequence of
events which kept British exporters and economic observers
constantly off balance.
The British periodical press, which offered such a spate
of articles between passage of the McKinley Act and the presidential election of 1892, displayed little interest in the
relationship of British trade to the American tariff after
18920

For analysis of the slowly

a~cumulating

evidence on

the performance of British goods in the protected American
market from the McKinley Tariff to the Dingley Tariff of
1897 and after, one must turn to The Times and above all to
The Economist, for which questions of American markets and
tariffs were naturally staple items.
dearth of information and commentary.

Here there was no
Both newspapers main-

tained constant surveillance of British exports.

Both be-

lieved the American market to be a crucial factor for the
progress or decline of British overseas trade.
There was nothing really decisive in the detailed newspaper coverage of the effects of American tariffs on British

l~

tradeo

The issue remained highly ambiguous between 1890 and

1897·

But the unceasing attention given to the question and

the attitude of dogmatic hope combined with a frustration
verging on despair which marked these press accounts suggest
that it was the inability of the British to

main~ain

their

American markets that made the American challenge a recognized national problem rather than merely the warning of a
few perceptive observers or the shibboleth of British fiscal
reformers.

As this chapter will attempt to show, the news-

papers attributed the losses in the American market principally to American fiscal policy.

Only at the very end of the

period 1890-1897 did they begin to recognize that American
industrial growth, which will be examined in the following
chapter, was making the United States less and less dependent
on manufactured imports from Great Britain.
The impact of the McKinley
throughout the British economy.

Ta~iff

was felt immediately

Portions of a series analys-

ing the first nine months of the operation of the tariff prepared by the Associated Press (New York) appeared in The
Times.

They showed that many major industrial centers of

Britain had felt its effects.

Liverpool, Sheffield, Glasgow,

Leeds and Bradford all reported significant losses.

Of all

the cities reporting, only Manchester maintained its American trade unimpaired; it continued to ship high quality textiles, the cheaper trade having been lost to the United
States even before the enactment of the McKinley Tariff .3
3The Times, September 9, 1891, 3-4.
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perhaps the most disastrously affected industry was the woolen
trade. 4 Throughout 1891 The Economist was filled with dismal
accounts from the woolen centers.

Bradford complained of

"next to no demand being experienced for export to the United
States."

Halifax reported. "that the McKinley tariff has been

the turning-point in many a fine business, and accounts for
a large part of the depression now so painfully felt."

From

Leeds came the gloomy prediction that American demand would
never fully recover, "for the lower grades of worsteds • • •
are practically shut out of the American market by the tariff."

Similar reports were filed at the beginning of 1892.

While the United States had imported only half as much worsteds in 1891 as it had in 1890, the British Consul-General
in New York was reporting that the American worsted industry
"has been marked by fresh life since the new tariff has to a
great extent cut off the importation of the lowest grades of
such goods."

Long dormant factories were operating again

"and new mills are being erected by European and British
capitalists."5
Neither The Times nor The Economist panicked at these
early adverse results.

In a number of leading articles which

appeared during the tariff's first year, The Times insisted
4 Even harder hit eventually was the tin-plate trade, but
the higher tin-plate duty did not go into operation until
July, 1891. The effet.:t of "McKinleyism" on this industry will
be examined in detail in the next chapter.

5The Fconomist, Com. History 1890, 28-29; Com. History
1891, 29-30; MTS, January, 1892, 3; MTS, July, 1891, 8.
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that "the attempt to levy blackmail upon the world's industry
for the benefit of the United States leaves extensive classes
of British trade wholly unaffected and will give back with
one hand to the remainder nearly as much as with the other
it takes."

Though it coLceded that the very high rates

established by the new tariff were a heavy burden to British
exporters, it remained confident "that American manufacturers
are unable to compete on anything like equal terms with Englishmen."

As a "serious check to the great volume of British

trade--an intention which some Republicans undoubtedly entertained--i twill turn out eventually futile."

Though it could

not deny that certain branches of British industry had been
severely hurt by the tariff, The

Ti~

believed that "the

chief permanent sufferer from it will be the country which
has been so unwise as to establish it" and that "in the course
of time things generally recover themselves."

Nearly a year

after the passage of the tariff, The Times still insisted
that the "total volume of trade between the two countries
exhibits no appreciable signs of diminution." 6

The Economist

asserted after six months of experience under the new tariff
that it "does not appear to have had any remarkable effect in
checking imports into the United States" and that "whilst
placing a barrier against the imports of some classes of goods

[it] had encouraged the import of others."

While also grant-

ing that some major British industries had been harmed,
6 Th
-.
. 1 es, J anuary 2 , 1891 ,
. e m.
. . imes, 1 eaa.ing
ar t ic

10, 9; Sepuember 11, 7.

7 ; Augus t
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especially woolens and iron, The Economist suggested that, as
soon as the Americans had consumed the large stocks which
they accumulated before the tariff went into effect, exports
of these items would be resumed on approximately the old
scale.?
Nevertheless, certain facts could not be ignored.
the McKinley Tariff had been in effect for a full year,

After
~

Economist admitted that "almost all our articles of export to
the United States have fallen off during the current year."
Total exports to the United States were off by several millions sterling and only the very inflated shipments of tinplates, in anticipation of the deferred duty, kept them from
being much lower still.

"It must be remembered,"

claimed~

Economist, "that we are now bearing the brunt, not only of the
actual and direct prohibitory power of the tariff, but also
of the accumulation of large stocks which •
the need of further supplies."

o

•

has limited

A short time later this over-

stocked explanation was called into question when it was noted
that "if anything, our trade has become more contracted as
compared with 1890, as the year has grown older. 118
British trade prospects for 1892 were therefore anything
but pleasant.

The record exports of 1890 had been achieved

before the McKinley Tariff and the Baring collapse checked
?The Economist, MTS, April, 1891, 1-2; essentially the
same message appeared in many issues of The Economist throughout 1891.
8 The Economist, MTS, November, 1891, 2-5; MTS, December,
1891, 3-4.

155
British trade, sending the export line on the graph curving
downwa.rd once again.
il?,000,000.

British exports fell off in 1891 by

More than one-fourth of that loss was experi-

enced in the American market alone; United States imports
from Britain declined

f~om.f32,000,000

to

~2?,500,000.

The

controversial question was, of course, how to explain the
loss.

Such statistics as these, together with the plaintive

reports coming from British manufacturing towns, fostered the
"grim expectations" which have already been examined.

But

even as late as 1892 those who sought to minimize the tariff
as a direct factor could offer apparently reasonable alternative explanations.

Not only were the Americans still working

off the large pre-tariff stocks, but the business boom which
many Americans anticipated would follow the passage of the
tariff had not materialized; instead there had occurred a
minor business collapse as customers proved resistant to
higher prices.

Early in 1892 The Economist expressed the

opinion that these adverse conditions were gradually disappearing and that the McKinley Tariff had already done most of the
harm of which it was capable.9

In the latter part of 1892

there appeared a number of signs that British exports to the
United States were on the verge of recovery.

In August ship-

ments of such prominent items of Anglo-American trade as woolen
and worsted articles, tin-plate, alkali, linen goods, and
cotton goods surpassed those of August, 1891; the exports of
9com. History 1891, 3.
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linen and cotton goods were, in fact, the greatest in many
years. 10 Near the end of 1892 The Times reported that,
"though English iron is virtually excluded from the United
states by the M'Kinley Tariff," and the staple trade of the
Leeds area, worsteds, "ha.s been shorn of very much of its
original dimensions through the operation of the M'Kinley
Tariff in America, 11 the manufacturing center of Birmingham
had found the American demand for guns, cycles, metal bedsteads, chemicals, anvils, and various kinds of hardware
"quite up to averageo"ll
These hopeful signs carried over into 1893, during the
first half of which the British were quite optimistic about
regaining their lucrative American trade.

Its review of 1892

moved The Economist to predict a better year ahead "because
in the directions in which we have suffered most, as in our
trade with the River Plate countries and the United States,
there are some encouraging signs of revival. 1112 Other prominent voices professed equally optimistic beliefs.

Sir John

Lubbock, Chairman of the London Chamber of Commerce, argued
"against commercial pessimism and counsels of despair by reference to the ascertained effects of menaces to British indus-

try which were understood to be uttered by the M'Kinley Tariff." 1 ~
lOThe Economist, ~ITS, September, 1892, 3.
11 The Times, December 27, 1892, 4-5.
12 Th.e Economist, MTS, January, 1893, 1-2.
l3The Times, leading article, January 25, 1893, 9.
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The Times unequivocally rejected "the gloomy prophecies often
:ard as to the incurable decay of British trade." 14 Even
some British industrialists who pointed particularly to the
McKinley Tariff as an important factor in the unsatisfactory
condition of the woolen, the iron and steel, and the engineering industries expressed their belief that the low-water
mark had been reached.

They anticipated improvement, though

it was expected to be very gradualol5

Such confident expressions were more than pious hopes.
They were based on reports of increased sales in the United
States.

Bradford, whose trade had been seriously affected

by the increased duties on woolens, was experiencing "a considerable increase in our trade to the United States, notwithstanding the existence of the M'Kinley Tariff. 1116 Gains
were also being reported in several categories of iron and
steel exports, especially tin-plates, and in cotton goods.
The United States continued to be the best customer for British jute and linen manufactures. 1 7 In the first half of 1393
Britain recovered nearly all the American trade which she
had lost in the comparable period of 1892:
British Exports to the United States, January-June (5)
1893
1892
1891
12,642,140
15,043,799
15,246,47?
14 Ibid.

-

1 5"The Present Depression of Trade," Fortnightly, LIII n.s.
(March, 1893), 297, 303, 306...;07.
i6The Times, January 11, 1893, 13.
i?The Economist, MTS, April, 1893, 2.
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-

The Economist called it "a satisfactory improvement" and

noted that the increases were distributed among textiles and
manufactures of iron and stee1. 18
Already, however, when these statistics were published,
British hopes for the American revival had been struck a
serious blow.

The United States was in the throes of a ser-

ious depression.

The United States correspondents of both

The Tines and The Economist were filing grim reports from
major American cities of the drastic curtailment of production, of the reduction of wages, and of rapidly rising unemployment.19

Such a depression w~.s bound to have a drastic

effect on British trade, as the British were well aware.

The

realization that the British and American economies were
interdependent was as vivid for the British in 1893 as it
had been in 1890.

The Times acknowledged that "British trade

is always dependent upon external requirements; and its principal customers for a couple of years past, whether willingly
or unwillingly, have fallen off.

The M'Kinley Tariff barred

the profitable export of the cheaper classes of goods to the
United States." 20 According to The Economist in late 1893,
18 The Economist, MTS, August, 1893, 4.
l9such reports appeared almost daily in The Times in
August and September and in nearly every issue of The Economist throughout the second half of the year; see, for example,
~de·t;ailed reports in the latter of July 29, 1893, 913-15;
MTS, October, 7-8; and November 11, 1346-47.
20 The Times, leading article, January 4, 1893, 7.
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The character of our foreign trade as a whole
has been largely determined by our interchange of
commodities with the United States, and this in turn
has been influenced to a considerable extent by the
effects of the commercial crisis which occurred in
the States during the past summer • • • • exports to
the United States, in consequence of the diminished
purchasing power of the people and the stagnation in
trade, have rapidly declined.21
Any hope for improvement in 1893 was totally shattered
by the American depression.

British exports to the United

States declined for the third successive year in 1893, dropping to 24 millions.

Britain's total exports sagged as well,

for numerous British strikes in 1893 had reduced output and
the lengthy Australian depression had produced a banking crisis which seriously checked British trade with that important
colony.

But the most important obstacle to British trade in

1893, according to The Economist, had been the American financial crisis which caused a six-month stoppage of business and
brought immense harm to British exporters.

The American panic,

it explained, "paralysed for months the business of one of
our most important customers, and even when it did subside,
uncertainty, first as to the repeal of the Sherman [Silver Purchase] Act, and later on as to tariff legislation, effectually
barred the way to improvement. 1122 This diminished business
with America accounted for more than one-third of the total
decline of British exports in 1893.

"Jute, linen, and woollen

piece goods have all declined, the falling off in each case
21 The Economist, MTS, November, 1893, 3-4.
22 Com. History 1893, 1-2; see also The Times, January
1894, 13.

'~,
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being mainly attributable to the lessened demand for the United
states.

The shrinkage of metal exports is also largely due

to smaller shipments for America, more especially of tinplates. "23

If 1893 had been a disaster--The Times called it
"the most trying year of the decade 1124--little iti the way of

immediate recovery could be anticipated for

1894~

for "busi-

ness in and with the United States must continue for some time
to be checked by uncertainty as to the form which the projected tariff legislation is likely to assume. 112 5
The new year, as anticipated, brought no relief from the
dismal conditions of late 1893.

'While the United States cor-

respondent of The Economist was describing the business decline
as the worst in America's history, 26 The Times lamented that
"the crisis in the United States, where a surplus that seemed
unassailable has been converted into a deficit, not only
checked our trade with America, but further complicated matters by depreciating securities held largely in this country. 1127
The Times' most fervent wish was for a rapid American recovery:
The prospects of a revival of trade in this country
are so intimately bound up with an improvement in the
industrial and commercial position of the United States
that there is a natural disposition to make the most
of every favourable sign • • • • we shall have to go
shares with the Americans in the resulting inconveniences
2 3The Economist, MTS, February, 1894, 1-4; see also MTS,
January, 1894, 1-3.
24 The Times, leading article, January 4, 1894, 13.
2 5com. History 1893, 4.
26The Economist, MTS, January, 1894, 8; for further details see the correspondent's report qf February 13, 1894, 144.
2 7The Times, leading article, January 4, 1894, 9.
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of the present depression.

A lack of vitality in the "Ameri-

can economy means a dull market here, and our own trade revival
is not likely to be very pronounced until they are beginning
to weather the storm." 28
Ever since the passage of the McKinley Tariff, the British had taken a keen interest in the prospects of American
tariff revision.

The Democratic victory in the Congressional

elections of 1890, a repudiation it seemed of the month-old
tariff, had stirred a flutter of hope in British hearts.

But

it was the Democratic adoption of an anti-"McKinleyism" platform in 1892 which earned the issue a prominent place in the
British press.

There were those in England who had no doubt

that the evils inflicted by protection on the American workers,
in the form of very high prices which served to enrich the
vested interests, were so great that they would assure a decisive anti-"McKinleyism 11 victory in the election. 29 When the
Democratic victory came, it seemed to most British observers
to guarantee a downward revision of the tariff which must
ultimately benefit Great Britain.
In an editorial comment on the election The Times said:
"We cannot doubt that the most monstrous absurdities of M'Kinleyism will be swept away or cut down to something like endurable dimensions, to the great benefit, we believe, of trade
in the United States and all over the world."

The change

28 The Times, leading article, February 23, 1894, 7.
2

9Don~.ld, "McKinleyism and the Presidential Election,"
489-504, especially 503-04.
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be slow and gradual "but it is difficult to see how, after
the national verdict on the present tariff, it can be long
postponed or restricted within narrow bounds."30

When, in

December, a national meeting of the Conservative Party passed
Colonel Howard Vincent's protectionist resolution by a large
majority, The Times disputed the assumption behind the resolution: "A few years ago the protectionist movement appeared to
be gaining ground all over the world, and the advocates of a
change in our own fiscal system still point to the M'Kinley
Tariff as a proof that we must do something to check the influx
of foreign imports.

But the M'Kinley policy has broken down
in the United States and has been rejected by the people. 11 31
The Economist drew essentially the same conclusions from
the Democratic success: that "a tariff reform in the United
States will ultimately prove advantageous to international
trade"; and that the election had confounded British protectionists who argued that the world was moving closer and closer
to a high tariff policy.

The Economist concluded "that ulti-

mately the removal of restrictions upon trade must lead to its
expansion, and one immediate advantage we will gain is, that
there will no longer be an inducement for European capital to
flow to the States in order to establish new industries which
might gain a footing in the American markets i f the people
were taxed for their support • • • • "3 2
30The Times 2 leading article, November l?, 1892, 9.
3lThe Times, leading article, December 14, 1892, 9.

32 The Economist, November 12, 1892, 1415.
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J. Stephen Jeans, a close student of both the British
and the American economies, expressed agreement with the
major point made by The Times and The Economist.

According

to him, "the decision that Grover Cleveland shall be once
~ore

the President of the United States, and that the Demo-

cratic party shall once again control tha destinies of that
nation, may be accepted as an earnest of the determination
of the American people to fling aside the crutches of protection, and rely on their

ovm

unaided strength for the time

to come."33
With Eritish trade in the doldrums, it was to be expected
that interested parties in Great Britain should adopt the most
sanguine views as to the beneficent effects of American tariff
revision.

As Jeans said:

It is natural that this decision on the part of
so important a contributor to the manifold requirements of the United Kingdom should inspire feelings
of hopefulness, almost akin to jubilation. A very
large section of the manufacturing and commercial
population of these islands appear to have been imbued
with the conviction that if the United States were
only to return the Democrats once more to power, the
Tariff would be got rid of, and British products of
manufacture would pour in upon the market of that
country like a flood 34
Such parties were, however, strongly warned that they should
not expect too much.
Jeans and The Economist both argued strongly that the
McKinley Tariff had not harmed British trade as much as had
33J. Stephen Jeans, "The American Tariff--Its Past and
Future," Fortnightly, LIII n.s. (December, 1892), 746.

34 ibid.
~
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been anticipated.

Jeans claimed that experience proved "the

futility of a tariff in regard to keeping out of a country
commodities that the country needs or desires."

A signifi-

cant portion of American foreign purchases was comprised of
highly dutiable goods from Great Britain; "the tariff has
been ineffectual to prevent the Americans from purchasing
even protected goods in English markets."35

The Economist

conceded that the McKinley Tariff had led "at first to a great
curtailment of imports into the States."

But it had quickly

been discovered "that even under the protection of the tariff
the~e

were many classes of commodities in which the American

manufacturer could not compete with his foreign rivals" and
many American producers expected such a high rate of profit
that the great price increases which followed enactment of
the tariff left many openings for foreign goods.

The point

of such arguments was this: that "just as the American imports
have not been curtailed to the extent that was expected from
the enhancement of the tariff, so they are not likely to expand
so much as some seem to expect from the reduction of the
duties."3 6
But minimizing the harmful effects of the McKinley Tariff
was not the only reason, nor the most important, for warning
the British against excessive optimism as to the implications
of Grover Clevelandts election.

Jeans pointed out that the

35Ibid., 756.
36 The Economist, November 12, 1892, 1415.
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American North was protectionist, cohesive, influential, and
able to bring strong pressure on Cleveland, most of whose support had come from the South and some of the Central states.
The Cleveland administration lacked the ability, even if it
had the will,· to revise the tariff in a radical manner.

This

fact, wrote Jeans, may very well "disappoint the not unreasonable hopes of the people of this country, that the greatest
market in the world, and probably in the world's history, is
once again to be found lying at the feet of British industry
and commerce."37

The E~onomist reminded the English people

that the Democrats had only a slim majority in the Senate;
thus the tariff adjustment was likely to be piecemeal and
lengthy and would seriously disturb trade until the matter had
finally been settled.

And it reminded its readers that "the

more the States free themselves from the trammels of Protection, the better able will they be to compete with us in foreign markets, and part of what we gain in one direction we
may lose in others."38
In March, 1893, when Cleveland was inaugurated, The Times
granted that he was no Free Trader in the British sense, but
it warmly applauded his Inaugural Address as "a declaration
of war against M'Kinleyism."39

However, as the United States

correspondent of The Economist pointed out, "the country has
37 Jeans, "The Jl_merican Tariff,;, 746-47.
38 The Economist, November 12, 1892, 1415.
39The Times, leading article, March 6, 1893, 9.
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practically adjusted itself to doing business on the basis of
the McKinley Tariff, and it might be a dangerous (political)
experiment for any party to insist within two years of the
passage of the McKinley Bill that merchants, manufacturers,
and importers should again revise their bases for doing business."

The most he expected was that there would be some

slight reduction on certain manufactured articles and the
inclusion of additional raw materials on the free list. 1140
When the depression of 1893 afflicted the

Unite~

States, the

danger of talking about tariff revision received further attention.

Chauncey M. Depew, American railroad magnate, assured

British readers that it was unwise and hopeless ever to expect
the United States to adopt Free Trade or even to revise significantly the McKinley rates.

He pointed out emphatically that

the electicn of Grover Cleveland in 1892 on a platform of
American-style Free Trade had been followed by the disastrous
panic of 1893. 41
Despite strong opposition, despite fears and hesitation,
and despite the depression (or perhaps further motivated by
it), the Democrats were determined to make good their campaign
pledge to revise the tariff and abolish the evils of "McKinleyism."

British newspapers were full of information and

editorial opinion on the revision campaign from the time it
began in Congress in the fall of 1893 until the Wilson Tariff
40 The Economist, MTS, April, 1893, 6-?o
41 chauncey M. Depew, "Prospects of Free Trade in the
United States," Nineteenth Century, XXXV (February, 1894),

343-52.
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passed and became effective in August, 1894.

Nothing bet-

demonstrates British confusion regarding their relationship to American tariff policy better than the frustrated,
ambivalent, and sometimes contradictory comments which appeared in The Times and The Economist during this hectic-and for British trade disastrous--ten-month period.
When The Times first editorialized on
tariff bill, it reiterated the dependence

~he

or

new American

Britain and of

the whole world on the United States for the revival of prosperity and stated that "we may rejoice on general grounds
that the Democratic party appears bent upon making a serious
and vigorous effort to bring existing uncertainties to an
end. 1142 How very little reason there was for rejoicing,
however, quickly became evident.

Yb.at The Economist called
"a· scandalously protracted party conflict" 4 3 over tariff re"'Ti-

sion occurred, preventing any possible recovery from the serious depression which had begun in 1893.

And not only did the

lengthy tariff controversy keep American imports to a minimum
but these British newspapers began to have second thoughts
about whether tariff revision would really be in Britain's
best interest.

The Economist repeated its by now customary

warning that, since the McKinley Tariff had been only partially responsible for the decline of British exports to the
United States, too much improvement should not be expected
42

The Times, leading article, November 27, 1893, 9.

4 3The Economist, August 18, 1894, 1013.
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to result from the revision of that tariff.

Though reduced

tariff schedules would no doubt benefit certain British industries, they would not "enable them to make good all the ground
that has been lost since 18900 11

Moreover,

11

the removal

o:f

the duties on their raw naterials would render the American
manufacturers, whose competition we already feel in certain
markets, much more serious rivals than they are now. 1144

The

Times also began to see the proposed revisions as more advantageous to the Americans than to the British.

It would

give the American worker cheaper clothes and housing.

Above

all, "it will give American manufacturers the advantage of
raw materials at a price that will place them on something
like a level with their :foreign competitors.

Whether or not

these changes would, in the long run, be for the benefit of
British industry and trade is doubtful. 114 5
By the end of 1893 it was beginning to sound as if the
British wi3hed that "McKinleyism" had remained unquestioned
and undisturbed.

The setback to British exports in 1893, of

which the tariff controversy in America was a prominent factor,
might well have evoked in Britain nostalgia for the more prosperous days which immediately followed the enactment of the
McKinley Tariff.

The prospects for 1894 were even worse than

the results of 1893.

Before 1893 was over, the American cor-

respondent of The Economist was calling attention to the fact
44The Economist, December 2, 1893, 1429-30.
4 5The Times, leading article, December 5, 1893,

9.
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that "the unrest and uncertainty due to threatened changes in
the tariff, following the practical prostration of business
by the financial panic of last summer, is producing some ser-

ious effects."

American merchants, caught with large stocks

cf foreign goods imported at McKinley rates and moving slowly
due to the depression, were petitioning Congress to postpone
the effective date of any new tariff until they could reduce
t ory. 46 What this meant for British exporters was
.
.
t h eir
inven
evident by mid-1894.

British exports for the first half of

1894 were considerably lower than for the comparable period
of 1893; iron and steel and jute, linen, and woolen manufactures made particularly bad showings.

The export figures

showed, said The Economist, "how seriously our trade has suffered during the past half-year, owing to the financial and
other troubles of our transatlantic kin.

And there is con-

sequently good reason to hope that a recovery in the States
will be promptly followed by an expansion of trade here." 4 7
Such a recovery, however, was dependent on settlement of
the tariff question.

And, amid the ever-worsening business

conditions of the first eight months of 1894, while American
importers remained reluctant to place new orders and while
the British increasingly doubted whether a downward revision
of the tariff would be of any value to them, the American
solons debated endlessly.
1893,

The American correspondent of

46
The Economist, December 23, 1893, 1537-38; December 30,

1565.

4 7The Economist, MTS, July, 1894, 2-3.

170
The Economist filed report after report telling of the strug-

-gle between supporters of the House bill (average ad valorem
duties of 35.51%, as compared with the 49.58% of the McKinley Tariff) and supporters of the Senate bill (38.68%); of
the numerous and troubl&some riders and amendments that were

proposed; and of the strong reaction of the business community
against Congress for its inability to resolve the matter and
allow normal trade conditions to return. 48 The Times' disgust
with the tariff revision debacle was nearly boundless.

It

even ceased to consider the implications of the tariff for
Britain during the first half of 1894 and devoted its leading
articles to exposing the scandalous incapacity of the American
politicians to liberalize their tariff and set their house
in order.

It acidly commented that the Americans had showed

the world the quickest way to turn a government surplus into
a deficit.

It noted that the United States was experiencing

"one of the deepest trade depressions which the world has
ever known," but it offered no sympathy; "they have no one
but themselves to thank for it," for they proved incapable of
agreement on the tariff.

From the point of view of The Times,

the haggling was not even over anything substantial; it called
one of the latter versions of the bill nothing more than "the
Democratic variation of the M'Kinley tariff." 4 9
48 see The Economist, August 11, 1894, 988; and the weekly

reports of the correspondent; particularly informative are
those of February 17, 1894, 211; March 3, 1894, 274; March 17,
1894, 355; May 19, 1894, 613; and May 26, 1894, 642.
4

9see The Times, leading articles, January 10, 1894, 9-10;
February 5, 9; April 19, 9; July 5, 9; July 23, 9; and August ·

13, ?.
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After nearly a year of debate, the Senate version of the
tariff prevailed and went into effect in late August.

Though

the general level of duties was reduced, the Wilson Tariff
out-McKinleyed McKinley by raising the duty on certain articles, as The Economist was quick to point out.

Particularly

important from the British point of view were the higher
duties imposed on certain iron and steel manufactures.50
Despite this feature and despite their quibbling about the
illiberality of the bill as it worked its way through Congress,
The Economist conceded that the reductions made by the Wilson

Tariff were "still very considerable" and The Times noted
that the new tariff "generally reduces the amount charged,
sometimes to one-half of what it was."

Yet The Economist was

not prone to exaggerate the prospects for any quick recovery
of British exports.

"The lower duties will unquestionably

work to our advantage," it said, "but that they will lead to
any very large expansion of our exports to the States is very
doubtful. t,5l

There was substantial agreement that the best

that could be hoped for was that the termination of American
tariff uncertainty would gradually restore some semblance of
normal trading conditions, providing British exporters an
opportunity to recover at least some of the lost ground.

How

50The Economist, September 1, 1894, 1077-?8. The complete text of the Wilson Tariff appeared, side by side with
the McKinley rates for comparison, in the MTS, September,
1894, 1-16.
.
5lThe Economist, August 18, 1894, 1013-14; The Times,
leading.article, August 18, 1894, 9.
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much had been lost could be seen in the stark fact that British exports to the United States had shrunk more in the first
six months of 1894 than in the entire period 1889-1893 and
The Economist recognized that "a considerable margin has
still to be filled up before our export trade to the United
States reaches the level even of 1892," which year itself had
been a very disappointing one.52
After the bad year which 1893 proved to be, The Economist
had looked forward to 1894 with only the most limited expectations.

But, as it said in reviewing 1894, even such a very

cautious forecast had proved considerably wide of the mark
since
we did not reckon sufficiently with the perversity of
the United States Legislature. For nearly eight
months, the two Houses deliberately dallied with the
tariff question, and, deaf to all the appeals made
to them, persisted in prolonging a state of suspense
under which the trade of the country shrunk and shrivelled in all directions.
With "equal disregard of the public interest," Congress refused
to do anything to stop the gold drain from the Treasury, giving
rise to serious misgivings about its ability to maintain gold
payments.
To the tariff unsettlement, therefore, was added a
monetary distrust, which not only arrested the investment of foreign money in the States, but caused withdrawal of foreign capital that had been previously
placed there. This, of course, tended still further
to cripple trade, and how seriously we were affected
by the business prostration of so important a customer
is shown by the fact that the value of our exports to
52 The Economist, August 18, 1894, 1013-14; The Times,
leading.article, September 14, 1894, ?; The Economist, MTS,
October, 1894, 1.
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the Statas in the first nine months of 1894 fell
short of the total for the corresponding period
of 1893 by fully~7,ooo,ooo, or more than 33 per
cent.
British exporters had actually increased their sales in other
markets in 1894, but so great was their loss in America that
Britain's total exports for 1894 declined by two millions
sterling in 1894, to .;¢216,000,000, the lowest figure since
1885.

British exports to the United States in 1894 were

nearly 22% below those for 1893 and 37% below those for 18900
They amounted to a mere .fl8,800,000; no figure since 1865 had
been lower.

As The Economist somberly put it at the end of

1894, there was some reason to expect that in 1895 things
could only get better.
For once at least, The Economist was not disappointed.
The United States experienced a strong economic recovery in
early 1895 and, for the British, it could not have come at a
better time.

Britain was suffering from numerous domestic

obstacles to economic recovery and her exports to most of the
world were suffering accordingly.

The horrible year 1894

might well have been followed by an equally bad 1895 had it
not been for the enormous increase of American demand.

Bri-

tain's total exports increased from.;i-216,000,000 in 1894 to
~226,000,000

in 1895.

The United States was responsible for

nearly the entire increment, her imports from Great Britain
increasing from

~18,800,000

to .i28,000,000o

America, a major

factor in the British distress of 1894, proved equally
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prominent in the expansion of British foreign trade in 1895.53
The Economist, however, was once again cautious as it
surveyed trade prospects for 18960

It recognized that a sub-

stantial portion of the increased American imports simply
represented purchases de.f erred during 1894 while the Wilson
Tariff was being debatedo54

Moreover, there was renewed con-

cern that the United States was contemplating tariff changes
again.

Passage of the Wilson Tariff had convinced many in

Britain that the United States was giving up "McKinleyism."
While that tariff was still being debated, The Economist
claimed that the United States had tried protection and found
it wanting and that the world was moving in the direction of
Free Trade.

Throughout the first half of 1895 it remained

confident that the United States was abandoning its fiscal
foolishness.

'When Lord Salisbury complained that protection

was in fact increasing throughout the world, diminishing British commerce and industry in the process, The Economist responded that the tendency was in fact away from ultra-protectionism, that nations were learning that high tariffs were
harmful:
In the United States McKinleyism had a career as
short as it was eventful, and the results were of
such a character as to suggest that the experiment
is not likely to be repeated.

The Economist clung to this mirage throughout the summer of
53see Com. History 1895, 1-2.
54Ibid., 2.

1?5
1896.

It professed to see that "in the United States there

are signs of the disappearance of the delusion that Freetrade means a decrease in the productive industries."

It

applauded Lord Farrer for a Cobden Club speech in which he
caid of the Americans:
Yith that period of prosperity it would be found that
the modifications which were made in the McKinley
Tariff had not ruined them, and there would probably
be an inclination to proceed in the direction of
making further alterations.55
The Times knew better.

As early as 1894 it had pointed

out that the Americans refused to put any faith in Free Trade,
that any tendencies toward it were checked and reversed every
time there was the "slightest decline in general prosperity."
In 1895 it carried a graver warning:
The repeal of the M'Kinley tariff and the passing of the freer Wilson tariff are probably to be
followed • • • by new changes in the direction of more
protection. This means that such part of our manufacturers' fixed capital as has been employed for producing articles for export to the United States will
become valueless in whole or in part, and that the
workmen who have been engaged in the business will be
thrown out of employment. It is useless to argue that
these trade dislocations inflict most injury on the
country which causes them. All that we need care to
know is that they inflict very grave injury on ourselves and that it would be worth our while to get
rid of them at some loss to the mere volume of our
trade.56

By the end of 1895 The Economist's knerican correspondent
was warning the journal how dangerously incorrect it was to
55The Economist, July 28, 1894, 917-18; May 25, 1895, 68586; August 24, 1895, 1106.
·56 The Times, leading article, November 27, 1894, 9;
leading article, July 29, 1895, 11.

l.
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expect any further downward revision.

The American business

community was likely to punish any party which so much as
raised the issue and if any revision did occur it would be in
the direction of still further protection.57

From that point

on, The Economist was considerably more sensitive about the
danger of a higher American tariff.

It noted that, though

American governmental revenue was less than expenses, Cleveland did not dare ask for new taxes for fear that he would
invite a new struggle with the protectionists.

When Cleve-

land took an inflexible position on the Anglo-Venezuelan
controversy late in 1895, prompting a brief stock market and
business panic, The Economist claimed that he had at one
stroke done much to arouse a great clamor for upward revision
of the tariff .58
To the relief of the British, the tariff did not become
an important issue in the United States in 1896.

There were,

nevertheless, a number of things which disturbed Britain's
export trade to America.

The American position on Venezuela

produced not only a short-term panic but a much longer period
of commercial uncertainty.

Furthermore, there existed through-

out 1896 the possibility of American intervention in Cuba
which also had "a very unsettling eff"ect" on Anglo-American
trade.

More important than any other single factor, however,

57The Economist, November 23, 1895, 1532-33; December 21,
1895, 1655-56; December 28, 1895, 1684-86.
58 The Economist, November 30, 1895, 1555; December 21,
1895, 1947--48; Dacember 28, 1895, 1681-82.
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was the money issue in the United States around which the
McKinley-Bryan presidential· campaign revolved.

The currency

question, as The Economist pointed out, was far more than an
American electoral issue.

Its outcome, its very existence,

produced worldwide effects and unsettled trade.59
The Economist treated Silver Democracy as irresponsible
nonsense and conveyed the impression that any nation which
allowed such a program to come within the realm of possible
national policy was a reckless people indeed.

Silver agita-.

tion in the United States had led to "an almost unprecedented
depression of business," for as long as the gold standard was
in doubt businessmen entered future contracts only in cases
of extreme necessity.

Naturally, British exports suffered and

The Economist believed that American trade could never revive
so long as the threat of a Democratic victory remained.
On the other hand, it also believed that the United States
would never really prosper until the evils of protection and
its direct offspring, trusts and pools, were eliminated.

If

the silver issue had disturbed American commercial circles,
the depression had also been "in no small measure due to Protection" and The Economist found the anti-trust and the tarifffor-revenue-only planks of the Democratic platform praiseworthy.

Caught in this dilemma, most of England including

~

F.conomist opted for McKinley and sound money .on the grounds
that "nothing would please the people of England better than
59com. History 1896, 1-2.
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to see America sound and prosperous, economically and poli60
tically."
The Economist rejoiced a.t the Bryan defeat but it had to
record that, though an industrial and financial crisis of the
eravest character "was happily avoided by the victory of the
sound money party • • • deep business depression reigned for
months, and only a partial rec0very" had occurred by the end
of 1896.
trade.

This, of course, had major repercussions for British
"It was inevitable that with one of our chief customers

reduced to such straits our trade should suffer."

British

exports to the United States fell drastically, from ;f.28,000,000
in 1895 to a mere t20,400,000 in 1896. 61
The Economist, however, was optimistic regarding the

prospects for 1897 •. While the McKinley administration was
"not showing itself so alive to the immediate necessity of
currency reform as it ought to be" and was "subordinating the
sound money issue • • • to measures for increasing the already
high protective tariff," no doubt the country's monetary arrangements would be put on a sounder basis.

"And while any

increase of the Customs duties is to be deprecated, trade
will suffer much less from an actual raising of the tariff
than from the uncertainty that now prevailso 1162
There was no reason for the British to be surprised that
60

~. and The Economist, July 11, 1896, 890-910

61 com •. History 1896, 1-2; The Economist, MTS, January,
1897, 2.
62 com. History 1896, 3-4.
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President-elect McKinley was giving tariff reform higher priority than currency reform.

It was clear to any reader of

The Times that the father of "McKinleyism" had made higher
tariff rates a major campaign issue.

He had insisted that

"the most urgent of reforms is a return to the tariff laws
known by his name. • • .He declares the underlying principle
of his projected legislation to be the obtaining of new markets
for American agricultural produce and manufactures without the
loss of a single day's work by an American labourer." 6 3 McKinley's victory gladdened the hearts of American and British
businessmen alike, but it also gave a great impetus to tariff
revision.

By the time of the election the House had already

passed the Dingley Bill and as soon as Bryan was defeated
tariff debates came to the fore again.

The Dingley Bill called
for substantial increases in most of the tariff schedules. 64
Yhile McKinley himself kept rather quiet about what he
would propose once in office, others in and out of Congress
talked excitedly of strong new doses of protection.

When

Mark Hanna made allegedly "conservative remarks on tariff
legislation," one of The Times' American correspondents retorted:
The most conservative remark I have seen attributed
to Mr. Hanna is the following:--"M'Kinley is in favor
of just so much protection as will enable us to compete
with foreigners and protect our labourers, and no more."
Preciselyo That is the foundation of every protectionist argument from Carey onward, and of every protectionist tariff from that of 1826 down to the M'Kinley
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Bill of 1890 • • • • If the British manufacturer expects
any modification of the tariff in the direction of
free trade or in deference to free trade theories,
he is deceiving himself completely. Mr. Hanna's
conservatism is the conservatism of protection for
protection's sake.65
As usual, such tariff speculation disturbed American trade.
The great recovery anticipated after the election of McKinley
failed to materialize and British exports to the United
States remained in the doldrums. 66
Speculation about McKinley's tariff intentions was
quelled by his unambiguous Inaugural Address in which, according to The Times, McKinley stressed protection "in its most
uncompromising form."

The Economist was sceptical whether

McKinley's avowed objectives--a substantial increase of governmental revenue and the protection of home industries--were
compatible.

It also questioned whether American public opin-

ion would permit McKinley to carry revision to the lengths
he proposed in his Inaugural:

"When, for instance, we have

American makers of steel rails boasting that they can now
undersell foreign competitors in their own markets, it should
be difficult to persuade the Legislature that they stand in
need of protection at home. 116 7 But the British newspapers did
not control any votes in Congress and the American legislators,
called into special session by McKinley for the specific
6 5The Times, November 9, 1896, 5.
66 The Times, January 5, 189?, 3; see also the comments
of the American correspondent of The Economist throughout
the first half of 189?.
6 7The Economist, March 6, 189?, 340-41.
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purpose of revising the tariff, passed the Dingley Tariff in
the sununer of 1897.
There was some concern in Britain, though it was minimal
by

comparison with the furor which the McKinley Tariff pro-

voked, over the effects of the tariff on British trade.

The

Dingley Tariff provided for average rates about 8% higher than
the average rates of the McKinley Tariff.

It was clearly

recognized in Britain that the tariff was designed to bar
foreign goods and would thus be "injurious and detrimental to
British interests.tt 68
For The Economist, however, there were some compensatory
factors in the situation.

It expressed not only the long

cherished British belief that "it is the people of the States
that will suffer most from its enactment'' but it also saw the
Dingley Tariff as a remedy for the American competition which
had suddenly emerged with a new intensity in foreign markets
and in Britain itself in 1897. 6 9 "We have heard much of late,"
said The Economist, of the ability of the iron and other manufacturers of the States to compete with their foreign rivals
on their own ground, and the increase in the exports of manufactured articles from the States has been the theme of much
self-congratulation there."

Under the pressure of the depres-

sion of the mid-1890s, .American manufacturers had struggled
68 The Economist, March 27, 1897, 443; September 4, 1897,
1263-64; Tfie Times, September 1, 1897, 3; "The Month in America," NatIOnal, XXIX (June, 1897), 558.
-69 See below, pp.
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successfully to reduce production costs and had thus become
competitive in world markets.

Now the new tariff would in-

crease the American cost of production and "cripple the export
trade."

Therefore, "whilst we cannot but regret that our

trade with the States should be hampered by a restrictive
tariff, there is some consolation in the knowledge that this
will give us better opportunities of pushing trade in other
directions."

The final redeeming

feature of the Dingley

Tariff was that old perennial: though the tariff raised further obstacles to British exports, the conclusion of the
tariff debate at least removed uncertainties and permitted
the resumption of normal trade patterns.

If the United

States, which by mid-1897 was enjoying a revival of prosperity,
remained affluent, such normal trade conditions should bring
an

improve~ent

in British exports to the United States despite

the Dingley Tariff.70
At the end of the year The Economist reported that the
United States had indeed waxed prosperous since the inauguration of McKinley.

In addition to the general revival of

trade, there was the special prosperity which accrued to
America when bad harvests in Europe and excellent ones in
the United States led to an enormous increase of American
agricultural exports.

American purchasing power had never

been higher than it was in 1897.

It proved, however, to be

70The Economist, March 27, 1897, 443; August 7, 1897, 1144;
August 14, 1897, 1176-77; Com. History 189?, 1-2.
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of little benefit to the British economy.

British total ex-

ports were on the decline· once again and the British "did
not obtain in [the American market] an

appreciable compensa-

tion for the contraction in other quarters."

British exports

to the United States exhibited only the slightest increase,
from.f20,400,000 in the disappointing year 1896 to
in 1897.

t21,ooo,ooo

71

That the American market failed to provide a compensatory
outlet for British exports The Economist blamed on the "prohibitive effect of the new Dingley tariff."

Inexplicably, i t

consistently failed in its year-end analyses of

B~itish

trade

to attribute failure to regain the American market to the
growth of American industrial capacity and self-sufficiency,
even though it was well aware of this development.7 2 However,
The Economist did note in 1897, for the first time, that American competition had provided a check to British exports to
other parts of the world.?3

The journal was impatient with

those who were morbidly sensitive to foreign competitionG

In

1896, when British excitement over German competition reached
a peak with the publication of E. E. Williams' Made in Germany,
which vividly described the German "invasion" of England,

~

Economist denied that German competition was really formidable.
In this context, the following remarks from its 1897 summation
are especially interesting:

71 com. History 1897, 1-2.
? 2 see Chapter V.
?3see Part III for details of American competition.
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It would be idle, of course, to ignore the fact that
our export trade did suffer to some extent, especially
in the iron and steel trades, from the competition of
the United States, where the cost of production has
been very greatly reduced of late years. In the opinion of many, also, German competition is a factor to
be taken into account, but that can hardly have affected us specially last year.
The Economist did not exaggerate American competition, though
it was intense in 18970

It presented that competition as a

feature of the disappointing year but not as a real cause.
It specifically denied the claim of some Englishmen that Britain "had failed to keep pace with our commercial rivals."74
Nevertheless, these comments marked a turning point in the
British recognition of the American challenge.
As Part II attempts to show, British concern about the
American challenge between 1890 and 189? revolved
American market itself.

aro~.ind

tt-e

By 189?, however, British attention

had shifted to the challenge of American competition in external markets including Britain itself, as Part III will show.
After 189? the American market absorbed a substantially smaller portion of Britain's total exports.

In 1890 Britain still

sent 12.2% of her total exports to the United States and this
figure was exceeded in the atypical year 1895.

But in 1897

only 9% of the total was sent to America and during the four
year period 1898-1901 less than
went there.

?% of all British exports

Though the percentage increased somewhat in 1902

and 1903, the United States was by then a considerably less
lucrative market for the British than it had been a decade

74 com. History 1897,· 2.
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earlier, as the following figures show:75
British Exports
1890
Total
264
To U.S. 32.1

1897
234
21.0

1898

233

14.?

1899
264

1801

1900
291
19.8

1901
280
18o4

1902

283
23.e

1903
291
2206

As the National Review put it in 1903: "During the last few
years we have seen a determined effort on the part of the
United States to kill our export trade to America, and if it
is not actually dead, it has been reduced to beggarly proportions.1176

The Economist did not give up its close scrutiny

of the American market and of the American economy generally
after 18970

But it had recognized by 1898 "that manufacturers

in the United States will be able in the future more fully to
meet the requirements for the various descriptions of goods
that were formerly imported from this countryo"77

75These percentages are approxi~ate, since they are calculated from rounded trade figures.
76 "Eplsodes of the Month," Navional, IlI (June, 1903), 526.
??The Economist, November-12, 1898, 16240

CHAPTER

V

THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1890-1897
American Industrial Growth
As The Economist suggested at the end of 189?, there
was more to the American economic challenge than a fiscal
policy which checked the importation of British goods and
accentuated, if it did not entirely cause, violent fluctuations in the course of American trade.

There was also the

unavoidable fact that American industry was growing with
amazing rapidity, that it was reducing its production costs,
and that with ever-increasing frequency it was offering its
products, in competition with British goods, in markets
around the world.

This obviously indicated that American

manufacturers could also increasingly supply the American
demand for goods which Britain had previously exported.
This chapter will examine the industrial aspects of the American challenge between 1890 and 1897 as the previous chapter
dealt with what were, for the most part, the fiscal aspects.
It bears repeating that the various aspects of the American
challenge overlapped and intersected at numerous points.
The material in this and in the preceding chapter, divided
for convenience of analysis and presentation, should be
considered as a unit.
186
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The economic growth of the United States following the
Civil.War never ceased to amaze the British.

It seemed no

less marvelous to them between 1890 and 1897 than it had
during the years from 1873 to 1889.
inspired by the

nationa~

In 1893 an American,

celebration being held at Chicago,

wrote a compendium of AI!lerican accomplishments for the edification of British readers.

After but a single century of

national existence, he argued, the United State-s had taken
its place among the great nations of the world.

It had be-

come
not only superior in population, wealth, influence
and intelligence to many, but the peer of any existing
nations • • • • This surprising development is not by
any means confined to commerce, trade, and the industrial arts, but it is as striking and gratifying in
the advancement made in scientific research, in inventions, in the fine arts, in educational and religious
facilities, and in all those ~onditions which are
manifest in advanced civilizationo
He supported his assertions with an array of statistics on
American manufacturing, commerce, banking, agriculture, and
national income designed to overwhelm the reader by their
magnitude and rapid increase. 1
Few Englishmen would have challenged such claims of
material accomplishment.

Mulhall's statistical compilations

led him to the conclusion that by the end of the 1880s the
United States had become "by far the wealthiest nation in
the world." 2 During the debates over "McKinleyism," stateru.ent
1 n. Brock, "Advance of the United States during One Hundred Years," Fortnightly, LIV n.s. (July, 1893), 116-41; the
quoted statement appears on the first page.
2 see Mulhall's table, "The Wealth of Nations," which
gives the figures for 1888, in Williamson, British Industries
.e_nd Foreign Competition, 238.
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after statement appeared in the British press repeating and
confirming that conciusion.

One British writer noted of

.America that "in the course of the last twenty years her
prosperity has become positively embarrassing. 113 Another
praised the "National sy8tem" of internal Free Trade and external protection for f6stering the growth of a prosperity
such as had never before been seen, to which nothing testified better than the immense numbers of Europeans who were
being attracted to the United States. 4 When The Times criticized "McKinleyism" and wondered when the Americans would
come to recognize the "waste of national energy" involved in
"battling against economic laws," a Fair Trader responded:
"'Waste of national energy!'

How very comic."

Since it had

adopted protection during the Civil War the United States
had demonstrated a rate of growth and accumulation of wealth
which were unparalleledo5

Even a Free Trader could maintain

that "it requires unusual temerity to allege that the tariff
system of the United States has been a failure--for that
country." 6 British readers were reminded once more, as they
had been so often during the previous decade, that their
national debt still stood at Qf 700,000,000 while the debt of
the United States, once nearly as large, had been paid off;
3cumming, "America and Protection," 373.
4

Frewen, "The National Policy of the United States,"
675-78.
5Williamson, British Industry and Foreign Competition,

237 and 239, n.

6 Jeans,"The American Tariff,"746-47 and 749-55.
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that beyond this the American government had amassed a surplus
so large that politicians had established a pension fund for
Civil War veterans the annual payments from which exceeded
the entire cost of maintaining the British army.

At a loss

for words to describe suc.h growth, the author had recourse
to the eighteenth-century eloquence of Edmund Burke who himself had found the increase of American prosperity defying
the powers of description: "generalities, which in all other
cases are apt to heighten and raise the subject, have here a
tendency to sink it • • • • Fiction lags after truth, invention
is unfruitful, and imagination cold and barren."?
Westward expansion and the consequent development of
agriculture no doubt played a major role in this rapid increase
of American wealth.

But the development of industry and of

related natural resources was becoming increasingly apparent
to British observers.

As Jeans wrote shortly after the pas-

sage of the McKinley Act: "Ten years ago, indeed, the United
States were very backward, as compared with most European
countries, from a manufacturing point of view.

In the inter-

val there appears to have been a process of revolution going
on." 8 The Canadian admirer of the United States, Erastus
Wiman, attempted to provide British readers with more graphic
illustrations of the magnitude of American economic activity.
The tonnage on the Detroit River, he wrote, ho.d reached in
?Ibid., ?4?.
8 Ibid., 751.

190
1890 an amount equal to the combined tonnage of London and
Liverpool.

More tonnage passed through the Sault Ste. Marie

[

b,,,

canal connecting Lakes Michigan and Superior in seven months
than passed through the Suez Canal in an entire year.

The

value of the American cotton crop in 1890, the product of
but a single section of the United States, exceeded in value
all the gold mined in the world during the preceding five
years.9

The magnitude of American industrial growth in the

1880s was seen in the census figures which became available
in the early 1890s: 10
The Growth of Manufacturing in the United States
1880
Factories
Invested Capital
Employees
Value of Product

1890

253,852
$3,000,000,000(approximate)
2,700,732
$5,000,000,000(approximate)

355,401
$6,524,475,305
4,476,094
$9,054,435,337

By 1890 the value of American manufactures exceeded those cf
Great Britain by $1500 million, those of France by $2000 million, and those of Germany by $2500 million. 11 That the
growth of certain American industries had been even further
stimulated by protective duties even that arch-critic of
"McKinleyism," The Times, had to concede.

"Though the M'Kin-

ley Tariff has not been long in force," it commented during
9Erastus Wiman, "Canada and the States--A Barbed Wire
Fence," Contemporar;z;, irx (April, 1891), 620-21.
lOThe Times, April 17, 1894, 10.
11 wiman, "Canada and the United States," 620-21.
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the Congressional debate on the Wilson Bill, "it has already
served to give a start to the productions which it was de12
signed to foster."
During the debate over "McKinleyism," the British press
-

was full of interesting information on American industrial
growth.

One of the more frequently noted factors was that

American industrial growth was taking place now on a continental scale.

The importance of the Midwest as a manufacturing

center was clearly recognized at the time of the Chicago Exhibition.

The growth of Southern industry was also a frequent
theme in the British press during the 1890so 1 3 The Duke of

Marlborough predicted that, if the basic-hearth process of
steel-making proved a success, "before vecy long we are going
to see the whole of this Tennessee valley a veritable Black
Country [the heart of the English manufacturing area] in America."

Occasional shipments of Birmingham (Alabama) iron and

steel to England served as constant reminders of what was
happening in the American South, while the Cotton States and
International Exhibition of 1895 served as a more dramatic
demonstration of the industrialization of the region. 14
This continental manufacturing network was bound together
by a transportation system which long before 1890 had won
12The Times, leading article, February 5, 1894, 9.
l3see, for example, The Times, leading article, June 16,
1891, 9; cf. the rema~ks of Robert McCormick above.
14
Duke of Marlborough, "Virginia Mines and American Rails,"
794-95; _cf. Kitson, "The Iro~ and Bteel Industries of Americao"
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British admiration and which had been continually expanded and
1mproved since Atkinson had called British attention to its
importance in the early days of the Great Depression.

As

Mulhall's statistics showed, the United States was interlaced
with 51,820 miles of

na·.~igable

inland waterways (compared

with 3,810 in the United Kingdom) on which operated a fleet
of vessels equal to one-third of the carrying-power of the
entire British merchant fleet.

Equally important, the United

States had an incomparable railway system comprising 171,800
miles of track (compared with 20,320 in the United Kingdom)o
In 1892 every hundred miles of American track represented
845,000,000 tons of merchandise traffic, while every hundred

miles of British track represented only 94,000,000 tons.

In

fact, two-thirds of all the railway merchandise traffic of
the world was carried by American railways.

Finally, and

this was a very sensitive point in England where manufacturers
complained bitterly about rail rates, the American railway
system carried goods much more cheaply than they were carried
anywhere else in the world.

The world average railway freight

charge (calculated in pence per 100 miles) was 97.

In the

United States the figure was 40; in Great Britain it was 140. 1 5
If the United States benefitted from cheap internal transportation, critics of "McKinleyism" insisted that the United
States suffered from artificially increased costs of the other
factors of industrial production.

Nothing was more frequent

l5Michael G. Mulhall, "The Carrying-Trade of the World,"
LXVI (December, 1894), 818-200

Contemporar~,
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in the British press during the early 1890s than predictions
that America's high-tariff policy would so raise prices as
to render the United States non-competitive in the neutral
markets of the world.
nnchallenged.

Such assertions, however, did not go

American wages had been increasing for a long

time and the advance between 1880 and 1890 had been greater
than that which had taken place during the previous thirty
years.
Tariff.

They rose still higher in the wake of the McKinley
Despite such considerable increases, there was ample

testimony that in many lines of manufacturing the United
States could in fact produce at competitive prices.

In 1891

Carnegie noted
that prices in Europe and the United States, for
everything, draw closer and closer together. In
recent times, steel rails, for instance, have sometimes been quite as cheap in New York as in London •
• • • Indeed some articles have been cheaper here than
abroad within the past three years.16
The following year Jeans wrote that, despite rising wages
and the McKinley Tariff, "the general course of prices has
been downwards for a comparatively long series of years, and
neither the McKinley Tariff nor any other legislative measure
or proposal has been able to arrest this movement."

The ex-

planation was that, since they had no choice but to pay high
wages,
the American manufacturers work with might and main
to make that labour as efficient as it can possibly
be made. This has been secured in a remarkable
degree by the introduction of labour-saving appliances
16

carnegie, "The McKinley Bill," 1029.
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of every kind. As a consequence, the increase of
wages • • • has been accompanied by a considerable
increase in the annual value of the product obtained
per employee.17
American efficiency and inventiveness had been bywords
in England for a long time.
1890s.

This was no less thG case in the

During the debate over "McKinleyism," it was frequently

pointed out that American manufacturers had reduced working
hours while maintaining or even increasing productivity. 18
The American worker, it was claimed, could produce all that
the country required in the course of a six-hour working day
while enjoying a higher standard of living through better
wages and more constant employment, given the modern machinery
and the available capital of the United States. 1 9 The operation of the McKinley Tariff and the onset of severe depression
in 1893 did nothing to dispel such notions.

The Americans had

proved beyond doubt, many Englishmen believed, that high wages
and short hours could stimulate increased production.
nail-makers earned twelve shillings a week.

English

Their American

counterparts earned twenty shillings a day "and yet American
nails are but half the price of English.

Here again we find

the explanation in the fact that the American turns out two
and a half tons whilst his English rival is making two
l?Jeans, "The American Tariff," 752-54.
18
.
See, for example, John Rae, "The Balance Sheet of
Short Hours," Contemporary, LX (October, 1891), 499-520.
l9Freuen, "The National Policy of the United States,"
680; Cumming, "4merica and Protection," 373-740
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cwt." 20

Or, as Jeans put it:

The increasing and almost unhealthy energy of the
American people has already placed them in a position
to reconcile their economic system with cheap production in many products that have hitherto been supposed to be almost of purely British growth.21
In a leading article on alleged American competition in 189?,
especially in the engineering trades, The Times remarked how
much more receptive were .American than British workers to
new techniques and new machinery, a charge that had been
made many times in the past.

At the same time, the system

of production of interchangeable parts gave the Americans a
decided edge over the British, much of whose production was
done on a custom-built basis. 22
All these things were, of course, of more than merely
academic or technical interest for the British.

What such

conditions across the Atlantic signified was stated quite
clearly as early as 1890.

"In many departments," wrote A. N.

Cumming, the Americans "are already ahead of us.

The Presi-

dent of the [British] Iron and Steel Congress has admitted
the fact of American supremacy in those industries.

It is

probable that in many others the same may shortly be the facto"
This remark by the President of the Iron and Steel Institute
was also echoed by L. J. Jennings, who claimed that the
20 L. R. Phelps, "The Economy of High Wages," Edinburgh,
CLXAIX (January, 1894), 33-61; the quoted statement is from
P.!

4?.

,

21 J. Stephen Jeans, "The Labour War in the United States,"
Nineteenth Century, XXXVI_(August, 1894), 26?.
22 The Times, leading article, December 4, 1897, 11.
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the American. people's
main object is to build up the biggest trade in the
world, and they will do it, and do it moreover by that
very Protection which, as our philosophers tell us,
saps the foundations of every industry to which it
is applied • • • • the Americans have beaten us at the
iron and steel trades, in which thirty yea.rs ago they
did next to nothing, and eventually they wi:l pass
us in the cotton trade. They are now turning their
attention to shipping, in which we are at present
supreme.23
·
Though such ancillary industries as coal and shipping
received some attention in the British press, 24 the greatest
coverage was devoted to those manufacturing industries which
were absolutely essential to British prosperity: textiles and
iron and steel.

And it was precisely in these areas, as

Jeans pointed out in 1892, that the growth of American manufacturing capacity was most pronounced.

Invested capital in

the American textile industry had risen from $386.5 million
in 1880 to $701.5 million in 1890, an increase of 8lo5%o

Dur-

ing the same interval the value of American textile manufactures had increased from $500 million to $693 million; the
increase in quantity was greater still for the output was
being sold at lower prices in 1890 than in 1880.

The iron

and steel industry was growing so fast that in 1892 it was
capable of producing nearly double the amount of pig iron and
of steel rails produced in 1891. 2 5 Little wonder, then, that
2 3cumming, "America and Protection," 374; Jennings, "The
Trade L~ague against England," 910.
24
.
For these, see below, 203-04, 250-59, 316-1?.
25·Jeans, "The American Tariff," 750-51.
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British exporters sometimes found it difficult to find buyers
in the United States or even in neutral and home markets for
a number of the traditional British export goods.
Textiles
Passage of the McKinley Tariff and publication of United
States census data in the early 1890s elicited numerous British statements on the growth of this industry in America.
The topic received much less attention later in the 1890s,
but enough appeared in the early part of the decade to make
it clear that Britain could not realistically expect to expand
or even to maintain her total textile exports to the United
States.

Among the different branches of the textile industry,

however, there were considerable differences.
Two branches of the trade fared relatively well in the
1890s.

The manufacture of cotton textiles was Britain's
,

major industry in terms of both the value of domestic manufacturing and the value of exports.

As was noted in Part I, how-

ever, the United States had for sone time been supplying much
of its own requirements, particularly in the medium and coarser grades.

Nevertheless, what American trade was left to

the British, that in the expensive, high quality articles-though it represented only about one per cent of the total
volume of British cotton exports--remained lucrative throughout the 1890s and occasionally experienced substantial increases. 26
26 For details see Com. History, annually.
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It was to the producers of lower quality grades of cotton
goods that American growth presented a problem.

In 1871 Bri-

tain had consumed 2,410,000 bales (of 500 lbs. each) of cotton
and the United States only 893,000 bales.

By 1891 Britain

consumed 4,230,000 bales (of 400 lbs. each) and the United
states 3,071,000.

In 1897 British consumption was 3,224,000

bales (of 500 lbs. each) and American consumption was 2,738,000
bales. 2 7 Thus, between 1871 and 1897 British consumption
increased by about 33%, while American consumption increased
by about 200%.
In certain branches of the trade the United States had
become increasingly self-sufficient.

In 1891 the United

States imported less than one million lbs. of British thread,
less than half the quantity imported in 1871, and The Economist concluded that the decline was "no doubt the result of
the continued growth of the manufacture in that country. 11
As for cotton piece g9ods:
Every year finds the Americans doing more and more
for themselves, whether or not they find it to their
profit; and evidently the only hope for British goods
is from superiority of design, material and finish.
Even in these we are not altogether safe, as our
rivals think nothing of appropriating wholesale the 28
styles our people have been at such pains to develop.
However, since the export of quality goods was well maintained,
and since the British had by 1890 grown accustomed to American
27

.
Com. History 1893, 27-28; The Economist, October 26,
1895, 1402; October 23, 1897, 1502.
28
T!le Economist, June 13, 1891, 760-61; MTS, June, 1892,
8; Com. History 1891, 27. Cf. the complaints made to Wood
and McCormick by those approached to exhibit at Chicago.
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self-sufficiency in lower quality goods, the American challenge to the British cotton goods industry was experienced
not so much in the American as in the neutral markets of the
world and will be considered in the subsequent chapters which
deal with such competit10n.
The British linen industry was much more alarmed when the
McKinley Tariff took effect than was the cotton goods industry.

Linen manufacturing was concentrated in Ulster.

More

than£15,000,000 of capital was invested in the Ulster industry, "hundreds of thousands of her inhabitants are entirely
dependent on the employment thus provided," and the United
States had for a very long time been Ulster's "largest and
most important foreign customer. 11

The McKinley Tariff imposed

very high rates on imported linens, with the anticipation that
an American industry would thus be created and the rates could
be reduced January 1, 1894. 29 However, by 1893 a correspondent of The Times could claim that "the great American linen
industry that was to spring up under the M'Kinley law has
proved a myth."30

Though Congress extended the linen duty

and Americ.ans built new factories and brought over trained
workers from Ireland, an apparently well-informed correspondent wrote to The Economist in 1893 that "the Irish linen
trade with the United States is in a healthier and better condition than it was previous to the introduction of the
2 9 11 Ultonia," letter to The Economist, April 22, 1893, 480.
30The Times, January 2, 1893, 11.
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tariffo 1131
If British cotton and linen producers were satisfied
with the state of the American market in the 1890s, compaints
came with great frequency from woolen and silk manufacturers.
The rapidly changing relationship between the British and
American woolen industries can be seen in the following
figures: 32

Consumption of Wool (thousands of lbs.)
1866

United Kingdom 313,000
United States 229,707

1876
369,000

235,020

1884

381,ooo
376,036

Proportionately farther behind Britain in 1876 than in 1866,
by 1884 the United States had nearly reached parity with Britain.

The American industry continued to grow rapidly during

the 1880s:33
Growth of the Woolen Industry in the United States
Invested capital
Employees
Value of product

1880
$159,091,869
161,557
$267,252,293

1890
$296,983,164
221,087
$338,231,109

The value of the product of the American woolen industry grew
during the decade by 26.56%, but this was an average which
masked considerable variations among the branches of the

3111 Ultonia," letter to The Economist, April 22, 1893, 480.
32Ed.win Burgis, Perils to British Trade: How to Avert Them
(London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 1895), 184; no figures beyond
1884 are provided.
33The Times, June 11, 1892, 8.
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industry.

Some of the British complaints about declining

sales in the United States are explained by noting that the
.American production of carpets increased by more than 50%
during the decade, hosiery by more than 131%, and worsted
goods by more than 136%034
Faced with such growth across the Atlantic, as well as
with tariffs and depressions, British woolen exporters found
the American market very disappointing in the 1890s.

Such

exports had fallen from their peak in 1872 of 6.3 millions
sterling to only 1.6 millions in 1877.

By 1890 they had

recovered well but were checked once again as the following
figures show: 35
British Exports of Woolen Manufactures
and Yarns (millions sterling)
Total
To U.

s.

1890
25o7
4.8

1891
23.5
3o0

1892
23.2
3o5

189?
220!5
2.6

1894
20o0
1.6

1892
27.0
605

1896
25o5
3.5

1892
22.6
3.4

The British silk industry was equally affected by what
one observer called "the simultaneous progress of the silk
manufacture in the United States, and decay in this country
for twenty years." His figures justified the remark:3 6
34The Economist, MTS, April, 1892, lOo
35see Com. History, annually, for the figures and also
for the anguished coillplaints reported ~early every year from
the various woolen centers. Still another significant decline
of exports to the United States was experienced in 1898 and
1899.
36 Burgis, Perils to British T.:-ade, 184; Burgis used as
the sterling equivalent of the dollar, 4s. 2d., rather than
the 4s. Od. which was more customary at the time.
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Value of Raw Material Used in the Silk Industry

United Kingdom
United States

1860
6,482,066
812,870

1870
5,774,510
1,628,658

(~)

1880
3,383,373
3,864,409

When The Economist surveyed the industry in i890, it found
that while the United States continued to purchase increasing
amounts of British yarn for its own manufacturing use, American purchases of silk cloth were declining.

The McKinley

Tariff provided a further obstacle to British silk exports,
but Americ1n production was the mont serious limitation.37
The Times reported that in 1891 there were nearly six hundred
silk factories in the United States.

"It is said that Ameri-

can manufacturers have now taken the entire home market for
certain styles of silk fabrics. 11 38 The growth of American
silk manufacturing had, it was claimed, both reduced the market for British silks and led to a 40% decline in silk prices
since 1885.39
Coal, Iron and Steel
The quantity and the cost of coal production were important factors in the growth of an industrial economy, for they
affected, directly or indirectly, the cost of production of
nearly the whole gamut of manufactured goods.

For no other

37com. History, 1889, 27; Com. History, 1891, 19.
38 The Times, May 7, 1892, 8.
39Williamson, British Trade and Foreign Competition, 209.
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industry were these more crucial than for iron and steel.
And, since the British were so vitally and constantly concerned in the 1890s with the enormous growth and occasional
competition of the American iron and steel industry, they
could not help but take a keen interest in American coal
production also.
In 1890 the United States was already producing more
than one-fourth of all the world's coal. lt-0

Production con-

tinued to rise and in 1893 the United States produced a
record 164,000,000 tons and entered the coa.l export trade. 41
Not only was American coal being mined in record quantities,
but the cost of production was decreasing.

Carnegie claimed

that generally coal was "much cheaper in the United States
than in Britain.

If we compare New York and London, New

York receives anthracite coal as cheaply as London receives
bituminous coal.

The former will, at least, give double
service, and it is said to yield three times as much." 42

And a knowledgeable British observer claimed that
So far as the United States are concerned, we have
to face the prospect of being permanently dislodged
from our former supremacy of rank as a coal-producing
country •• o .the United States have for some years
past been producing their coal at a cost not much
40Brock, "Advance of the United States during One Hundred Years," 127.
41 The Economist, March 24, 1894, 365.
42 Andrew Carnegie, "Britain and the United States:
Cost of Li Ying Compared," Contempo1•ary, LXVI (September,
1894)' 323.

k.
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exceeding one-half of that of many coal-fields that
are being worked at home.43
By 1897 the British, who formerly had found a good market for coal on the Pacific Coast of the United States where
the only competition they faced was from British Columbia,
were being exposed to the increasing competition of coal
mined in the eastern United States. 44 Simultaneously Britain
was being affected by a great engineering strike at home and
American competition in numerous products and in a variety of
markets.

This led to a number of in-depth analyses of the

basic factors underlying Britain's economic position.

Per-

haps no other single factor received as much attention as
British coal production.

Three decades earlier Stanley Jevons

had initiated a great controversy when he asserted that Britain might some day exhaust her coal supply and that such a
situation would threaten Britain's rank as the leading industrial nation of the world.

In 1897 the President of the Royal

Statistical Society gave an address recalling Jevon's thesiso
He pointed out that American coal production had increased
by more than 1000% in thirty-eight years and placed great
emphasis "upon the danger to our commercial supremacy from
the competition of the United States. 114 5
If in 1897 there were doubts expressed about the continuation of English commercial supremacy, there was no question
4 3J. Stephen Jeans, "The Coal Crisis and the Paralysis
of British Industry," Nineteenth Century, XXXIV (November,
1893), 801.
44
The Economist, December 11, 1897, 1739.
4 5The Times, leading article, December 16, 1897, 9.
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as to supremacy in the manufacture of iron and steel.

In

this industry the United States had surpassed Britain in
1890 and held, with only occasional exceptions, a commanding
lead thereafter.

And if there was rejoicing in Belfast be-

cause the Ulster linen trade sustained itself against the
challenge of "McKinleyism," there was little but gloom and
despair in Wales.

Tin-plate was to Wales what linen was to

Ulster, its only important industrial resource and its major
employer of capital and labor.

Most British tin-plate was

produced in Wales and about three-fourths of Britain's tinplate exports were sent to the United States; tin-plate exports normally made up the bulk of Britain's total iron and
steel exports to America.

When, under the protection affor-

ded by the McKinley Tariff, the United States established a
tin-plate industry capable of furnishing more than half of
the nation's requirements, Wales faced disaster.
Wales serious effects were also felt.

Beyond

The greatly reduced

demand for Welsh tin-plate led to reduced demand also for the
steel plate from which it was made, thus reducing demand for
British steel and pig-iron.

Similarly, it reduced the demand

for Cornish tin and thus nearly destroyed still another
regional industry.

Finally, the tremendous decline of tin-

plate exports to the United States, coupled with the reduction of American demand for British iron and steel products
generally, had serious effects on British shipping.

The

growth of the American iron and steel industry, and particularly the successful establishment of American tin-plate
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production, was of the utmost significance for key industries
which represented gigantic investments of British capital.
At the beginning of 1890 tin-plate was not being produced in the United States and as late as September of that
year The Economist asserted that no American tin-plate works
were in operation. 46 A Pennsylvania Congressman, however,
assured the American canning interests, who were concerned
about the adverse effects to their business of raising the
tin-plate duty from one to 2.2 cents per pound, that within
eighteen months American tin-plate producers would be making
all that was required for domestic consumption at a price
competitive with imported plates.

McKinley himself pointed

to the tin-plate duty as one of the outstanding benefits of
the new tariff.

McKinley and the Congressman from Pennsyl-

vania both insisted that the tariff would create a new industry, provide employment for between 30,000 and 50,000 men,
and eliminate the payment of $20,000,000 annually for British
plate. 4 7
The importance of the American market to British producers can be seen in the following figures: 48
British Exports of Tin-Plates (tons)
Total
To U. S.

1887
354,773
268,364

1888

1889

391,361
292,626

430,650
336,689

1890
418,725
318,108

4 6The Economist, MTS, September, 1890, 4.
4 7The Times, August 15, 1890, 3; September 29, 1890, 5.
48
com. History 1890, 24. According to the Com. History
1891, exports to the United States in 1890 were 321,109.
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The British press, therefore, watched the tin-plate duty
debate in America with great interest and concern.

The Times,

noting that nearly three-fourths of all the tin-plate produced
in Britain was sold to canning interests in the United States,
predicted that the proposed duty would "almost ar.nihilate the
tin-plate industry of South Wales."

The Economist was more

reserved in its comment, believing that it would be some time
before the Americans could establish their own works and that,
therefore, there would be an interval of time before any
4
serious decline would occur. 9 There were reports, however,
that "some of the largest manufacturers in America are increasing their capital very considerably with a view to the production of tin-plates."

Even before the tariff passed, I"TcKinley

claimed that plates were being tinned in St. Louis and as
soon as the duty was finally agreed upon it was announced
that major works were being established at Pittsburgh and
Baltimore.

As early as May it had been predicted that, if

the duty were increased, "parties from Wales" would establish
a large tin-plate mill at Pittsburgh.50
Congress, anticipating that it would take some time to
get the new industry established, arranged that the tin-plate
duty should not take effect until July 1, 1891.
interval between passage

.o.:f

In the

the tarif'i' and that date, the

4 9The Times, June 2, 1890, 11; The Economist, MTS, September, 1890, 4a
50The Economist, October 18, 1890, 1337-38; The Times,
September 29, 1890, 5; October 4, 1890, 5; May 21, 1890, 5.
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British regained a certain amount of confidence.

Despite

reports to the contrary, The Economist maintained that "there
is little evidence of any new tin-plate works being erected
in America," and "the Welsh tin-plate makers who have just
~eturned

from the American excursion of the Iron and Steel

Institute do not seem much alarmed at the prospect of competition in the States."

Reinforcing this confidence were the

Democratic victories of 1890 which called the maintenance of
protection into doubt and made it unlikely that large amounts
of capital would be invested in American mills.
~

The Econo-

was still hopeful that the Welsh industry could be

saved, along with the 500,000 tons of pig-iron which that
industry annually consumedo5l
The Americans remained convinced that a new industry had
been born.

In 1891 a celebration was held in Madison Square

Garden to celebrate that birth.

All the table service was

of American-manufactured tin-plate, including the tin menu
cards.5 2 Evidence was beginning to accumulate in support of
.American optimism.

The British Consul at Chicago reported

that "one of the largest manufacturers of cans and importers
of tin-plate had nearly completed tin-plate facilities outside Chicago and it was expected "that the substitution of
machinery for hand labour • • • will materially reduce the
cost, and within three or four years plates will be made
5lThe Economist, MTS, November, 1890, 4-5; Com. History
1890, 23.
5 2 The Times, May 1, 1891, 5o
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greatly cheaper than those now imported from En.gland, and
entirely of American material, and with American labour."
A Chicago steel firm was planning another tin-plate mill to
supply local packers, an already operative factory in St.
:iouis was being expanded, and other factories were being
built or planned throughout the Yddweat.

"It is confidently

believed," he reported, that the use of labor-saving equipment
"will lower the cost of production to a point which will in
a few years remove any fear of competition, and entirely
exclude imported plate. 11 53
Anticipation-of the new tariff kept American demand at
a very high level during the first half of 1891, so high iL
fact that the total figures for the year looked quite good;
British exports of tin-plate in 1891 exceeded 325,000 tons,
surpassing the figures for 1890.

However, only 62,000 of

those tons were sent after the tariff took effect July 1.
Nevertheless The Economist continued to hope that "the American demand will continue to expand still further" once the
large stocks of early 1891 were worked off, for "so far there
is little satisfactory evidence of any great development of
the power of production on the other side of the Atlantico"
James Kitson, President of the British Iron and Steel Institute, whose statement of 1890 that the Americans were and
would remain supreme in iron and steel was so widely quoted,
also expressed a cautious optimism.

He conceded that, 1'should

53The Economist, MTS, June, 1891, 9.
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the duty on tin plates be maintained, the Americans will
doubtless in course of time make their own tin plates."
But he believed further that "it will take many years to
displace what we are now sending from this country, and
• • • • it is therefore wise not to be alarmed fvr the future
of the tin-plate trade, but rather to anticipate with confidence that the United States trade will be replaced by
demands from other markets."54
Such guarded optimism was supported by statistics; in
the first half of 1892 Britain shipped a greater quantity of
tin-plates to America than she had in the first half of 1890,
indicating to some that American surplus stocks were nearly
gone and that the trade was being resumed on a pre-McKinley
, scale.55

Yet there was no denying that the McKinley Tariff

had already had adverse effects on the Welsh industry.

The

pre-tariff overstocking of the American market had led to
the danger of an "exceptional depression" for British producers.

The Economist pointed out that they might be forced to

go to half-production for a number of months to accomodate
themselves to the reduced demand.

In fact, many of the Welsh

mills closed for weeks in the summer of 1891.

The workers,

angry at the loss of wages, threatened that they would only
return after the layoff if their wages were increased and
there was fear that many of them might be lured away to the
54James Kitson, "The Iron and Steel Industries of America,"
Contemporary, LIX (May, 1891), 634-35.
55The Economist, MTS, July, 1892, 3.
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mills. in America.

Even the increased shipments of 1892

little to alleviate the depression of the Welsh industry
for these sales were being made at prices which The Economist
described as "quite unremunerative. 11 5 6 So far the Welsh
industry had escaped the annihilation which The

~imes

had

predicted, but it had not avoided depression and the disappearance of profits.

Such was the cost of dependency on the

American market.
Late in 1892 there were those in England and America who
claimed that the tariff had failed to foster an American tinplate industry.

A British critic argued that as of March,

1892 the A.merican,s were producing only enough to satisfy tHo
days' requirements of the United States.

He noted that many

American tin-plate factories, including the symbolically
important Pittsburgh McKinley Tinplate Company Limited, had
already failed and been abandoned.·

He concluded that in the

attempt "to create an industry at the expense of Wales, the
Americans have had the worst of it. 11 57

As late as December,

1892 the American Tin-plate Consumers Association complained
that, even if American producers made as much as they clained
they could in 1893, this would represent only 5% of what the
United States consumed; the remainder had to be imported at
tremendous cost to the American consumer because of the

56 The Economist, MTS, June,1891,

3-4; MTS,

April, lD;2, 5.

.

4; MTS, July, 1891,

57nonald, "McKinleyism and the Presidential Election, 11
499-500.
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tariff. 58
For many in England the future of the Welsh industry
s~emed

closely tied to the outcome of the American presiden-

tial election of 18920

The Economist noted in July that

So far the Mc;Cinley Tariff has had but little
effect on the tinplate trade • • • • No doubt some
small quantity of sheets are [sic] being tinned in
America, but any extensive development on the other
side of the Atlantic is improbable until the issue
of the present elections is decided. Should the
Republicans be again returned to power there will be
more confidence in the maintenance of the present
high duties, and capital may flow more freely into
the trade, whilst it is not iillpossible that some
South Wales makers may decide to transfer their
trade to the United States, as has been the case with
other large manufacturers, such as the Coates and
Clarks of Paisley. 59 The victory of Grover Cleveland generally pleased the British
and kindled new hopes for tariff revision.

But sober British

observers realized that it did not guarantee the security of
the Welsh tin-plate industry.

During the first year of oper-

ation of the new duty, the United States produced 20,000,000
pounds of tin-plate, enough, the American correspondent of
The Economist reported, to convince American protectionists
that the tariff could foster home industries.
according to the American Iron

By mid-1892,

& Steel Association, twenty

tin-plate factories were operating or ready to operate and
ten more were being built.

Tin-plate imports were expected
to decline considerably in the near future. 60 According to
58The Economist, MTS, December, 1892, 8.

59The Economist, MTS, July, 1892, 4; see also "Terne,''
letter to The Economist, October 22, 1892, 1333-34.
60 The Economist, August 20, 1892, 1071; MTS, June, 1892, 4.
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a United States Treasury report thirty-two works were producing tin-plate in September and fourteen others were being
built; ten of the producing firms were enlarging their facilities.

The United States was at that time producing at an

annual rate of 50,000,000 pounds or one-sixteenth of total
American consumption.

Under such conditions The Economist

warned that "it would be dangerous • • • to assume that the
change of Presidency will at once put a stop to tin-plate
production" in America.

Given the current level of activity,

"the more important question is whether any reduction of duty
will entirely stop the production in America."

Many author-

ities believed that once the industry was established in the
United States no policy was likely to check it,
especially as the American mind is quick to devise
new methods and improvements upon the production of
old countries. When any revision of the tariff comes
to be considered, there is no doubt that the new
industry will have to be heard in its defence • • • •
it is just possible that such a measure of protection
will be accorded in the future as may enable the
American producers of tin-plates to compete successfully with South Wales • • • • The fact that several
South Wales tin-plate makers are opening works in
America would seem to indicate an expectation on their
part that the production is likely to be still further
developed.61
Yet British exports increased once more in the first
quarter of 1893 and British opinion remained, tentatively
at least, optimistic.

Export figures indicated to The Econ-

omist that "in spite of the excessive duty and the efforts
made to manufacture tin-plates in the United States, we are
still able to command an extensive market there."
61 The Economist, November 19, 1892, 1445.
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1893 the Foreign Office released a report on the American
tin-plate industry drawn up by the British Legation at Washington, a report which The Economist described as "exhaustive."
Its principal findings were that little American-made tinplate had as yet become commercially available and that imports of British plate had not declined but had in fact shown
signs of increasing.

According to the official who prepared

the report, "a new industry in the manufacture of tin-plates
may be said to have started in the United States" and "there
appears to be no reason why the present difficulties as to
price and quality • • • should not be overcome in course of
time, provided the duty be maintained."

But, he continued,

whether the industry prove to be a success or merely
an experiment, it will, I ven"ljure to predict, be long
before more tin-plate is produced than will be absorbed by the constantly increasing consumption in
this country, and it will probably be years before the
English product will be seriously affected by the
McKinley Act or b~ the new industry under the best
of circumstances.62
The American depression of 1893-1894 resolved these ambiguities and destroyed British hopes that the tin-plate industry could maintain its American market.

The American de-

pression caused a drastic drop of British exports to the
United States during the second half of 1893 and "tin-plates
experienced even greater depression than any other branch of
the iron and steel trade."
62

American imports of British tin-

The Economist, MTS, April, 1893, 2; March 18, 1893, 323;
The Times carried an account of this report May 19, 1893, 2.
Por further manifestations of British confidence, see The
Times, leading article, January 25, 1893, 9; and The EC'Oiio~' MTS, January, 1893, 9.
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plates, which had fallen from more than 325,000 tons in 1891
to about 278,000 tons in 1892, fell still further in 1893 to
less than 256,000 tons. 6 3 This substantially reduced demand
for British steel plate and for pig-iron.
nea~ly

Furthermore, it

destroyed the tin-mining industry of Cornwall, for the

demand for Cornish tin was almost totally dependent on the
American demand for tin-plate.

By mid-1894 many Cornish

mines were on the verge of bankruptcy and tin-mine shares
had fallen from 40% to 97% below their post-McKinley Tariff
highs of 1892. 64
The depression in the United States lowered prices and
production costs to such an extent that The

Econo~

believed

that America would be able to maintain her tin-plate industry
and supply much of her own requirements.

By early 1895 the

price of steel billets, the raw material of the industry, was
"actually less in the United States than in South Wales" and
American production continued to rise.

There was little hope

for any immediate revival of the Welsh tin-plate industry,
but only the watchful waiting to determine the effects on the
American industry of the new Wilson Tariff, which reduced the
tin-plate duty from 10 to 5 10s. a ton. 6 5
American production figures provided no basis whatsoever
6 3The Economist, July 1, 1893, 785; MTS, September, 1893,
2; December 30, 1893, 1560; Com. History 1893, 25.
64 The F.conomist, August 4, 1894, 954-550
6 5The Economist, October 6, 1894, 1224; MTS, January,
1895, 5; April 13, 1895, 4820
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for British optimism.

According to the American Iron & Steel

Association, there had been no American tin-plate industry
when the McKinley duty took effect in mid-1891.

Within four

years, it boasted, "we had built up a tin-plate industry that
had excited the wonder of our Welsh rivals, compelled them to
greatly reduce the price of the tin-plates they sent us, and
given ample assurance that in less than four years more-perhaps in less than two years--we will be able, with favourable legislation, to supply all our own wants for tin-plates,
including exports, thus saving an annual payment of about
$20,000,000 to foreign manufacturers. 11 There could be no
doubt that the American industry had grown impressively:
American Tin-Plate Production (lb&)
1892
13,646,719

1893
99,819,202

1894
139,223,467

1895
193,801,073

"This pyramid of tin-plate production," contended the Association, "forms as complete a justification of the Protective
policy as has ever been printedo 1166
The prospects of the British industry could hardly have
been gloomier than they were as the tin-plate manufacturers
looked toward 18960

Though the American economic recovery

of 1895 had driven up the American cost of production, causing tin-plate producers to agitate for increased tariff protection, 67 both The Times and The Economist by now conceded
66 The Economist, November 16, 1895, 1498-99.
6 7The Economist, July 20, 1895, 942-43; September 28,
1895, 1275-76; November 16, 1895, 1498-99.
\
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that the United States had become practically self-sufficient
in the manufacture of tin-plates. 68 The United States was
now capable of producing at least 200,000 tons a year, a
figure sufficient to cut the average British shipments of
1889-1893 by half.

And, as if this were not bad enough,

there was the possibility that the tin-plate tariff might be
increased once again.

As The Economist sadly pointed out in

its review of the first quarter of 1896, only a few years
earlier Britain had been producing 550,000 tons of tin-plate
annually and sending more than 60% of it to the United States.
"Now we have lost fully one-half of the American trade, and
the remainder might be lost altogether by any change in the
American tariff. 1169
Whereas every other branch of the British iron and steel
industry experienced a renewal of prosperity in 1896, the
tin-plate trade remained severely depressed.

Even increasing

production costs proved incapable of checking the amazing
growth of the American tin-plate industry.

American produc-

tion increased from 193,801,073 lbs. of tin-plates in fiscal
1895 to 307,228,621 lbs. in fiscal 1896, an increase of 58%
in a single year.

Correspondingly, British tin-plate exports

declined significantly and by mid-1896 half the tin-plate
works of South Wales were reported closed.

Whereas only five

years earlier Wales had shipped an average of more than
68 The Times, leading article, January 14, 1896, 9; Col11.
History-rd95, 23-24.
G9The Economist, January 4, 1896, 4-5; April 11, 1896, 455.
t.
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25,000 tons a month to the United States, the monthly average
in 1896 was only 10,000 tons, a decline of 60% in the trade
of Wales' principal customer.

Throughout most of 1896 nearly

half of the 530 tin-plate mills in Britain were closed and
the remainder operated only irregularly.70
The prices which Welsh makers got for their product had
been low for years.

The American tendency toward self-suffi-

ciency kept them low and the depressed condition of the American iron and steel industry which led to the intense Anglo-·
American competition of 1897 drove them lower still.

As mill

after mill closed down or reduced hours and wages, labor
troubles became serious in the Welsh tin-plate industry.
The Economist was highly critical of the workers for refusing
"to meet the serious competition now experienced by English
manufacturers, and if this condition of matters continues,
the results may be very disastrous to the trade of the country. "7l

Any British reader who had followed the vicissitudes

of the British tin-plate trade in the pages of the British
press since the passage of the McKinley Tariff might have been
excused for thinking that the disaster had already occurred.
Though other branches of the British iron and steel
industry were not as

drastic~lly

affected as the tin-plate

trade, the industry generally nevertheless faced a formidable
challenge from its American counterpart in the 1890s.

In

70The Economist, July 11, 1896, 892-93; November 21,
1896, 153~; January 16, 1897, 76-77•
7libid •.
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1890 the United States had surpassed Britain for the first time
in the production of iron (9.2 million tons to 7.9 million)
and of steel (4.3 million tons to 3.7 million).

At the meet-

ing which the British Iron and Steel Institute held at Philadelphia in 1890, Sir James Kitson, Institute President, asserted that
the United States are the first producers of iron in
the world, and this is the first year of their exceeding the production of Great Britain, in which industry
Great Britain will never be able to regain the lead.
It is undeniable that America also leads the world
in the production of steel.72
Kitson's prediction was not quite accurate.

Britain regained

the lead in pig-iron production by a wide margin in 1894 and
by aslight margin in 1896.
essentially true.

The statement, however, remained

Whatever the actual production figures,

American productive capacity grew much more rapidly during
the 1890s than that of Britain so that, whenever demand warranted it, the United States could out-produce Britain by a
very wide margin.
The British iron and steel industry was reviving in the
latter 1880s from the serious depression which the industry
had suffered a few years earlier:?3

72Brock,"The Advance of the United States during One
Hundred Years," 127; Jennings, "The Trade League against
England," 902. There were numerous other references to
Kitson's.statement in the Britinh press in the early 1890s.
73com. History, annually.
include tin-plates.

These total export figures
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British Exports of Iron, Steel, and Their Products (tons)
!·~

1885

1886

1887

1888

1889

1890

Total 3,128,401 3,319,167 4, 1'+6, 907 3,966,984 4,188,388 4,001, 57
804,570 1,212,445
639,760
To U.S. 397,613
573,666 . 522,94
In regard to these figures it should be noted that: (1) Britain, which had long been without a serious rival, had been
displaced as the world's leading producer in 1890; (2) the
United States was a major purchaser of British iron and steel,
taking no less than 12% and upon occasion as much as 30% of
Britain's total exports; (3) American purchases fluctuated
violently, 1886 witnessing an increase of more than 100% and
1888 experiencing a decrease of nearly 50%; and (4) there was
no inverse correlation between American production and British
exports to the United States, for the same tendencies--especially the periodic "booms" in railroad construction--which
stimulated American production simultaneously enhanced the
opportunities for British exporters.
At the beginning of 1890 all seemed well with the British
iron and steel industry.

British total production and exports

were both up in 1889, despite declining American purchases.
According to The Economist, "the prospect of any immediate
increase in our trade with America is not very good," for "the
iron and steel trade of America has expanded at a very rapid
rate, and the production of pig-iron has been more than doubled wi thi:i.1 ten years."

Nevertheless, it continued, "it is

probable that the shipments to the United States have now
about reached a minimum, as they consist mainly of tinplates
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with a small quantity of pig-iron, unmanufactured steel, and
old iron."?4 With the important American market apparently
stabilized and home and foreign demand on the rise, the industry anticipated great prosperity.

The revival in iron and

steel had led to a great wave of activity in the engineering
trades as well.

When The Times compared the engineering

trades of Britain with those of the United States and the
Continent it smugly concluded that freedom of import and
governmental non-interference tended in thelong run to produce the greatest prosperity.75

The Economist also took note

of this engineering activity and commented that
while on previous occasions export to the United
States has been the main factor in determining the
prices of iron and steel, such a measure of trade no
longer applies. The increased demand for the services of British engineers~ and for the products of
engineering factories, comes now from all parts of
the world.r6
The British iron and steel industry looked to the future
with confidence.

Activity and prosperity had returned.

The

industry was less dependent on American demand, for home consumption and foreign sales in other markets were increasing.
Exports to the United States were believed to have hit bottom.
Though the American correspondent of The Economist reported
that Americans were predicting that within five years the
United States would have replaced Britain as the iron-supplier

or

the world,77 the British could easily pass this off as the
4
7 com. History 1889, 22-24.

?5The Times, January 24, 1890, 13.
?6·Com. History, 1889, 21.
??The Economist, February 8, 1890, 175-?6.
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idle talk of a traditionally boastful people.

They knew, for

example, that the United States Commissioner of Labor had
determined that the labor cost for producing a ton of steel
rails in the United States was $11.59 whereas in England it
was only $7.88.78 Yith such a competitive edge, the British
felt they had little to fear.
As previous chapters have shown, however, economic conditions could change rapidly and drastically and this proved
no less true for the British iron and steel industry between
1890 and 1897.

During the period it experienced both pros-

perity and depression, often alternating with great rapidity.
It learned that, contrary to the opinions of 1890, not only
did the American market still mean a great deal, that it was
as important as any other single factor facing the British
industry, but it also experienced occasionally severe American competition in iron and steel and in the engineering trades.
It faced this American challenge in the American market, in
neutral markets of the world, and even in England itself.
Not even Middlesborough, capital of the British iron and steel
industry, escaped being directly confronted by the American
challenge.
The prosperity and confidence of 1890 gave way with great
suddenness.

First came the Argentine political and financial

crisis and the subsequent Baring collapse.
Tariff was passed.

Then the McKinley

Finally, in 1890 American iron and steel

Production outstripped that of Britain.

78 The Times, August 15, 1890, 3.
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By mid-1890 January's optimism had begun to evaporate.
:Exports, The Economist reported, no longer represented a
bright spot in the picture and this was particularly true of
the American market.

"Owing to the great expansion of produc-

tion in the United States during the last twelve months • • •
our export trade with America is a diminishing quantity, and
even some of this is threatened by the Tariff Bill."

The

McKinley Tariff reduced certain duties, as Carnegie and others
pointed out to the British.

But the duty was increased on

the finer qualities of steel such as cutlery and screws and
the duties under the new tariff on such important items as
steel rails, beams, and wire rods remained sufficiently high
to compensate for the greater American production costs and
still leave an ample margin of protection.

We have already

seen what effect the McKinley Tariff had on tin-plates, which
represented 60% of Britain's total iron and steel exports to
the United States in 1889 and 1890.

The next most important

item among these exports was cotton tie hoops, which the
United States used in large quantities to bundle raw cotton
for shipment.

The Times and The Economist agreed that the

framers of the McKinley Tariff increased the duty on cotton
ties "so as to secure their being made in America, and • • •
we will likely lose this trade (about 20,000 tons) for next
season," for the duty was high enough "to secure the whole of
that trade to the American manufacturer."

As The Economist

wrote: "The intention of this tariff is to secure to American
Producers all the trade in iron and steel, and it would appear
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as if in time this might happen, but, as it will not happen
suddenly, we shall have time to adapt ourselves to this
changed condition of affairs."

With the tariff affording

ample protection to American makers, with the tin-plate trade
1 ~ jeopardy, and with the cotton tie trade likely to disappear,

British iron and steel producers would lose the demand for
a half-million tons of pig iron a year and the iron export
trade "has now but a comparatively small interest in American
business. 11 79
In sober contrast to the sanguine outlook at the beginning of 1890, The Economist declared the outlook for 1891 to
be dismalo

"Our trade with the United States," it said, "has

received a great shock by the passing of the McKinley Tariff
Bill • • • [and] it is beyond doubt that for some considerable
time our trade with that country must experience a check. 1180
While the British producers grew increasingly anxious about
their depressed trade, two illustrious British visitors to
the United States were writing glowing reports on the growth
of the American industry, especially that of the South.

The

Duke of Marlborough, after presenting the usual array of
statistics and an invidious comparison of British and American
rates of growth, hazarded the prediction that the center of
American production would shift from Pennsylvania to Virginia
?9The Economist, MTS, September, 1890, 4; Donald, "McKinleyism and the Election," 497-98; The Times, January 30, 1891,
3; The Economist, Octobe~ 18, 1890, 1337-38; Com. History 1890,
23 •.
80 com. History 1890, 23; The :Economist, January 3, 1891,

5-6.
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and Tennesseeo

He looked forward to the day when its ample

coal and ore supplies and the cheaper transportation and labor
costs which it enjoyed, would enable the South to outproduce
the North and to become "a veritable Black Country in America."
Sir James Kitson,

Presiden~

of the British Iron

a~d

Steel

Institute who had in 1890 declared the supremacy of the American industry, called attention to the great American talent
for adaptation.

Though the important inventions of the modern

iron and steel industry were all of British origin, according
to Kitson, the Americans profited from English experience.
"The Americans have not invented, they have improved" and,
"supplemented by their own ingenuity for mechanical devices
and appliances, they were able to lay down plant of the best
models • • • • Their blast fm:-naces are more capacious than
ours, their engines are more powerful, their rolling mills
are of new and improved construction."

These, together with

the high standard of education, particularly technical education, among the workers and the managers' promptness to discard the old and immediately adapt whatever improvements became available, made American facilities the best in the world.
This was particularly true of the Southern facilities.

Kitson

noted the rapid expansion of iron foundries, nail factories,
and pipe and engine works in Alabama.

The production cf pig-

iron in that state had increased from a mere 62,000 tons in
1880 to l,?80,000 tons in 1890.

The Birmingham district alone

produced 2,200 tons of pig-iron a day and at the lowest
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production cost in the United States. 81
Despite such impressive growth, Kitson insisted that
"there need be no ground for apprehension as to the competition o:f the United States," for "the English iron and steel
makers will continue to
est competitors."

h~ld

their position with their keen-

Not only were the British beginning also

to erect modern fac·ili ties on a large scale, but the vast
productive capacity of the United States would be kept fully
occupied satisfying the enormous domestic demand.

Even were

this not the case, the British policy of Free Trade, "our
insular position, our abundant supply of labour, our accessibility to mineral products, make it certain that England, as
a producer of iron and steel, will continue to hold the leading place in the neutral markets of the world. 1182 Such confident predictions, however, could not hide the fact that the
British industry was in serious trouble in 1891 and 1892.
British pig-iron production in 1890 declined by nearly 400,000
tons, while American production increased by 21% (on top o:f a
17% increase in 1889).
alarming.

Longer-term statistics were even more

Between 1880 and 1890 American steel production

had increased by 290%.

Between 1880 and 1892 British produ·c-

tion o:f pig-iron had decreased by the enormous amount of
1,132,343 tons, while American production increased by 5,321,809
tons.

Under the circumstances The Economist felt obliged to

echo Kitson's remark of 1890 and to grant to the United States
81 Duke .of Marlborough, "Virginia Mines and American Rails,"
?91-92, ?95; Kitson, "The Iron and Steel Industries of America,"
635-36, 6400
82Kitson, "The Iron and Steel Industries of America," 640-41.
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"the title of premier pig-iron producers of the world." 8 3
The dismal pattern continued.

British pig-iron produc-

tion, which in 1891 had fallen to a post-1886 low, fell still
further in 1892 to 6,616,890 tons.

British total exports of

iron and steel, which between 1887 and 1890 had averaged
more than 4,000,000 tons annually, fell in 1892 to only
2,740,2170

British exports to the United States also contin-

ued to decline; in 1892 they reached the lowest point in nearly
a decade:
British Iron and Steel Exports to the United States (tons)
188?
1,212,445

1888
639,760

1889
573,666

1890
522,943

1891
43?,884

1892
348,788

Reasons for this export decline were not hard to find.
plate exports were checked if not yet destroyed.

Tin-

The trade

in cotton ties had been destroyed; in 1891 Britain exported
less than 5,000 tons of this article to America, far under
the nearly 30,000 tons of 1889.

Another badly depressed

branch of the British industry was that of steel rails.

The

Economist pointed out in dismay that not only had most of
Britain's former customers ceased to build railroads at the
same time but that some countries, the United States among
them, could now make all the steel rails they required. 84
8 3The Economist, MTS, November, 1890, 5-6; The Times,
April 24, 1891, 5; Williamson, British Industry and Foreign
Competition, 236-37;_ The Economist, February 7, 1891, 170-71.
84
The Economist, MTS, April, 1892, 5; December 31, 1892,
16360 See also'""'t1ie ..Com. Histories for 1891 and 1892.
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Hindrances to British exports to America were not limited to expanding American production and the protective tariff,
however.

The American industry had overproduced in 1890; in

1891 it faced depressed conditions and cut back production.
But, far from bringing any satisfaction to the BI·i tish industry, this reaction led to price-cutting and an American search
for foreign markets. 8 5 In 1891 Andrew Carnegie predicted that
the already low American prices would decline still further
before the depression was corrected.

This meant that there

was little hope for any British revival for, as Carnegie
pointed out, the industrial economies were interdependent.
"The world is so closely interwoven, one part with another,"
he said, "that nothing can happen in Europe which cannot affect
us here, and vice versa." 86 This interdependence of the
British and American economies, lost sight of when British
trade prospered in 1889 and 1890 despite the fact that exports
to America were falling to less than half the 188? level, was
brought once again to the attention of the British during the
depressed conditions of 1891; they seldom forgot it thereafter.
American prices did continue to drop, as Carnegie had predicted.

"The present prices ruling in America for pig-iron and

steel rails," The Economist commented in 1892, "does not seem
to hold out any :imlediate hope for any increase of trade
8 5This competition will be examined in Part III.
86 The Economist, MTS, April, 1891, 4, quoting an interview
With Carnegie which appeared in the American journal, Iron Age.
For additional comments on this interdependence, see The Economist, August 8, 1891, 1015-16; and MTS, September, 1891, 4.-
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these articles." 8 ?
In the light of all these factors The Economist doubted
validity of the British optimism which the election of
Grover Cleveland brought about.

It pointed out that British

iron and steel exports to the United States had been falling
consistently since 1887, even before the passage of the McKinley Tariff.

Furthermore, American production was on the rise

again after a slack 1891.
9~157,000

In 1892 the United States produced

tons of pig-iron to Britain's 6,617,000 and with

already existing facilities the United States could produce
more than 12,000,000 tons if demand warranted it.

"Of one

thing," The Economist concluded, "the British iron-master
may remain perfectly satisfied, and that is, that the Americans, having now got the control of their own market, mean
to keep it by hook or by crook."

Finally it pointed out that,

if a tariff reduction resulted from the Cleveland victory,
wages and other costs cf production would also decline and the
United States would become still more competitive in neutral
marketso 88
By early 1893 the unsatisfactory conditions in the British iron and steel industry were becoming more widely noticed.
The Times called attention to the increasing disparity of
production between the rivals: "The :production of pig-iron
[in the United States] increased from 2,546,713 tons in 1872
8 7The Economist, November 19, 1892, 1445.
88 The Economist, February 4, 1893, 133-34; November 19,
1892, 1445-46; Decembe.!' 31, 1892, 1637-38.
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to 9,157,000 tons last year.

Twenty years ago it was a little

more than a third of that of Great Britain; but it has grown
so steadily and rapidly that now the United States is the
largest producer in the world." 8 9 A very much stronger statement appeared in The

For·~nightly

Review:

From all we can learn it seems certain that the
extraordinary depression of the British iron and
steel trade must be attributed chiefly to the effects
of competition. In the United States, iron and steel
are produced as cheaply as, if not more cheaply than,
in Great Britain, although the wages of labour are
from fifty to seventy per cent. higher in America,
and capital can only be obtained there at a higher
rate of interest. It is a severe reflection upon
the intelligence of the British manufacturers of iron
and steel that they are losing their s~premacy in
this branch of trade, because they will not introduce
labour-saving appliances until they are compelled to
do so by the pressure of successful competition.90
The worst, however, was still to come.

The American de-

pression which began in the summer of 1893 had an immediate
and tremendous impact on British trade and iron and steel
suffered along with the other British industries.

The extent

of the British adversity can be judged from the following
mournful mid-year comment:
Bad as the present condition of the [iron and
trade is, we regret that beyond the statement
that 'things can scarcely be worse," we see little
to encourage any great expectations as to the future.
• • • Our best foreign customers are now suffering
very severely from financial disturbance, and we cannot expect but that they will do a hand-to-mouth trade
for a very long time to come.
steel~

If anything, continued The Economist, the .American situation
8 9The Times, February 27, 1893, 11.
90
.
"The Present Depression of Trade," Fortnightly, LIII
(March, 1893), 308-09.
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"is perhaps more unsatisfactory than our own."
iron production increased slightly.

British pig-

In the United States pig-

iron production declined by 22% (though it remained larger
than British production) and Bessemer steel production dropped
off even more sharply.

with the American market in such a

depressed state, British iron and steel exports to the United
States declined for the sixth consecutive yearo9l
The gravest problem for the British industry remained
the decline of American prices.

This decline, which had

begun in 1891, was accelerated by the depression of 1893-1894.
The American correspondent of The Economist pointed out in
1893 that the price of American steel rails had recently been
slashed from $29 to $21 a ton, "so that we have the spectacle
of leading rail manufacturers offering their wares at practically the same price they would cost f .o.bo at London, without
takers. 11 92
Not even the substantial reduction of certain duties
enacted by the Wilson Tariff was sufficient to restore British sales in the American market.

Though the new tariff

out-McKinleyed McKinley by raising the duty on such metal
manufactures as wire, iron and steel rivets, and umbrella and
parasol ribs, tips, and frames, the general direction of the
revision was downward in iron and steel as well as in other
products.

The duty on tin-plate, as we have already seen, was

9lThe Economist, July 1, 1893, ?85; MTS, February, 189L'.,

4; Com. History

1893, 25.

~ 92 Th e Ee onomis
. t , December 2, 1893, 143?0
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nearly halved.

Cotton ties were placed on the free list.

The duty on pig-iron was cut from $60?2 to $4.00 a ton and
other reductions were also made.

But, since America was now

producing iron and steel at virtually the same price as the
British (or at least at

v~ices

equivalent to British cost plus

transportation charges), the Wilson Tariff availed the British
iron and steel industry next to nothing.

The Americans were

manufacturing cotton ties at a cost sufficiently low to exclude British imports.

The same was true in the case of rail-

road and bar iron, which "are now sent [to America] in such
exceptionally small quantities that the trade may be said to
be practically nil" and no tariff revision could alter the
fact.

As for pig-iron and steel, the reduced protection affor-

ded by the Wilson Tariff was still more than sufficient to
give the Americans the competitive edge in their home marketo93
When, toward the end of 1894, the American industry began
to revive and it became apparent that low American prices were
not merely the result of depression and therefore only temporary, the British became alarmed.

Andrew Carnegie pointed out

to British readers that the price of Bessemer pig-iron and of
steel billets at Pittsburgh had dropped below the prices at
Middlesborough, center of the British industry.94 The Economist
analysed at great length the fall of iron and steel prices
93The Economist, September 1, 1894, 1077-78; August 25,
1894, 1042; October 6, _1894, 12240
94carnegie, "Britain and the United States," 323; for a
similar rep~rt see The Economist, MTS, January, 1895, 5.
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throughout the world and concluded that the tendency was
strongest in the United States, where manufacturers had substantially reduced prices, in some cases cutting them by half.
They had been able to do so because of the reduction of the
price of ore (now as cheap as that which Britain used); the
reduction of the price of coke (now much cheaper than British
coke); the reduction of transportation costs (also much cheaper
than Britain's); and the reduction of wages (by as much as
20%)o

Though American wages remained higher than British wages,

American labor was considerably more efficient.

The only fac-

tor which saved the British iron and steel industry from the
gravest danger was, according to The Economist, distance and.
the necessity of transporting the American product by rail or
by river and then across the Atlantic.

"But for this fact

the iron-masters of Alabama would now be flooding English markets with their common forge and foundry pig-iron, which they
are selling at furnaces for four or five shillings per ton
less than the same quality or iron is sold for in this country."
There were reports that a manufacturer in the American South
had taken a large order for pig-iron at less than $6 a ton;
a decade earlier most iron experts had been certain that pigiron could never be sold profitably at less than $10 a ton.
The Economist warned further that, if these conditions did
not change, not only would the British have to reconcile themselves to the loss of all their American business "but we
should be prepared for possible competition in some of our
foreign markets; already it is experienced in Canada."

In

234
fact, in both 1893 and 1894 American exports of iron and steel
exceeded the import of those goods.

There were reports that

high quality American iron and steel products were underselling
British goods in England itselfo95
Although in 1894 British production of pig-iron exceeded
American production for the first time in five years, the
American industry revived rapidly at the end of the year,
leading The Economist to predict that there would be no increase
of British iron and steel exports to the United States.

Hap-

pily for the British, in the short run at least, the prediction
proved erroneous.

By mid-1895 the American revival was in

full stride; there was a general recovery throughout the American economy in which the iron and steel industry participated
fully.

Renewed prosperity meant renewed demand.

Together they

led quickly to rather considerable price increases which in
turn presented long-awaited opportunities for British iron
and steel producers.

Even cotton ties, which Britain had not

exported to the United States for

y~ars,

were once again in

demand and The Economist happily predicted that most of America's requirements for cotton ties in 1896 would be imported
from Britain.

For the first time in years the "Commercial His-

tory & Review" was able to report a distinct improvement in
the British iron and steel industry, an improvement based
95The Economist, November 3, 1894, 1343-44; February 2,
1895, 153-55; Com. History 1894, 23; May 25, 1895, 686; Williamson, British Industries and Forei n Com etition, 236-37~
For detai s on
erican compe 1 ion outsi e
e nited States
see Part IIIo
·

'

l

235
chiefly on the reappearance of American demand for British
iron and steel goods.9 6
American economic recovery stimulated British exports
and British hopes, but they were to be short-lived.
soared, so did American production.

As prices

The American industry

had been producing at only two-thirds capacity or less for
several years, but as soon as prices became remunerative the
additional capacity was brought into operation.

During the

interval between the decision to go to full production and
the actual expanded functioning of the American facilities,
British producers eagerly received a flood of American orders.
But the brief duration of such, a prosperous interlude was
apparent to The Economist even at the beginning of 1896.

Bri-

tish optimism, it warned,
was in large measure doomed to disappointment, owing
to the rapidity with which the American manufacturers
set to work to bring their large reserve force of production into operation • • • • Unless there is a very
large demand from the railway companies of America
in 1896 it will be found difficult to absorb the present tremendous output, and competition will likel~
keep prices down to about the cost of production.9r
Just how rapidly the Americans responded to the new situation can be seen in the fact that pig-iron production in 1895
increased by 4,2% over 1894, reaching a record 9,446,000 tons,
well above the previous high of 1890.

By November of 1895

American production had risen to an annual rate of 12,000,000

1895,

9 6 The Economist, October 12, 1895, 1334; Com. History

23.

9?com. History 1895, 23-24.
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tons and the experts insisted that this could be increased to

i5,ooo,ooo

if necessary.

But, as The Economist predicted,

only highly unusual requirements could create a demand sufficient to absorb this large output; American demand in 1896
proved inadequate to the enormous production.

By early 1896

the rate of production had dropped 10% from its November peak
and prices had fallen by $4 a ton.98
The growth of the American iron and steel industry had
won admiring commendations from British protectionists.

As

one' wrote:
The great object of American statesmanship has been
the creation of manufacturing industries; and this
object has been realised by the aid of protective
duties. The rapid growth of the iron and steel trades
in the United States proves the wisdom of American
fiscal policy. Home production for home consumption
has been the corner-stone of America's industrial
systemo99
In 1896, however, American home consumption proved unequal to
production and prices once again began to fall.

We have al-

ready seen that this reaction proved to be the final disaster
for the British tin-plate industry.

What it meant generally

to the British iron and steel industry was active competition
in Latin America, in Asia, and even in England.

British inter-

est in the American market tended to fade in the face of thi.s
American competition, to which we must now turn.

98 The Economist, February 1, 1896, 137-38.
99Burgis, Perils to British Trade, 1800
I
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PART IIIo

THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN INFLUENCE

AND COMPETITION AROUND THE GLOBE, 1890-1897

CHAPTER VI
THE APPEARANCE OF AMERICAN COMPETITION
The Growth of American

Export~

As Part II attempted to show, the major thrust of the
American challenge between 1890 and 1897, as seen from the
British point of view, had to do with British losses in the
American market.

Nevertheless, even at the height of the

debate in the British press over the effects of the McKinley
Tariff, a few observers foresaw that Britain might have to
confront that challenge on a much broader scale in the future.
The "main object 11 of the Americans, wrote L. J. Jennings,
is to build up the biggest trade in the world, and
they will do it, and do it moreover by that very
Protection which, as our philosophers tell us, saps
the foundations of every industry to which it is
applied • • • • the Americans ha·.re beaten us at the
iron and steel trades, in which thirty years ago
they did next to nothing, and ~ventually they will
pass us in the cotton trade. They are now turning
their attention to shipping, in which we are at
present supreme • • • • the shrewd Americans believe
that their chance has come of stepping into the
first place, and putting England into the second. 1
Jennings was a Fair Trader and therefore perhaps not an unbiased witness.

There was no taint of the Fair Trader about

J. Stephen Jeans, however.

Jeans favored Free Trade for

England and he was a sober analyst not given to exaggerating
1

Jennings, "The Trade League against England," 910-11.
For the earlier contributions of Jennings,_Jeans, ~nd Atkinson, see Part Io
23?

l.
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the American threat.

He too attempted to alert British rea-

ders to the possibility of American competition.

His argu-

ment had nothing to do with American protection but was,
rather, an amplification of certain points which the American
Atkinson had first brougat to the attention of the British
public.

Like Atkinson, Jeans believed that the growth of the

American railroads, by cheapening commodities throughout the
world and revolutionizing the source of Europe's food supply,
had established a new world economic situation.

He noted that

the United States already benefited from low ocean transport
rates and he anticipated still further reductions of American
internal transportation costs.

"It seems, then," he wrote,

"to be the 'manifest destiny' of the United States to continue
for many years to come to be the dominant factor in the agricultural, and perhaps, also, in the industrial situation of
Europe, and more especially of the United Kingdom."

Though

Jeans' more immediate concern was Britain's overwhelming depen-

touched but slightly, though indulgently, on the antiquated and decaying institutions of Europe, in order
to expatiate on the present grandeur and prospective
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pre-eminence of that glorious American republic, in
which Europe enviously seeks its model and trembling
foresees its doom.2
More typical of British opinion in 1890, however, was
The Economist when, without any mention of the United States,
it listed Britain, Germany, and France as the "chief rivals
in the world market."3

American exports had demonstrated an

awe-inspiring growth since 1870, when they had amounted to
less than f80,000,000o

In 1889 American exports were valued.

at d'l65,450,000 (compared with Britain's ci248,049,000), an
increase of

nea~ly

20% over 1888.

But "it is noticeable, as

usual," The Economist said, "that the manufacturing industry
of the country has but an insignificant share in the improvement."

Two-thirds of the total was made up of food and raw

cotton and three-fourths of the increase over 1888 was in
these same commodities.

According to The Economist,

Manufactured goods constitute only a small fraction
of the total and show but a trifling advance, the
main reason, of course, being that the manufacturing
industry of the country is hampered by the protective
tariff • • • o However much the protective tariff may
enable manufacturers in the United States to dominate
the home markets, it certainly renders it impossible
for the country to compete in her export trade with
one which labours under no fiscal restrictions.
Passage of the McKinley Tariff further· strengthened this widelyheld British belief.

Though total American exports rose again

in 1890 and iron, steel, and cotton goods exports showed
2

J. Stephen Jeans, "American Railways and British Farmers," Nineteenth Centur~, XX:VIII (September, 1890), 407, 392,
409. _The Coming nace (1 71) was a utopian fantasy of a lost
subterranean people, by Edward Bulwer, Lord Lytton.

3The Economist, MTS, October, 1890, 15-16.
I
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impressive gains, The Economist continued to insist that
it is difficult to see how any impetus can be given
to foreign trade in manufacturing articles so long
as the cost of production is enhanced by protection.
If the people of the United States care to relinquish
their power of competing in the markets of the world
in order that a few nanufacturers a~ongst them may
enjoy the monopoly of the home trade • • • it is
scarcely the place of outsiders to complain.4
As we have seen in Chapter IV, however, by 1897 The Econo-

-

mist was forced to acknowledge that American manufactured
exports were serving to check the expansion of similar British

goods.

America's competitive ability came as something of a

revelation to the British in 1897 for, despite the numerous
indicators that appeared in the British press between 1890 and
1897 which comprise Part III of this study, few people in
Great Britain really believed that a nation which adhered to
"McKinleyism" in one form or another could be a truly formidable competitor in world markets.

This chapter will examine

what may be called the pre-conditions to the emergence of
serious American competition: the growth of American manufactured exports, plans for strengthening the American merchant
marine, and the expansion of America's global influence.
sequent chapters in

Pa~t

Sub-

III will examine reciprocity and

American competition in the New World and American competition
around the globe between 1890 and 18970
It quickly became apparent that the American policy of
"McKinleyism" was not going to halt the growth of total
4

The Economist, MTS, March, 1890, 5-6; MTS, March, 1891,
Similar statements often appeared in The Times; see,
for example, February 15, 1890, 13.

5-6.
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American exports or the expansion of American industrial capability.

Yet both The Economist and The Times continued to

emphasize the preponderance of agricultural exports and "the
continued poorness of the part played by American manufacturers
in her total foreign tra~e."5

At the same time, however,

these newspapers published information which demonstrated
that at least certain American manufactured exports were increasing at an impressive rate.

A comparison of American

exports for fiscal 1890 and fiscal 1891 showed that cotton
goods exports increased by
£2,721,000.

~21,000

and reached a total of

Manufactured petroleum products increased by

i298,000, totalingot9,230,000.

Iron and steel increased by

.f6?4,000, reaching £2,655,000.

Leather and copper manufactures

also showed sizeable increases. 6
fiscal 1892.

This growth continued in

The total value of American manufactured exports

was seldom ascertainable, but The Economist was able to gauge
the approximate rate of increase by comparing the "all other
articles" category (that is, total exports minus the exports
of natural products) of official United States figures.

From

fiscal 1887 to fiscal 1892 this category of American exports
grew as follows:?
1887
36.3

1888
36o3

1889
39.5

1890
43.9

1891
46.3

1892
47.5

5see, among many examples, The Economist, MTS, August,
1892, 4-5; The Times, March 13, 1891, 13; October 1, 1892, 9.
6 The Economist, MTS, September, 1891, 5o
7The Economist, MTS, August, 1892, 4-5.
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''

The question of the character of American exports was
chiefly one of emphasis.

Robert McCormick, in England to

promote the Chicago Exhibition, conceded that more than 80%
of American exports consisted of foodstuffs and raw materials,
but he considered it

mor~

appropriate to call attention to

the relative growth of manufactured exports rather than to
the preponderance of natural products.

He informed the Bri-

tish public that among American exports in 1891 important
increases had been made in many manufacturing categories.
These included hardware, sewing machines, tools, engines and
boilers, glassware, and miscellaneous machines.

Most impres-

sive of all, the export of American locomotives increased by
;£447,524 and reached a total value of i65Lt,965; the export

of railway cars increased by ;f251,437 to a total of ~1,055,382. 8
The Englishman, J. Stephen Jeans, concurred with McCormick.
He denied the British assertions, which appeared frequently
during the presidential campaign of 1892, that the Americans
had seen the folly of "McKinleyism" and were repudiating it.
Furthermore, he denied that the American policy of protection
had proved a failure.

Jeans pointed out that the growth of

American exports between 1880 and 1890 represented "a larger
increase than has occurred within the same interval on the
part of any other country in the worldo"

Agriculture was and

would likely remain the staple industry of the United States,
he said.
8

But there had occurred "a sensible increase of late

McCor~ick, Future Trade Relations, 21-22.
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years" in manufactured exports.

Only 9.6% of America's total

exports in 1880 had been of manufactured goods.

Of the much

larger total exports of 1891 19.3% were manufactures.

Despite

constantly increasing wages and the passage of the McKinley
Tariff, the value of American manufactured exports rose from
545,500,000 in 1860 to $79,000,000 in 1880 and to $169,000,000

in 1891.

American industry was clearly something which British

manufacturers would have to reckon with.9
The .American depression of 1893-1894 caused many American manufacturers to seek foreign outlets for their products
and in these years manufactures contributed to the continuing
expansion of total American exports.

This increase of Ameri-

can manufactured exports, coinciding as it did with the sharp
decline of British exports to the United States, elicited a
number of statements in the British press.

The author of a

study of foreign competition compiled a list of manufactured
items which the United States exported in large quantities:
rifles and ammunition, clocks and watches, pianos and organs,
locks and safes, joinery work and furniture, agricultural
implements, and tools and machinery of all kinds. 10

In a

more detailed statement, the values of leading American manufactured exports were pointed out to British readers by Andrew
Carnegie.

In 1893 the United States exported i6,000,000

worth of iron and steel; for the first time these exports
9Jeans, "The American Tariff, 11 755, 757.
lOYilliamson, British Industry and Foreign Competition,
237.
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exceeded imports of the same items.
reached.f2,400,000.

Cotton goods exports

Exports of agricultural implements were

valued at nearly Dfl,000,000 and Carnegie boasted that "America
has now the command of the world for agricultural machinery."
Other prominent exports were copper manufactures Gf900,000);
carriages and cars (.;£500,000); glassware (il,600,000); leather
and its manufactures (..(2,000,000); musical instruments (;;(360,000);
paper G;E300,000)--"some English journals are now printed upon
American paper," according to Carnegie; clocks and watches
(.£200,000); and scientific instruments (J=260,000). 11
Reflecting on this growth of American manufactured exports,
Jeans wrote in 1894 that
American agriculture had displaced English agricultural produce many years ago, and threatens to do so
more and more. But the British manufactu~er has
recen~ly been threatened with the same fate.
In
the iron, cotton, and other leading industries, American inventiveness and enterprise have brought American prices almost down to a European level. The
cultivation of foreign markets, hitherto disregarded
except for agricultural produce, has now become for
American manufacturers a matter of the most pressing
concern. Having filled to overflowing their own
previously redundant order-books, they are now adjusting their costs so as to meet Britain in the
principal markets of the world.
If the depression led to labor strife in the United States,
such as Britain had experienced in 1893, then, according to
Jeans, "the competition which we dread may still be some way
off, but if Britain were to have a monopoly of labour troubl es • • • this undesirable and ominous end could not be long
11 carnegie, "Britain and the United States," 324; for
similar information on some of these exports, see The Economist,
April 28, 1894, 517-18; MTS, August, 1894, 4-5.
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delayed."

12

This theme continued to receive attention in the British
press during 1895.

"Great Britain is not, and never now can

be, the workshop of the world," wrote Edwin Burgis.
title was passing to Britain's rivals.

This

"The success of the

protectionist policy of our foreign competitors • • • in
building up their manufacturing industries in the face of
our competition, to an equality with ourselves, has now deprived us of even the last advantage," that of keeping costs
low and finding ready sales in neutral markets.

The protec-

tionist nations have also lowered the cost of production, he
claimed, and Germany, France and the United States "are in a
position to dispute the possession of every market in the
world with us, notwithstanding all that has been said in
favour of o:ir Free Trade policy."

Captain Lugard insisted

that the search for new markets for· British goods was imperative because of the "commercial rivalry" and the "commercial
hostility" among the Great Powers, "more especially on the
part of America, Germany, and France, by means of hostile
tariffs, State bounties, and protectiono"

An

anonymous author,

whose long-term fear was of Chinese competition, noted that
in his own day Germany, the United States, Belgium, and even
Italy "are all beginning to compete with us more or less seriously in some of our own pet markets, and there is every
prospect of a growing competition in the future. 111 3
12 Jeans, "The Labour War in the United States," 267.
1 3Burgis, Perils to British Trade, 74, 143-44; Captain F. D.
Lugard, "New British Markets (3) Tropical Africa," Nineteenth
~ntur~, XXXVIII (September, 1895), 442.
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Still, the notion that the tariff prevented the United
states from being competitive in world markets did not die.
"The competition of America is weakened, if not destroyed,
by a protective tariff," one Englishman wrote, though he did
predict "that if that tariff be modified or suppressed, and
Free-trade be adopted on the other side of the Atlantic, we
shall be embarked upon a struggle far more severe than any
in the past. 1114 More prestigious voices drew even more negative conclusions.

Though The Times claimed that "Germany

seems to be hopelessly outdistanced and our serious competitor
would seem to be the United States," it reiterated American
exports consisted chiefly of foodstuffs and raw cotton, which
did not compete with British

p~oducts.

And, though the United

States was obtaining an increasing share of the European market, that "share is still only 9 per cent. of the total, and
they have lost some ground in the various American countries
which, a

prior~,

sessions.1115

they ought to have kept, and in British pos-

Sir Robert Giffen, Board of Trade official and

influential economist, denied, as he had long done and would
continue to do, the existence of any real challenge to British
industry.

He recognized that cotton manufacturing had grown

rapidly on the Continent and in the United States so that Lancashire had become "primus inter pares" rather than the commanding leader of the world industry.

He recognized further

14 L. R. Phelps, "The Economy of High Wages," Edinburgh"
CLXXIX (January, 1894), 59.
15The Times, leading article, May 4, 1894, 9; for details
Of AmerICaii exports to these markets, see Chapters VII and
VIII.
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that the United States had surpassed Britain in iron and steel
production and was on the verge of surpassing her in the production of coal.

But, he insisted,

there is nothing in these facts to explain the special apprehensions of the present depression. As
yet there has been nothing in foreign competition
to prevent great growth and great prosperity at home •
• • • On grounds of theory, we believe, there is
nothing in the extension of that competition to gi6e
us any real cause for apprehension in the future.
American exports had sagged in 1895, but by the end of
the year prices were reviving and exports were climbing once
again.

In 1896 American exports reached£20l,175,000, an

increase of

~36,300,000

over 1895.

This was the first of a

series of export increases and set the stage for the British
excitement over American competition in 1897·
In 1896, however, i t was tne fear of German competition
which alarmed many in Britain.

E. E. Williams' Made in

Ger·~

manz was only the most flamboyant of the many publications of
1896 which called attention to the German threat and which
provoked Salisbury's scornful comment that his contemporaries
were "a degraded generation compared with what our fathers
were."

Lord Rosebery, on the other hand, attempted to make

the issue his own and gave a number of speeches on German
competition.

The Times and The Economist sided with Salis-

bury, denying that German competition was a serious threat
to Britain. 1 7

Nevertheless, public opinion was sufficiently

16sir Robert Giffen, "Depression Corrected," Edinburgh,

CLXXXII (July, 1895), 1-11; the quoted passage is from ll.
1 7The l'irnes, leading article, September 16, 1896, ?; a.IJ.ong

the many such statements in The Economist, see especially June
20, 1896, 794; August 1, 1896, 996-97; and October 24, 1896,
1385-86 •.
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aroused that Parliament called for an official investigation.
This resulted in the publication in January of 1897 of a report
compiled by Sir Robert Giff en and Sir Courtenay Boyle under
the auspices of the Board of Trade entitled "Memorandum on the
Comparative Statistics of Population, Industry, and Commerce
in the United Kingdom and Some Leading Foreign Countries."
This report, popularly known as the "Boyle Memorandum," analysed the commerce and industry of Germany, France, and the
United States.

Its primary focus was on German competition

since it was this which led initially to the demand for an
investigation, but it contained interesting and significant
information about American com.:petition alsoo 18
The "Boyle Memorandum" acknowledged that Great Britain
was facing increasing competition on the part of rival exporting nations.

It took the position that changes in relative

population must significantly affect trade patterns.

Of the

foreign nations under consideration, the United States demonstrated the highest rate of growth both in total and in urban
population.

As for the growth of foreign trade, France occu-

pied the same relative position as an exporting nation in
1891-95 that she had held in 1880-84; Germany had advanced;
and the United States had advanced even more rapidly than
Germany.

However, the "Boyle Memorandum" concluded, "we are

still greatly ahead of either country in our power of manu-

v

~,i

I

18The following section is based on press reports of the
content of the "Boyle Memorandum." The most important of these
were the detailed summary which appeared in The Times, January
29, 1897, 12; and January 30, 1897, 120 A summary and selected
excerpts appeared in J.B.C. Kershaw, "The Future of British
Trade," Fortnightly, LXII n.s. (November, 1897), 732-43.
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facture for export, so much so that up to the present the
gains of either in this respect have had no very serious
effect upon our trade, but beginning from a lower level, each
country is for the moment travelling upwards more rapidly
than we are who occupy a lD.uch higher eminence."

In addition,

it pointed out, "neither of our rivals exports manufactures
to the same extent [as Britain], although Germany has undoubtedly made some gains, and both Germany and the United States
have developed the capacity to manufacture not only for their
home markets, but to some extent for export also."

If Eng-

land had suffered, and the "Boyle .Memorandum" believed that
to be a moot point, it was from the consistent price decline
of the preceding years, a tendency which affected other nations as well and which had diminished their total export
values.

The sole exception to this tendency was the United

States, whose exports had increased in value by about 10%
during the previous sixteen years.

But, it was pointed out,

this had scarcely affected Britain in a serious way for the
increase occurred more in agricultural exports than in articles which were competitive with those produced in England.
In summation, the "Boyle Memorandum" maintained that Britain
was neither losing ground in her own home market nor being
displaced significantly in neutral markets.
It was, generally, a very confident report which the
Board of Trade issued at the beginning of 189?.

Yet the

situation across the Atlantic was changing rapidly and by the
end of the year the "Boyle Memorandum" was very much out of
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date.
~,

American exports were growing at a rate which the Amer-

ican correspondent of The Economist described as "astonishing."
American exports for fiscal 1897 exceeded by nearly

s22,ooo,ooo

the previous annual high, which had been registered in fiscal
1892. 1 9 The exports of 1897 were 50% above those of 1887 and
manufactures were increa8ingly to be found among these American exports.

As we have seen, by the end of 1897 The Economist

was pointing out that American competition in various markets
was checking the export of British goods.
The year 1897 was a turning point.

After that date the

British nervousness about foreign competition was transferred
from Germany to the United States, reaching a peak in the
alleged "American invasion" shortly after the turn of the
century.

The principal pre-conditions for this formidable

competition were the growth of American industrial capability
and the expansion of American exports, which we have already
examined, and the prospects of the revival of American shipping and the expansion of the global influence of the United
States to which we now turn.
American Shipping
Their greatest protection against American competition,
many English.men believed, was the woeful condition of the
American merchant marine.

Free Traders in particular consis-

tently called attention to the disintegration of American
l9The .~conomist, July 31, 1897, 1103-04.
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shipping since the adoption of protection during the Civil
War. 20 This American weakness was pinpointed by The Times
when it commented on the great expansion of American foreign
commerce in 1889:
The only drawback from the American point of view is
that the exports and imports were mostly carried in
foreign ships. Of the total imports of 149 millions
sterling, upwards of 117 millions were imported in
foreign ships, and of the total exports of 146 millions sterling upwards of 126 millions were shipped
in foreign vessels. Of the total commerce of the
country, less than 14 per cent. was carried under
the American flag; whereas 30 years ago nearly 75
per cent. of the commerce of the United States was
transported in national vessels.21
Even J. Stephen Jeans, who had proved himself willing to
acknowledge American achievements, believed that the utter
inadequacy of the American navy was one of the chief reasons
why Britain had no reason to despair over the American challenge.

"Great Britain," he wrote during the debate over the

McKinley Tariff, "does not much care what artificial restriction may be placed on our commerce, so long as we have the
command of the ocean-carrying trade."

He recited,

as~

Times often did also, the sorry story of the decline of American shipping.

In 1860 American ships had carried not only

a large proportion of their own trade, but they had carried
12% of Britain's foreign trade as well; in 1892 American

ships carried a mere 0.4% of Britain's trade.

Jeans blamed

this, as others did, on the tariff and he predicted that so
20 cr. Part I.
21
The Times, February

5, 1890, 13.
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long as protection remained the American policy, Britain had
no reason to fear the shipping rivalry of the United States. 22
The numerous books and articles of Michael Mulhall invariably
referred to the supremacy of the British mercantile marine
and frequently offered comparative statistics on .t\.merican
shipping, as in the following example: 2 3
Maritime Carrying-Power of National Merchant Fleets
Tonnage
1882
1892

Great Britain
United States

19,020,000 27,720,000
1,760,000

Percentage of
World Total
1882
1892

1,680,000

This progressive decay of an indispensable industry continued,
so that by 1896 only 8% of America's enormous foreign trade
was carried in national ships. 24
Despite this obvious decrepitude of American shipping,
there were Englishmen who feared tqe realization of the muchdiscussed schemes for the revitalization of this American
industry.

The Times occasionally carried reports of plans

"to revive American shipping by means of enormous bounties. 112 5
The British were aware that the United States Secretary of
the Treasury had made a public issue of the large fortune
22
Jeans, "The American Tariff," 756-57; see also The Times,
May 13, 1892, 5.
2 3Michael G. Mulhall, "The Carrying-Trade of the World,"
Contemporary, LXVI (December, 1894), 812.
24Alexander Maclure, "America as a Power," Nineteenth
Centurx, XXXIX (June, 1896), 907.
2 5see, for example, The Times, May 13, 1892, 5; and November 16, 1892, 14.
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which American passengers and freight paid to foreign shipping interests and that he had recommended governmental subsidies to encourage American shipping. 26 They knew also that
several measures had been sent to Congress which would provide
subsidies to American shipbuilders and lucrative mail contracts for American ship operators.

From Philadelphia came

word that America was "filled with the idea of placing the
American flag upon all parts of the ocean, and sending its
ships throughout the world. 1127
Could the Americans possibly challenge England, which
possessed such an overwhelming marine superiority?
Englishmen feared that they could.

Some

The British had once

enjoyed a comparable superiority in iron and steel, commented
A. N. Cumming, and only recently the President of the British
Iron and Steel Institute had conceded American supremacy.
What was to prevent this supremacy £rom being extended to
shipping as well?

"It is notorious," he wrote, "that a slight

modification of the existing Protection would enable America
to become most formidable in that branch of competition."
The Americans had already demonstrated their technical competence; "the vessels recently built in the States for her Navy
possess an average speed higher than anything to be found in
the English navy."28
26The Economist, February 14, 1891, 210.
2 7The Economist, March 14, 1891, 338-39; Jennings, "The
Trade League against England," 911.
28 cumming, "America and Protection," 374.

254

\.lb.at many in Britain feared was that "McKinleyism" would
be used to foster American shipping competition as well as to
c~eate

new home industries.

for such fears.

There were reasonable grounds

Andrew Carnegie, for example, considered

shipping subsidies as integral components of "McKinleyism."
In his interpretation of the McKinley Act for British readers,
he laid great stress on the encouragement it offered to American shipping.

The success of the reciprocity clause, he

believed, demanded the encouragement of regular steamship
service between the United States and other nations, especially those of South America.

The Subsidy Act promoted this

by providing handsome payments for carriage of the mail in
American-built ships, the rate of payment increasing in proportion to the size and speed of the vessel.

Thus the

greatest incentives were offered to vessels of the first
class.

Carnegie admitted that it would be some time before

the full effect of this measure could be fairly judged.

But

he noted that the Inman Steamship Company was preparing to
build on the Delaware "two of the largest and swiftest vessels, fit mates to the 'City of Paris' and the 'City of New
York,'" which were among the premier ships afloat.

These

latter vessels, though of foreign registry, were owned principally by Americans and they "may be naturalised and fly
the flag of the Republic."
This would create a weekly American line upon the
Atlantic, superior to any now existing. Such ships
would receive for carrying the mails each round trip
nearly five thousand pounds. Making ten trips per
annum, this would equal five per cent. upon a million

r
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sterling, a sum much greater than the cost of each
ship. It is evident that all parties in this country have determined that an earnest effort shall be
made to give the flag its former prominence upon
the sea.29
As the .figures for 1896, which were noted above, indicated, the various shipping subsidy schemes bore little fruit
between 1890 and 1897.

During this period, however, there

was just enough which was happening or being proposed to keep
the British constantly aware of the possibility of American
competition on the seas.

The chief importance of these

years was that the British became sensitive to the issue of
an American maritime threat and were thus prone to panic
when J. P. Morgan began his "raids" on British shipping in
the first years of the new century.
The British were shocked in 1893 when, as Carnegie had
predicted, the superior and prestigious 'City of Paris' and
'City of New York' were transferred to American registry as
part of the complete takeover o.f the Inman Line by Americans.
The normally confident and sober Economist was moved by the
transfer to publish a lengthy analysis entitled "The 'Stars
and Stripes' v. the 'Union Jack.'"

The transfer was described

as
a new departure in the history of transatlantic
navigation, which is calculated to induce more
satisfactory reflections on the past than confident
anticipation for the future. It is not satisfactory
to find that a rival Power has become possessed of
one of our principal li~es of transatlantic steamships,
and it is all the less so when that transfer is
2

9carnegie, "The McKinley Bill," 1033.
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accompanied by circumstances that appear likely to
induce rivalry that may in the long run tend to the
serious disadvantage of the one country or the other.
The Economist was by no means ready to concede.

It pro-

vided once more the by now almost ritualistic account of the
decline of American shipping since the Civil War.

It pointed

out that it cost about 50% more to build ships in the United
States and nearly 100% more to pay the wages of American seamen.

It maintained that it was "difficult to see how England

can be much injured by the fact that the Americans are once
again about to compete with us in the Atlantic trade."

Never-

theless, it concluded, "the experiment will be watched with
interest all the same."

The danger was twofold.

First, since

the governmental subsidies favored the swifter vessels, the
American lines, by offering very speedy service, could hope
to attract a greater portion of the first-class trade and thus
to secure the higher income necessary to offset their higher
costs.

Furthermore, the American cost disadvantage was to

be reduced, for the Inman Line planned to use the newly
opened port facilities at Southhampton.

Southampton was

closer to London than was Liverpool and its facilities guaranteed fewer port delays.
an economic advantage.

Its use would give American ships

Secondly, whether or not the Americans

were ultimately successful, the competition thus established
could not but render British shipping somewhat less profitable.

The British, therefore, had to take this challenge

seriously.30
30The Economist, February 18, 1893, 190-92.
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British awareness of American maritime ambition was kept
alive in 1894 by the attention devoted to the visit of Captain
Alfred Thayer Mahan.

When The Influence of Sea Power upon

Histori was published in 1890, reviewers had noted how ironic
it was that such a perceptive analysis should come from a
naval officer whose country had allowed its maritime strength
to deteriorate so badly.

But by the time of Mahan's visit to

:England in 1894, the British were readier to believe that this
American weakness would be remedied.

A testimonial dinner for

Mahan elicited an editorial statement by The Times that Mahan
had made the English realize that their sea power, which was
based on national fortitude and the predestination of nature,
had made them a great nation.

"If Captain Mahan is to be

trusted,'' The Times continued, "it is hardly less certain • • •
that these conditions must make hereafter for the sea power
of the United States."

It concluded that, "for good or for

evil we have to face the prospect of the growth on the other
side of the Atlantic of a seapower not unequal to our own,"
and that such a change must "vitally affect" the whole civilized world.3l
The intervention of the United States in the dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela was the occasion for an outpouring of commentary in the British press in late 1895 and
1896.

The major issue was the diplomatic one but it had im-

plications for the maritime challenge which did not escape
3lThe Times, leading article, May

25, 1894, 9.
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British notice.

It was widely recognized in the British press

that Secretary of State Olney's extension of the Monroe Doctrine marked the beginning of a new era in international relations.

The United States was now taking responsibility for

a substantial part of

globe and this new responsibility
implied the creation of a navy adequate to such a task.3 2 The
th~

issues of 1896 had to do chiefly with the United States Navy,
but any stimulus to the American Navy caused concern in England for it stimulated American shipbuilders and expanded
their facilities for producing merchant vessels.

That the

Americans had not given up hope of a shipping revival was
evident in 1897 when the Dingley Tariff was passed.

It con-

tained a clause which imposed an additional duty of 10% on
all goods imported into the United States in vessels not
flying the American flag unless such vessels were registered
in a country whose ships had by prior treaty obtained the
right to enter American ports on the same basis as American
vessels.

Since British ships carried such a large proportion

of America's foreign trade, there was a brief flurry of excitement in England until the United States Attorney-General
ruled that British ships qualified by treaty for exemption
from this extra chargeo33

32 These implications of American policy were clearly set

forth in Sydney Low, "The Olney Doctrine and America's New
Foreign Policy," Nineteenth Centurz, XL (December, 1896), 850-60.
British press reaction is examined in detail in A. E. Campbell,
Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903 (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1960), Chapter 2.
33The Times, September 1, 189?, 3.
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The American maritime challenge did not really become
formidable until 1901, but the possibility of an American
revival was kept constantly before the British public from
1890 onward.

This was so not only because American exports

continued to increase and American politicians continued to
seek additional governmental assistance for American shipping
but also because the United States had begun to establish
its influence in distant parts of the world.

This expansion

of American influence could only enhance the possibility of
American economic competition.
The Exoansion of American Influence
One direction of the American outward thrust of the
1890s was into the Pacific.

Americans had long had substan-

tial interests in Hawaii and The Times recognized that because
of these the United States might find involvement in the poli~
tical upheavals of 1893 unavoidable.3 4 According to the American correspondent of The Economist, "there is no disguising
the fact that public sentiment is distinctly in favour of
'taking in' the mid-Pacific Ocean Kingdom."

"We want no Ber-

muda off our Pacific Coast," is the way he summed.up the predominant American opinion.35

This caused no alarm in Britain.

The Times spoke for most Englishmen when it stated that
it is easy to understand the advantages which will
accrue to the United States Navy, the development
4
3 The ~imes, leading. article, January 30, 1893, 9.

35The Economist, February 18, 1893, 199-200.
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of which is now the object of so much care and expenditure, from the possession of a naval station so
advantageously placed. The civilized world, too,
has every reason to be contented that the United
States should "protect" these beautiful islands.3 6

',

~..

'

The extension of American influence in Hawaii and its ul timate annexation by the United States did not provoke any significant British complaints.
Though the British had important commercial interests
in Hawaii, American competition there did not become a major
issue.

Ironically, what competition there was resulted from

the extension of the Canadian transportation system, which
many Englishmen hoped would relieve Canada from the American
challenge.37

The Canadian Pacific Railway and the Canadian-

Australian Steamship Line made American products including
manufactures so accessible that many Hawaiian purchasers
shunned British goods which were cheaper but which took considerably longer to arrive.

In this way sugar machinery was

imported from St. Louis and American steam engines began to
replace those of British origino3 8
Hawaii's real significance was as a stepping stone to
Asia.

The establishment of American maritime facilities in

Hawaii and in Samoa was often linked in the British press to
3 6 The Times, leading article, March 26, 1894,

?.

37see the following chapter.
38 The Economist, November 30, 1895, 1561. English interests in Hawaii also complained about strong competition from
American soap manufacturers but this soap, which bore imitations of the labels and brand names of prominent American
manufacturers, was really made in Japan; ~·
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the prospective completion of a canal across the Central
American Isthmus.

Though work on the canal was for the most

part suspended between 1890 and 189?, it was the subject of
occasional articles in the British press and no one doubted
that such a waterway would some day be completed.39
The advantages which the canal would provide for American commerce was an important part of Robert McCormick's
appeal for British participation in the Chicago Exhibition.
In words which echoed the statements of earlier British commentators, he noted that the discovery of the passage by way
of the Cape of Good Hope had destroyed the commercial supremacy of the Mediterranean cities; similarly, the Suez Canal
had superseded the Cape of Good Hope and had made Great Britain commercially supreme.

"How," McCormick asked, "will the

opening of the Nicaraguan Canal affect the present channels
of trade and the present trade relations, especially the trade
relations between Great Britain and the United States?"

The

implied answer was obvious; McCormick had only to supply the
figures.

First, the canal would give New York a 2,700 mile

advantage over Liverpool in reaching the Pacific ports of
the New World, three-fourths of whose trade was controlled by
Europeans in 1892.

Secondly, the vast populations of Asia

and the other Pacific markets, all of which were dominated
by Britain, would be brought nearer to New York by distanceo
39see, for example, E. H. Seymour, "The Present State of
the Panama Canal," Nineteenth Century, XXXI (February, 1892),
293-311. For pre-1890 British comments on the canal, see
Part Io
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varying from 2,000 to 10,000 miles.

The British journal,

Engineering, confirmed McCormick's thesis.

Completion of the

canal, it stated, would "help to shift centres of trade, and
to bring American and foreign ports, where the British mer-

~hant flag is now more or less supreme, much closer together. 1140
By the mid-1890s the markets of China had become a cause
of diplomatic friction among the European Powers and British
observers were aware that, with her growing foreign trade and
Pacific influence, the United States had to be taken into
consideration.

But, until the emergence of the ''open door"

policy in 1898, there was no unanimity of British opinion as
to the significance for Britain of America's expanding role
in the Pacific.

Some anticipated the "open door" solution,

suggesting that nations whose interests in Eastern markets
were

identi~al

with Britain's should be brought into a coali-

tion.

"For this purpose we need look no further than the
United States, Japan, and possibly Germany." 41 Others had a
greater fear of American than of Russian expansion and encouraged Anglo-Russian cooperation:
The fact that a civilised and organised Power [that
is, Russia] confronted the United States upon the
Pacific would not, in itself, be a matter of regret;
and if, as is not inconceivable, the trade of the
United States sought outlets in China, affairs would
have to be arranged between the two great Powers concernedo 42
40 ttcCormick, Future Trade Relations, 20-22; En.gineerins,
quoted ibid., 28.
41 Robert K. Douglas, "The Greater Eastern Question,"
National, XXVI (December, 1895), 493.
42 H. O. Arnold-Forster, "Our True Foreign Policy,"
Pineteenth Century, XXXIX (February, 1896), 211.
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Still others spoke of "the precarious and uncertain condi.tion
of our prosperity at present" and insisted that prosperity
was dependent on maritime supremacy and the retention and
consolidation of the Empire.

Unless Britain proved herself

capable of forging a strong policy against rival European
nations, it was argued, the British Colonies would feel that
the imperial connection made them vulnerable in war time and
that Britain could no longer protect them.

They would detach

themselves and "the hegemony of the scattered fractions of
our race will then fall naturally and almost inevitably to
the United States, and Great Britain proper will be reduced
to the level of a third-rate power. 114 3

However. they assessed

its role, the British were fully conscious of America's presence in the Pacific by 18970
Closer to her own borders, America's expansionist tendencies seemed still more pronounced and intensive.

As seen

by the British, growing American influence in Latin America
and in Canada was closely linked to the reciprocity clause
of the McKinley Tariff.

For this we must turn to an examina-

tion of actual American competition.

4

3"1920," Contemporary, LXVIII (December, 1895),

770-71.
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CHAPTER VII
CANADA
Canadians were angered by the passage of the McKinley
Tariff for they believed that it was aimed directly at themselves,.

American politicians nad given them ample reason for

so believing.

The debates of the McKinley Bill in both hou-

ses of Congress were full of expressions indicating the belief
that passage of the Bill would lead to a closer union with
and possibly even the absorption of Canada.
. Bri"t ain.
.
l
no t e d in

These were duly

Even where differences of opinion emerged

over the proper use of reciprocity, there was often substantial agreement as to the desired objective.

Chauncey Depew,

for example, believed that it was by giving the largest possible scope to reciprocity that

"t~e

closest commercial rela-

tions with Canada" would be achieved.

On the other hand,

Senator Evarts, though he supported reciprocity generally,
wished to see Canada excluded.

It was offering reciprocity

to others and refusing it to Canada, he thought, which would
hasten the day "when the American flag would wave over Canada
in the place of the British standard" and Canadian commerce
would become American. 2
1 see, for example, the speeches of Representatives Butterworth and Richie reported in The Times, January 25, 1890, 5.
See also Moreton Frewen, "The National Policy of the United
States," 6810
2
The Times, November 20, 1890, 3; September 10, 1890, 5.
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No one was more incensed than Sir John MacDonald, head
of the Canadian government.

He charged that Canada's marvel-

lous growth since Confederation had made the United States
covetous.

At the same time he strenuously denied that the

alleged aim of the McKinley Act, to force a merger of the two
countries by means of trade policy, would ever be accomplished.3
Many people in England shared MacDonald's view of the McKinley Tariff.

If, wrote Lyon Playfair, the object of the McKin-

ley Act was "to force the United States lion and the Canadian
lamb to lie down together," as he believed to be the case,
"this can only be accomplished by the lamb being inside the
lion. 114 With the McKinley Tariff in operation, wrote Moreton
Frewen, the United States had "a very great prize • • • in
sight; that prize is Canada. 0 5
that

0

The Earl of Dunraven claimed

we are seeing Canada exposed to a gigantic bribe in the

shape of reciprocity with the United States, and Newfoundland
boiling" because the British Government refused to allow her
to come to what she considered favorable terms with the United
States. 6

L. J. Jennings accused Secretary of State Blaine

of trying to force Canada and the South American republics
into an arrangement under which American products would be
3see his angry speech which was quoted at length in The
Times, October 6, 1890, 13; and further, The Economist, October
11, 1890, 1290.
4
The Times, November 14, 1890, 3.
5Frewen, "The National Policy of the United States," 681.
6 Earl of Dunraven, "Commercial Union within the Empire,"
Nineteenth Century, XXIX (March, 1891), 511.
,\
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imported on exceptionally favorable terms and· England "further
handicapped in the race for markets."?
Such views, however, were far from unanimous.

The Econ-

omist chided the Canadians for feeling aggrieved by the McKinley Tariff when their own national policy was one of high pro.
8 Lyon Playfair predicted that "the natural effect
tee t ion.
of the Act will be to draw together Canada and England."
His explanation was the widely accepted notion that trade was
essentially barter; that the McKinley Tariff would force Canada to sell more of her goois in England, so that England
would naturally sell more to Canada in return.

A Free Trade

Canada, Playfair claimed, would have no need to fear her
mighty neighbor.9

Such was also the view of The Economist

which said that "it is idle to talk of the McKir..ley tariff
forcing Canada into the arms of the Republic • • • • the probability is that Canadian intercourse with the mother country
will be substantially increased by this new Bill, and if it
be, then the main action of the new United States Tariff

.

will be to draw the Dominion nearer to us in the future."
Given fast ships and the expansion of the Canadian railway
system, Britain could in fact expect her Canadian trade to
.
10
increase.

26?
The Economist found nothing surprising in the fact that
Canadian trade with the United States had reached very large
proportions:

-From
United Kingdom
United States

Canadian Imports (;£)
1888
?,859;744
9,696,369

1889
8,463,478
10,107,488

The common border and easy communication by rail and water
meant that this was to be expected.

The Economist was content

that Great Britain, though thousands of miles away, should
remain "a very good second to the United States. 1111 It was
more concerned with the adverse effect of the Canadian than
of the American tariff, so far as Canada's future was concerned.
As the Canadian tariff was framed, the smaller amount of imports
from Britain paid duties of il,890,100 while the larger amount
fr•om the United States paid only .;fl ,474,200.

The Economist

believed that the United States needed no such advantage and
that such a policy was decidedly not in the Canadian interest. 12
The discussion of the impact of the McKinley Tariff occurred at the height of an election campaign in Canada.

The

major issue of the campaign was tariff policy and the best
response of Canada to the new conditions imposed by the McKinley Act.

Wilfrid Laurier, leader of the Liberal opposition,

asserted that the "only salvation of Canada was in unrestricted
11 Ibid.
12The Economist, February 14, 1891, 199-200. A partial
explanation of this discrepancy was that Britain shipped a
greater proportion of finished manufactures to Canada than
did the United States.
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reciprocity with the United States in natural products and
manufactured goods. 1113 The Liberal Party demanded the appointment of a commission to negotiate a reciprocity treaty with
the United States under the terms of the McKinley Act. 14 Another Liberal declared that with a neighbor such as the United
States at her doorstep it was ridiculous to seek markets three
thousand miles away. 1 5

Erastus Wiman, prominent Canadian

industrialist and Liberal, was an ardent crusader for the
views that Goldwin Smith had been voicing for years, that
Canada's natural economic relations were with the United
States.

"If material progress is the essential standard of

success and happiness," he wrote, "then Canada would be enormously benefited by a free relation with the United States. 1116
In a speech before the British Iron and Steel Institute at
Niagara Falls, Wiman declared that the Canadians required
"only the magic

touc~

of freedom and appreciation of the Amer-

ican people to enormously enrich them."
If the Congress of the United States should express
a willingness to extend to the north an invitation to
reciprocal arrangements similar to that which, in
their new tariff, they have extended to southern
nationalities, the people of Great Britain must not
blame Canada if she accepts this first omen of better
relations hereafter to exist between the Englishspeaking nations that hold this vast continent in
common.I?
13Quoted in Jennings, "The Trade League against England,"
907-080
14The Times, December 20, 1890, 5o
15Quoted in Jennings, "The Trade League against England,"
907-08.
lGiJiman, "Canada and the States," 623.
l 7Quoted in Jennings, ''The Trade League against England,"
907-08.
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The stick and carrot approach of the McKinley Tariff was obviously receiving serious consideration on the.part of Canada.
One of the Canadians wrote a letter to The Economist in
which he insisted that the Canadian people were wavering on
the question and that, if MacDonald ''desires to remain in
power mu.ch longer, he is bound to accept terms from the
United States which will be detrimental to ourselves. 1118
Even a Quebec newspaper which on most issues be.eked MacDonald's government favored closer trade relations with the
United States: "Trade is what we want," it remarked, "not
twaddle about loyalty to the Crown. 111 9
Across the Atlantic, however, things were seen in a different light.

When, during the campaign, the Liberals pro-

posed a new Canadian tariff that would establish free trade
between Canada and the United States while retaining the
duties on British and foreign goods, 20 there were those in
England who saw this merely as evidence that the Canadians
were not sufficiently self-confident to resist Blaine's crude
attempts at bribery.

An Englishman ridiculed the notion

held by Wiman and many other Canadian Liberals, that the reciprocity possibilities of the McKinley Act should be construed
as a sign of proffered American cooperation and friendship.
18 William J. Harris, letter to The Economist, March 28,
1891; for further letters from Hanis, see the issues of April
11 and 18, 1891.
l9Quoted in Jennings, "The Trade League against England,"
907-08.
20The F.conomist, February 14, 1891, 199-200.

2?0

He reminded Canadians of the verse
It was all very well to dissemble your love,
But why did you kick me down stairs?
and insisted that the McKinley Act had been passed by Americans for American benefit.

It seemed likely at one stroke to

cut off one-sixth of Canada's total exports.

He advised the

Canadians that no tariff adjustments would ever provide them
with the markets they required to develop their potential.
Instead, they should adopt Free Trade and develop commercial
relations with the rest of the world, and especially with the
other portions of the British Empire.

Complementary trade

between the rich and rapidly developing British possessions
would more than compensate Canada for the loss of her American trade. 21 The position of The Times was essentially the
same.

Canada should not attempt to fight a tariff war with

the United States, it maintained, but should adopt Free
Trade.

She was more likely to prosper by looking to the east

than to the south, and in the future she could even hope to
supplant the United States in the markets of China and Japan. 22
Alarmed by certain views expressed during the election campaign, Earl Grey, a former Secretary of State for the Colonies,
wrote a book which he dedicated to the people of Canada in the
hope that they would adopt Free Trade.

This brief work con-

tained no novel arguments but simply contended that the Empire
had prospered under Free Trade and that the wisest Canadian
21 cumming, "America and Protection," 371-72, 382.
22 The Times, leading article, October 9, 1890, 9; see also
the leading articles of August 13, 1890, 7; and October 18,

1890, 9.
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reaction to the McKinley Tariff was neither higher Canadian
protection nor Canadian-American reciprocity but the establishment of free commercial relations with the rest of the
world. 23
The Economist dismiBsed the campaign argument of the
Liberals, that only through reciprocity could Canada avoid a
drastic curtailment of trade, and also that of the Conservatives, that reciprocity would lead to political absorption.
The real point, according to The Economist, was that reciprocity would mean that "the American manufacturers would be protected against the only effective competition they have to
fear; the competition, that is, of British manufacturers."
The people of Canada would be doubly burdened for the benefit
of the United States.

They would not only have to pay in-

creased internal truces to replace lost customs revenue, but
they would also have to pay the higher prices the Americans
could charge in a non-competitive market. 24
MacDonald's Conservatives won a fairly close election
in 1891.
~'

However, according to both The Times and The Econo-

an analysis of the returns demonstrated clearly that a

large majority of Canadians had refused to swallow the American bait. 2 5 The Economist held out the pleasing prospect that

2 3Henry George Grey, The Commercial Policy of the British
Colonies and the McKinley Tariff (London; New ~ork: Macmillan
and Co. , 1892).
2 4 The Economist, February 14, 1891, 200-01; virtually the
same argument appeared in the issue of February 13, 1892.
25The Times, leading article, February 5, 1891, 9; The
Economist, March 14, 1891, 334-35.
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Blaine would have to sweeten his proposals if he wished Canada
to discuss reciprocity and that, should Cleveland win the
election in 1892, the Canadians could look forward to benefiting from the large tariff reductions which the Democrats
. .
26
were promising.
For many both in Canada and England, however, the dilemma
was by no means resolved nor were the prospects so hopeful as
The Economist suggested.

Not only were there those who asser-

ted that the McKinley Tariff was doing far more harm to Canada
than to Britain herself , 2 7 but there was the nagging question
for Canadians and British alike: why was Canada growing and
prospering so little in comparison with the United States?
No one framed the question more strongly than Erastus Wiman,
the Canadian industrialisto 28 He pointed out that Canada
was larger than the United States exclusive of Alaska and
that the variety and richness of the Dominion's natural resources equalled or even exceeded those of the United States.
What then, he asked rhetorically, were Canada's possibilities?
"The measure of development which is possible for the whole
continent is that which has actually taken place in the southern portion of it, and which is found in the creation of a
commerce, and the development of wealth-giving forces for the
good of man, which in the United States have actually taken
26

The Economist, March 14, 1891, 334-35·

2 7nonald, "McKinleyism and the Presidential Election,"
493-94.
28 The Times, leading article, February 5, 1891, 9.
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placeo 1129
Canada, said Wiman, despite possessing the greater part
of the continent, British support, stable institutions, large
supplies of money, and everything else to make her great,
has had no progress at all comparable with the progress of the United States • • • • Measured by every
standard of comparison, the experiment in Canada of
self-reliance and self-development is a failure.
Beyond all question, the cause of this has been that
the freedom of trade, which among the [United States]
has built them up, has been denied to Canada. If the
Declaration of Independence had taken in the whole
continent, the same relative progress would have taken
place north of the 45th parallel, the Lakes, and the
St. Lawrence that has taken place south of them, and
the wo::-ld would have been enriched to double the extent of the contributions of the United States.
Would Great Britain have suffered had such an event occurred?

Fa~

from it.

Great Britain would have been infinitely better off,
because while she is receiving twenty-five millions
of dollars in interest every year from her possessions
in North America, she is receiving two hundred millions of dollars in interest from the revolted colonies that declared their independence of her fiscal
interference • • • the United States are, today, one
hundred times more important to the commerce of Great
Britain than is Canada.
Britain worried that closer commercial relations with the
United States would weaken imperial loyalties.

They must

come to learn that "if the penalty of adherence to British
connection be poverty, loss of population, increase of indebtedness, and decline of values, then British connection
is imperilled by consequences far more serious than those
that would follow the most intimate commercial relation with
2
.1

l

9wiman, "Canada and the States," 620-21 •
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the United States. 1130
Obviously Canada could not grow and prosper in economic
isolation.

Yet the injunction to adopt free trade and to

hope for an increase of inter-imperial trade seemed to be
wishful thinking, while the policy of even closer commercial
ties with the United States was favored only by a minority in
Canada and virtually no one in the mother country.

In England,

however, numerous proposals appeared for realizing Canada's
great potential by means of an imperial customs union.
One of those came from Moreton Frewen.

He took excep-

tion to those in Britain who denied that the McKinley Tariff
was a constructive policy.

It was, he wrote, only the latest

phase of a "national policy," an American system of Free Trade
which the United States had adopted long ago.
of "Free Trade within, Protection without."

It consisted
This American

system of Free Trade, in combination with the British system
of Free Trade which operated to provide America with markets
and with population to fill her empty spaces, had made the
United States the most prosperous nation in the world.

"It

has attracted, and still must attract, the greater portion
of all the immigration from foreign lands, and having once
attracted the settler, it serves no less to keep himo 11 3l
This latter was a barbed remark addressed to the problem of
migration or re-emigration from Canada to the United States,
30ibid., 621-23.
3lFrewen, "The National Policy of the United States,"
674-76.
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which was of serious concern to Canadians and British alike
at this timeo3 2
It was, according to Frewen, from the "political laboratory" of the United States that answers for the political
problems of the future were coming.

It was this "National

policy" of the United States--"Solidarity through Federation,
State Rights through Home Rule, and Social Progress through
the restriction of competition--which will force upon England
• • • that National policy which all portions of the British

Empire can combine to carry out."

Frewen recalled for his

readers the statement which John Sherman had made in the United
States Senate in 1888:
~ominion

"Within ten years from this time the

of Canada will, in my judgement, be represented either

in the Imperial Parliament of Great Britain or in the Congress
of the United States."

The choice, concluded Frewen, was

Britain's but it had to be made soon.

"The McKinley Bill

may indeed lose us Canada" to the attractions of the American
economy.

But, if Britain will act quickly and wisely, it

will more likely "win over to a wiser and greater Britain,
not Canada alone, but also Australasia and South Africa."33
L. J. Jennings was another admirer of what the Americans had
accomplished through their system of a large internal area of
commercial freedom protected by tariffs.

He was convinced

that the "day will come when the English people decide that
2
3 see, for example, The Economist, August 29, 1891, 1106-07.
3 3Frewen, "The National Policy of the United States, 11
681,6830

~ ..
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they were right," but by then it might be too.late.
already the eleventh hour, he said.

It was

Canada might still re-

spond to a British offer of a common tariff.
later no such offer would be possiblea3 4

A few years

The British Government had no intention of offering
Canada fiscal change cf any kind.

Left to her.own devices,

Canada opened negotiations with the United States with a view
toward establishing reciprocity under the provisions of the
McKinley Act.

The discussions did not go well,35 but never-

theless the British were deeply concerned.

"It is not plea-

sant," The Times editorialized, "to contemplate the possibility that, under protective tariffs of increasing stringency,
our colonial trade may slip from us and the political allegiance of our colonial fellow-subjects may be gradually broken down. 11 3 6
In June, 1892, the Congress of Chambers of Commerce of
the Empire met in London.

The first question raised for dis-

cussion was: "Commercial relations of the mother country with
her colonies and possessions, with special regard to the renewal
of European treaties, and recent commercial legislation in the
United States."

During the discussion of this question, Sir

Charles Tupper, spokesman for the Canadians, proposed that a
preferential duty not to exceed

5%

be levied by the Imperial

4

3 Jennings, "The Trade League against England," 911-13.

35The Times, February 17, 1892! 5.

36 The Times, leading article, April 27, 1892, 9.
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and Colonial governments against certain foreign articles "in
order to extend the exchange and consumption of the home
staple products in every part of the Empireo"3?

Tupper re-

minded the delegates "that France and the United States had
made marvellous progress under a protective policy."

He at-

tempted to win them over to his proposal for imperial preference by damning the McKinley Act, not as a protective measure,
but as an enormous "wrong to this country [Great Britain] as
well as to Canada."

It was part of an American effort, he said,

to expand the Monroe Doctrine, "to undermine our national
position, and establish one Government from the Equator to
the Pole."

Tupper further noted the many thousands of Bri-

tish subjects who annually emigrated to the United States,
where, in order to become citizens, they had to "renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty whatever_, and particularly to the
Queen of England."

Had there been in existence such a system

of preferential tariffs as he was advocating, Tupper claimed,
the largest number of these emigrants would have gone to Canada, to the benefit not only of Canada but of the empire generally. 38
Tupper's attempt to arouse feelings of loyalty to the
empire against the aggressive designs of the United States
was received unsympathetically by a majority of the chambers
3?charles Tupper, "The Question of Preferential Tariffs,"
Fortnightli, LII n.s. (August, 1892), 139-40.
3Sibid., i41-43.
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represented at the Congress. 39

Canada was nearly alone in

being vitally concerned with increasing inter-colonial trade.
Whereas the largest portion of the trade of the other parts
of the Empire was already imperial, only forty-seven percent
of Canadian trade was imperial; most of the remainder was with
the United States.

To many delegates at the Congress, Tup-

per's proposal seemed to be a request for them to tax themselves .for the benefit of Canada.

For this reason The Econo~ predicted the failure of the Tupper proposa1. 40 When the
vote came, it was defeated fifty-five chambers against thirtythree. 41

Even The Times, though it too was concerned that

the McKinley Tariff had been designed to alienate Canadian
trade and loyalty from Britain, and though it hailed the
Canadian proposal as "a most encouraging sign of loyalty and
good will," had to warn the Canadians that "we could not for
a moment think of establishing a differential tariff for the
advantage of the Canadians alone. 1142
Thus rebuffed, the Canadia.ns had to learn to :ii ve with
the situation brought about by the McKinley Tariff.

She con-

tinued, as The Times and others had encouraged her to do, to
work on a program of economic expansion which would lead to
39Though Englishmen such as Frewen and Jennings, and the
Fair Traders generally, were enthusiastic supporters of a policy such as the one proposed by Tupper, the Chambers of Commerce, and especially those in Britain, tended to be strongholds of Free Trade.
,
40
The Eco1iomist, July 2, 1892, 852-53.
41 Tupper, "The Question of Preferential Tariffs," 143.
42

The Times, leading article, April 27, 1892, 9.

279
increased imperial and other global trade relations.

Canada

spanned the continent with a railroad to connect her with
Australia and Asiaq

She established steamship service in the

Atlantic and Pacific and planned for a large mercantile marine, the object of which could only be non-American trade.
Furthermore, the Canadian Parliament took up the discussion
of a system of tariff reductions which would be more favorable
to British than to American trade. 4 3
In the meantime, however, the Ca:aadian aspect of the
American challenge continued.

Despite all the talk, all the

proposals, and the various attempts of the Canadian government,
the facts remained: the United States had grown considerably
faster in population, j_n wealth, in industry and commerce than
Britain's North American Dominion; and, while Britain was
anxious about the growth of her foreign trade, the Americans
were increasingly outstripping them in the Canadian market.
As 1h_e Economist had predicted, the effect of the McKinley Tariff was to increase Anglo-Canadian trade.

But the

increase occurred almost exclusively in Canadian exports to
England.

British exports to Canada remained virtually sta-

tionary, while those of the United States continued to rise:
Canadian Imports, Fiscal Year Ending June 30
From
1890
1§2..1
1896
Great Britain
8,630,000
8,678,000
6,595,948
11,714,804
United States
11,644,000
10,448,000

-

4 3The Times, leading article, March 28, 1894,
44 The Economist, April ?, 1894, 422-23.

7.

44

r
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Percentage of Total Canadian Imports Supplied45
·1868-72
1878-82
1888-92
1895-96
~
Great Britain
55046
44.03
37.51
27.94
United States
35.08
46.18
46046
49.63
No doubt the British exports continued to include a larger
proportion of manufactured goods, but there was no doubt
either that American competition in the Canadian market was
real.

The depression of 1893 had caught American textile

manufacturers at full capacity operation.

Despite drastic

price cuts, there still were no buyers to be found in the
American market.

Subsequently there were widespread Canadian

and British complaints "of the invasion of the Canadian market
by American cottons at cut prices. 1146
In 1887 Sir Charles Tupper had begun an ambitious program
to foster the Canadian iron and steel industry by enacting
heavy duties on imports and paying bounties to Canadian producers. 47

In 1890 the Canadian demand for foreign iron and

steel was still great and The Economist predicted that, as a
result of the McKinley Tariff, Britain could expect to replace
the United States as Canada's major source of supply. 48 But
neither the Canadian dream of self-sufficiency nor the British
4 5The Economist, September 1, 1894, 1072; for the last
set of figures November 28, 1896, 1571. Such figures appeared
in many other places as well; see, for example, Michael G•
.Mulhall, "The Trade of the British Colonies," Contemporarz,
LXXII (Noyember, 1897), 702-03.
46
The Economist, June 16, 1894, 737-38.
4
7The Economist, July 24, 189?, 1058.
48
see Part I.
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hope of ousting the American supply was realized.

In 1896

British exports of iron and steel to Canada amounted to
$3,150,000 and those of the United States $6,450,000.

The

Canadian system of protecting and subsidizing the domestic
iron industry had actually served to give foreign manufacturers an advantage.

The Canadian industry, located in Nova

Scotia, could not economically ship its product to manufacturing centers in Toronto and elsewhere,

Thus, Canadian

agricultural implement makers, for example, had to pay more
for thej.r ra.w material either through very high transport
costs for Canadian iron or through the duty imposed on imported iron.

Neither the Canadian iron industry nor Canadian

manufacturers who required iron or steel as raw material
were in a position to withstand American competitiono 4 9
In addition to subsidizing her iron and steel industry,
Canada had also subsidized the petroleum industry for many
years and at great cost, on the grounds that it "would succU1llb
at once if exposed to free American competition."

In 1897

Standard Oil was preparing to disrupt the Canadian industry
just as it had for many years prior to this been disrupting
the Scotch oil industry.

Standard Oil was planning to estab-

lish a refinery in Canada and, according to the Canadian
correspondent of The Economist,

it'~ill

make short work of

the Canadian refineries, which," he complained, "might as
well have been killed by free-trade in oil as by the competition
4

9The Economist, July 24, 1897, 1058.
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within Canada of that vast monopoly."50
By 1897 there was widespread discontent with Canada's
economic system among all parties and on both sides of the
Atlantic.

American goods continued to pour into Canada to

the detriment of Canadian and British manufacturers.

The

invasion of Canada by Standard Oil dramatically symbolized
the increasing hold on Canadian industries by Americans.
The population of the United States continued to increase at
an amazing rate which made the growth of Canadian population
seem meager by comparison.

The Canadian census of 1891 showed

an increase of less than 12% whereas in the previous decade
(1871-1881) the population had doubled.

The Economist thought

it very evident that there had been a consistent and serious
leakage of Canadians into the United States.51 This trend
continued throughout the 1890s.

"To the counterattractions

of the United States cheap living is the great advantage
Canada could offer," The Economist believed, but since her
unwise protective policies denied that to her people "she
need not be surprised that, owing to a constant leakage over
the United States border, her population grows with such slowness.1152
The Economist _maintained a critical attitude toward the
Canadian tariff throughout the 1890s.

In a lengthy assessment

50ibid. For the competition between Standard Oil and the
Scotch oil industry, see Chapter IX.
5lThe Economist, August 29, 1891, 1106-07.
52 The Economist, September 1, 1894, 1072.
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offered by its local correspondent in 1895, The Economist
pointed out that the Canadian tariff had been adopted in 1879
to force the United States to open its markets to Canadian
products, to improve the balance of trade, to stimulate manufacturing, and to stop the exodus of British subjects to the
United States.

It had accomplished not a single one of these

objectives, the correspondent concluded.

The United States

was even more the nemesis in 1895 than it had been in 1879.
The tariff had raised the cost of living in Canada, had led
to inefficiency and the formation of trusts, and had produced
no solid growth.53

Moreover, the Canadian tariff actually

discriminated against Britain, The Economist charged.

It

allowed many .American semi-manufactures to enter free of duty
as raw materials for Canadian industry.

British manufacturers

had to pay heavy duties to get their goods into Canada and,
once there, these goods had to comp8te with articles which
were half the product of Canadian and half the product of
American industry.54 British prospects in Canada were grim
in 1897·

"It is evident," The Times admitted, "that Canada

purchases most of her manufactured goods .from the United
States."55

And Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who only recently had

been elected Canadian premier, said in a speech at Montreal
that the United States had virtually captured Canadian trade.5 6
53The Economist, July 20, 1895, 943-45.
54 The Economist, December 12, 1896, 1642.

702.
'

I.

55The Times, May 15, 1897, 5.
56 Reported in Mulhall, "The Trade of' the British Colonies,"
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Laurier's Liberal Party had consistently favored closer commercial relations with the United States.

Once

ele~ted,

his

first act was to send representatives to Washington to negotiate for the free exchange of a long list of items.

But,

"owing in part to a belief, which Mr. Blaine did something
to create, that Canada can be starved into annexation, Congress refused to let down the bars."

According to The Econo-

mist, the Republican response to this Laurier initiative was
the Dingley Tariff .57

Faced with such new and strong evidence

of American commercial hostility, the Liberal Government
decided to offer tariff reciprocity to all well-disposed
nations.

In a further about-face, the Liberals granted imme-

diate trade preference to Britain.

British imports were given

a 12.5% reduction of duties to June 30, 1898 and thereafter
a 25% reduction.58
In most quarters there was a sensible respect for the
limitations of such a policy insofar as any major change in
the relativ8 positions of Britain and the United States was
concerned.

Mulhall, for example, warned that any hope for

large increases of British exports were "doomed to disappointment."

America's manufacturing ability, added to its geo-

graphic proximity, meant that the trade between these neighbors "must go on increasing in strength and volume year after
year. 11 59

The Canadian correspondent of The Economist believed

57The Economist, July 24, 1897, 1059.
58The Economist, May 1, 1897, 635-36.
59Mulhall, "The Trade of the British Colonies," 703.
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that the new system would prove to be of little advantage to
Britain's basic industries.

He chose not even to mention the

possibility of increased British textile shipments but rather
the necessity for the Americans and Germans to cut their
prices if they wished to keep the trade.

As for iron and

steel he offered no hope at all:
It is not likely that the reduction of one-fourth
of the duties in favour of iron and steel from the
United Kingdom will have the effect of transferring much
trade from American to British manufacturers. The former are selling as cheap as any of their ccmpetitors.
This spring the Canadian Pacific bought from the Carnegie Company 65,000 tons of steel rails for its new
road through the Crow's Neet Pass at a price lower
than the lowest ever paid to British makers. The
United State3, indeed, has been cutting out England
in this market in almost the entire range of iron
and steel goods.60
Yet, as l"Iulhall pointed out, many British manufacturers
and merchants did in fact expect a sizeable increase of Bri.
61
tish exports to Canada.
The Canadian correspondent of The
Economist anticipated considerable growth in Canadian demand
for a wide range of British products. 62 "The immediate point"
of the new tariff policy claimed The Times, "is that Canada
has decided to shift her main market from the United States
to the United Kingdom. 116 3
There was, then, in 189?, some hope expressed both in
Great Britain and in Canada that the American takeover of the
60 The Economist, July 24, 1897, 1059.
61 Mulhall, "The Trade of the British Colonies," ?03.
62 The Economist, July 24, 1897, 1059 •
. 6 3The Times, leadipg article, April 26, 1897, 9.
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Canadian market might be at least halted if it could not be
checked altogether.
hopes false.

Time was to prove even these limited

r
CHAPTER VIII
RECIPROCITY AND AMERICAN COMPETITION IN LATIN AMERICA
The Americans were looking to the south as well as to
the north in 1890.
--the

If growing American influence in

virtual'~mericanization"

Canada

of the Dominion some would have

said--attracted attention in the British press, so did American attempts to gain footholds in the markets of Central and
South America and of the Caribbean.
in fact related.

The two movements were

Both Canada and Latin America were affected,

though in different ways, by the American reciprocity policy.
Both were, therefore, elements of that "McKinleyism" which
the British saw as driving them out of certain sectors of the
American market, disrupting key British industries, and perhaps posing a threat to British mar.itime supremacy.

Particu-

larly in the two years following the passage of the McKinley
Act, Amer·ican commercial forays into Latin America competed
for British attention with the other elements of "McKinleyism."
By 1893 British fears of the effects of American reciprocity
had diminished considerably--though the case of the British
West Indies was an important exception.

Yet what reciprocity

could not accomplish American industrial growth often could.
In a number of their traditional Latin American markets the
British faced increasing American competition between 1890
and 189?.
287
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In their 1892 campaign in

England, both Henry Trueman

Wood and Robert McCormick emphasized that the cultivation of
Latin American markets for American manufacturers was one of
the principal objectives of the Chicago Exhibition.

Though

McCormick also stressed that the completion of an Isthmian
canal would encourage American trade with Central America and
give New York a great advantage O'rer Liverpool in reaching
the Pacific ports of Latin America, he could point to present
as well as prospective competition.

American manufacturers,

he noted, "encouraged and aided by the opportunities afforded
them by the Treaties of Reciprocity," were already entering
South America in significant quantities and English and German importers in Brazil were sending to the United States
for their merchandise since a reciprocity treaty had been
signed between the United States and Brazilo 1 It was this
reminder of the reciprocity clause of the McKinley Act which
had prompted the British journal, Engineering, to repeat its
assertion that "the United States Government is making a care.fully organized attack upon our South American trade. 112

But

the strongest statement in the British press on American
reciprocity came from another visitor to England in 1892.
Sir Charles Tupper, who presented the Canadian proposal for
preferential tariffs within the Empire, which itself was
chiefly a reaction to "McKinleyism," gave British readers
1

McCormic~, Future Trade Relations, 22.

2

Quoted ~., 28.
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this picture of the Americans:
Like a great octupus they threw their tentacles over
South America, the Antilles, and the West Indian
Islands, with the intention of driving out British
trade. And they are going to do it. Read the language of the British Consul in Brazil. What does
he say? He tells the people of Great Britain, "You
must make up your mind to lose the British t~ade in
Brazil, because the United States has absorbed it
under the reciprocity clause of the McKinley Bill."3
Though it was the reciprocity feature of the McKinley
Act which motivated much of the British interest in the fate
of their Latin American markets in the early 189Cs, readers
of the British press were well aware that the American search
for Latin American markets had begun well before that Act
had been passed.

The Southern hemisphere of the New World

was a focal point of the policies of Secretary of State
James G. Blaine.

"It becomes us," The Times quoted Blaine as

saying in 1390, "to use every opportunity to extend our market
on both American Continents. Our f·ield for commercial development lies in the South. 114 Long before the McKinley Bill was
passed, the Pan-American Congress, held in the United States
in 1890, was dramatizing Blaine's and America's interest in
the southern continent.

The Pan-American Congress proposed

a number of policies whose effect would be closer economic
relations among the nations of the Americas.

The Congress

recommended, and according to The Times the United States
would support, a plan calling for the coinage of a common
3Tupper, "The Question of Preferential Tariffs," 141.
4
The Times, July 15, 1890, 5.
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silver dollar to be used as legal tender among all the American nations.

A related plan would have the United States

issue certificates of deposit on bullion sent to the United
States by the peoples of Central and South America.5

Presi-

dent Harrison sent to Congress Blaine's request for funds to
pay the United States' share of the engineering survey for an
international railway system to link together all parts of
North and South America.

The Senate Commerce Committee re-

ported favorably on a bill providing more than $6,000,000 for
construction of a deep-water port at Galveston, Texas,
to facilitate trade with the southern hemisphereo 6 Such act~e

tivities as these, when coupled with the reciprocity policy,
were sufficient to arouse considerable anxiety in England.
Blaine had authorized the United States delegates to
introduce a discussion of reciprocity at the Pan-American
Congress.

The Congress responded by adopting a report which

favored such treaties among all the American Republics.7
During the acrimonious debates in Congress over the McKinley
Bill, the American correspondent of The Economist had reported
that the strong protectionists, who disliked reciprocity,
might eventually include a reciprocity clause in the Bill as
5The Times, March 4, 1890, 5.
6 The Times, May 21, 1890, 5; February 19, 1890, 5.
7The Times, March 29, 1890, 5; April 12, 1890, 7. Not
all the Latin American nations were enthusiastic supporters
of the work of the Congress; there was substantial antiBlaine feeling in Latin America. Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay cast r,egative votes on the reciprocity report; ibid.;
see also July 15, 1890, 8.
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a sop to Blaine and other moderates but that it would be a
sop which the protectionist majority had no intentions of
implementing. 8 Once the McKinley Act was law, however, it
soon became clear that the reciprocity clause was not going
to be a dead letter.

In February, 1891, the United States

signed a reciprocity treaty with Brazil, one of Britain's
more important Latin American customers.

Similar negotia-

tions were soon under way with Spain (on behalf of Cuba and
Puerto Rico), the British West Indies, and several of the
Latin American nations.
By the terms of the United States-Brazilian treaty, the
Americans could send into Brazil, duty-free, not only a variety of foodstuffs and other natural products but also articles competitive with British exports: coal, farm implements,
tools, machinery, and railway equipment.

Many other items

entered Brazil at a 25% reduction of duty.9

No sooner had

the treaty been signed than three American steamers left for
Brazil with exhibits of American goods.

By 1892 the Brazil-

ian Steamship Company, which formerly had scheduled only
three ships a month between Brazil and the United States, was
sending fourteen and McCormick was claiming that English and
German importers now received their merchandise from the
United States. 10 A letter to The Times complained about
8 The Economist, October 4, 1890, 1264.

?,

9The text of the treaty appeared in The Times, February
1891, 5; see also the issue of February 12, 1891, 5.

lOThe Times, February 18, 1891,
Trade Relations, 22.

5; McCormick, Future
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"the exceptional favour shown to the United States in this
matter to the detriment of England, the principal creditor
of Brazil," and expressed surprise and dismay that there
had not been a great outburst of public indignation in
England. 11
The letter was premature.

Soon the British press was

full of commentary on the treaty and speculations regarding
the negotiations currently taking

pla~e.

Andrew Carnegie

warned British readers that all Europe would become concerned
over the reciprocity provision of the McKinley Act and with
good reason.

"Hereafter," he wrote, :rthe American farmer

has a better market in Brazil for hi.s grain, and the American manufacturer has a new market for his products, his foreign competitor being subject to duties upon similar articles
twenty-five per cent. higher than he."

The treaty with Bra-

zil, Carnegie continued, was only the beginning.

The Presi-

dent had publicly stated "that othe1·s are to follow, and • • •
the products of the United States • • • are to find free or
favored access to the ports of many of these South and Central American States."
example of Cuba.

Carnegie offered British readers the

No sooner had the McKinley Act been passed

than she was clamoring for reciprocity with the United States.
"Cuba," he insisted, "will hereafter be of as little good to
Spain as Canada is to Britain. 1112
1111 Amigo.De Brazil," letter to The Times, February

1891, 4.
12carnegie, "The McKinley Bill," 1030-31.
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The Spectator,

which denied also that the Canadians

would show any interest in reciprocity, had been so bold as
to claim that "Mr. Blaine's South American policy, which
aimed at securing the whole trade of the Southern Continent
by the differential duties authorised in the Tariff Act, has
gone to the winds."

It thus set itself up for attack by

L. J. Jennings, who made a career of contesting those who
minimized the American threat.

As Jennings pointed out, no

sooner had the Spectator forecast the failure of reciprocity
than there came the announcement that Brazil had signed a
treaty with the United States.

The truth, according to Jen-

nings, was that
The United States are making persistent efforts to
form a new commercial federation in their own favour,
to embrace the Nhole of the continent on which their
destinies have been cast • • • • They have it within
their power to offer very great advantages to the
South American Republics and to Canada to induce them
to enter into an arrangement by which the productions
of the United States shall be taken upon exceptional
terms, and England, among other powers, be further
handicapped in the race. The South American Republics
will in due season enter into this arrangement, and
we shall find our trade with Brazil, Peru, Honduras,
the Argentine Republic, and other countries greatly
reduced.
There was more involved even than the loss of American trade,
Jennings warned; there was the danger that British colonies
would "drift off into commercial unions with other nations. 111 3
The Economist described the treaty as "important not
only in itself, but also as an example of the methods by
which Secretary Blaine is endeavouring to secure to the United
1 3Jennings, "The Trade League against England," 904,

907, 901.
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States a predominant trade position in Mexico and the South
American Republics."

First, it pointed out, the tariff reduc-

tions which the United States received helped to offset the
American disadvantage of high-cost production under a protective system.

Secondly, Blaine was challenging Britain's

chief advantages, financial and shipping supremacy, by creating a.n international bank of the American Republics and by
subsidizing steamship service.

Though The Economist was

rather sceptical of the success of the reciprocity scheme, it
conceded that it should "be watched with much interest, not
only as affecting our trade with

Brazil, but also as an ex-

periment" which Blaine intended to extend to the other American states at the earliest opportunity. 14 In a pair of letters to The Economist, a protectionist pointed out still
another danger.

"We are about the see the custom of one of

our most important colonial possessions [Canada] transferred"
to the United States unless Britain takes special steps to
prevent it and the West Indies and the South American Republics
will be offered proposals such as the one which Brazil already
accepted.

But the most serious disadvantage for Britain is

that the American policy of reciprocity "means that we are to
be deprived for the future of all chance of obtaining 'most
favoured nation treatment' in the markets of the world. 111 5
This last statement was not quite correct.

One of the

14The Economist, MTS, March, 1891, 4.
l5William J. Harris, letters to The Economist, March 28,
1891, 409-10; April 18, 1891, 503-0LJ.. .
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factors which kept the British from panicking.in the face of
American reciprocity was the fact that Britain already had a
most favored nation treaty with every state of the South
American continent except Brazil.

Every concession which

Blaine obtained for American products in these countries
would be shared by the British.

Thus when Spain signed a

reciprocity treaty with the United States under which certain
American goods entered Cuba and Puerto Rico at preferential
rates, British goods were automatically granted identical
reductions. 16 Two factors, however, marred this otherwise
favorable situation for Britain.

The first was that Britain's

commercial treaty with Spain was due to expire in mid-1892.
There was concern that Spanish efforts to retain favorable
trade relations between her Caribbean possessions and the
United States might be an obstacle to Britain's retention
of most-favored-nation-treatment in the Spanish West Indies.
In 1891 The Economist began urging interested British merchants and Manufacturers to let the British Government know
that they were keenly interested in renewing the existing
treaty with Spain intact. 1 7
The second factor was that American reciprocal trade
relations with such producers of tropical products as Cuba,
Puerto Rico, and Brazil put the British West Indies at a
disastrous disadvantage, for the United States had been by
16 The Economist, MTS, March, 1891, 4; The Times, April
18, 1891, 7; September 9, 1891, 7; The Economist, September
19, 1891, 1202-03.
1 7The Economist, September 19, 1891, 1202-03.
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far their most important customer.

As The Times pointed out,

once the United States gave preference to sugar from other
areas, "the West Indian planters are manifestly given a
strong reason for the acceptance of close trading relations
with the States. 1118 There was considerable agitation in the
British West Indies for reciprocity with the United States,
even though Canada also was considering a reciprocal arrangement with the Indies.

The Economist advised the West Indians

to come to terms with Canada, for "it will serve no good purpose to encourage expectations of reciprocal trade arrangements of an exclusive character between the British West
India Colonies and the United States."

Such an arrangement

was most undesirable from the British point of view since it
"would make the economic and fiscal systems of these colonies
dependent upon that of the United States • • • a condition of
dependence of this nature would not be for the general and
ultimate welfare of the colonies. 111 9 West Indian planters
spurned this advice and put considerable pressure on the
British Government to negotiate with Washington.

A treaty

was worked out in 1892 but it never received the final approval of the British Government and was not implementedo 20 The
plight of the British West Indies grew continually worse.
1897, as we will see later, this British possession was in
very dire straits.
18The Times, leading article, January 2, 1891,
l9The Economist, MTS, July, 1891, 4o
20 The Times, February 2, 1892, 6.
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Like the McKinley Act of which it was a part, the reciprocity clause provoked considerable discussion during the
months after it became operative.

By 1892, however, there

was evidence that it was not the boon to American trade it
was expected to be.

Early in the year Sir Michael Hicks-Beach

told the Association of Chambers of Commerce that, though
some success had attended the American reciprocity treaty
with Brazil, Britain shared in the gains obtained by the
United States elsewhere.

Furthermore, the value of the con-

cessions which the United States could make diminished with
each treaty that was signed.

"It is hardly likely, therefore,"

he said, "that the new tariff policy of the States will have
any marked effect upon our trade, and, indeed, any beating
down of tariff barriers to which it may lead is more likely
to be a gain than a loss to us. 1121 Reciprocity policy comprised the bulk of the annual report for 1892 of the United
States Secretary of the Treasury, which The Economist analysed
for its readers.

American exports to countries which had

signed reciprocity treaties did increase, from.fl8,367,000 in
1891 to i"22,521,000 in 1892.

But it was the increase of

American imports from these same nations (fromj'-52,929,000
to i69,788,000) which The Economist considered most significant.

The increases were largely in commodities which the

Unitad States did not produce and which would have been imported under any circumstances, it maintained.
21

~Economist, MTS, March, 1892, 5.
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then, [Secretary] Fester maintains that Brazil and Cuba have
gained nothing by the treaties, and have been beguiled into
making tariff concessions to the States, for which they
obtain no return. 1122
A number of Latin American governments apparently
The Economist's view of reciprocity.

sha~ed

The British Consul

reported that the Ecuadorian Government, after consultation
with the Guayaquil Chamber of Commerce, was "decidedly adverse"
to reciprocity with the United States on the grounds that
benefits would be slight while concessions to the United
States would too greatly reduce governmental customs revenue.
Venezuela rejected reciprocity for the same reasons.
Brazil quickly became dissatisfied.
treaty had

~ade

Even

The American-Spanish

Spanish colonial sugar competitive with Bra-

zilian sugar in the United States.

Industrialists and impor-

ters were also unhappy and Brazil sought to renegotiate its
treaty in 1893. 2 3 From 1893 onward, the British press ignored
American

re~iprocity

for the most part.

The relations of the

United States with Latin America received editorial attention
only when an international crisis occurred, as was the case
when the Anglo-Venezuelan controversy provoked American
intervention and the Olney Doctrine.

On such occasions the

British press did not make much of the economic issues
involved, though the observation of a Chilean newspaper is
22 The Economist, December 24, 1892, 1607-080
2 3The Economist, MTS, April, 1892, 10; The Times, July
2'1:, 1891;'5: The Economist, MTS;, January, 1893, 9.
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pertinent here.

During the Venezuelan crisis it warned Latin

American nations that they would gain nothing by throwing
themselves into the arms of the United States, for they would
simply become "new centres of exploitation for the great
country whose diplomacy is merely an auxiliary or its mercantile enterprises. 1124
Whatever the success of the American reciprocity policy,
it was clear to those who followed the consular and other
trade reports which appeared in the British press, particularly in The Economist, that the Americans were in fact increasing their manufactured exports to Latin America during
the 1890s. 2 5 In the Brazilian market much of this new competition was rightfully attributed to reciprocity.

The treaty

of 1891 admitted into Brazil, free of duty, a long list of
manufactures, the most important of which were: agricultural
tools, implements, and machinery;

m~ning

and mechanical tools,

implements, machinery, and engines; all machinery for manufacturing and industrial purposes except sewing machines; and
railway equipment and construction material.

Other manufac-

tures were admitted with a 25% reduction of duty including:
cotton goods; iron and steel products not on the free list;
24 The Valparaiso Chileno, quoted in The Times, January
28, 1896, 10.
2 5statements to the contrary, though rare, occasionally
appeared. During the Venezuelan crisis one writer insisted
that the United States was losing Latin American trade because
of shortsig~-ited business methods--a critic ism more frequently
applied to the British--and lack of shipping; H. Somers Somerset, "Great Britain, Venezuela, and the United States,"~
teenth Century, XX.XVIII (December, 1895), 768.
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leather manufactures except boots and shoes; and all wood and
rubber manufactures. 26 The Rio News confidently remarked
that a 25% reduction of duty just about equalised the cost

"Mr. Blaine," it

of British and American goods in Brazil.

said, "will have to conjure up something beside a reduction
of 25 per cent. on dutie3 before he can turn the tide of
importation in South America from England to the United
States. 112 7 The response in England was much less optimistic.
The danger to British trade with Brazil was discussed in the
House of Commons.

The Manchester Chamber of Coffimerce be-

lieved the treaty would be particularly detrimental to Manchester industries and requested that the Prime Minister,
Lord Salisbury, receive a deputation to discuss the matter. 28
This British concern was understandable.

Between 1888

and 1890 the United States supplied only about 9% of Brazil's
imports.

Britain supplied more than 50%.

In 1889 British

exports to Brazil were valued at cf6,232,000 and it was estimated that two-thirds of that would face American competition
as a result of the reciprocity treaty.

In 1889 fritain sent

cil,182,500 worth of coal, machinery, tools, and implements to
Brazil, where they then paid a duty ranging from 5% to 48%0
The United States obtained in 1891 the right to send competing
goods

duty~free.

In 1889 Britain sentof3,514,900 worth of

26The Economist, February 21, 1891, 243.
2 7Quoted in The Economist, March 7, 1891, 307. Since the
Rio newspaper bore an English title, it is possible that it
represented the interests of the English mercantile class in
that cityo
28 Ibido
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cotton goods, iron and steel manufactures, and rubber and
leather products (except boots and shoes); these paid duties
ranging from 15% to 50%.

The United States could export competing goods at a 25% reduction of duty. 2 9 At least a few

AMerican industries quickly reaped the benefits of the treaty.
In 1891 Brazil was one of the major purchasers of American
locomotives, buying£367,557 worth. 30 In 1894 a British
· consul in Brazil pointed out that one of the most significant
results of the treaty was that "American shirtings, sheetings,
and plain cotton goods are gradually supplanting, to some
extent, similar articles of British manufacture, owing to the
difference :.n duty."

In finer quaiity goods, though, the
British were holding their own.3 1
Argentina was another major British marketo

In 1890,

the last year of the Argentine "boom," the United Kingdom wo.s
Argentina's leading source of imports, sending $ (Gold)
61,217,504 worth.

The United States ranked fifth, sending

$ (Gold) 9,307,315 worth.

In the latter part of 1890 occurred

the financial crisis which led to the Baring collapse and
drastically curtailed Argentine imports for a number of years.
This, however, did not prevent the United States from gaining
2 9The Economist, MTS, March, 1891, 4.

30McCo~mick, Future Trade Relations, 22.
3lThe Economist, MTS, August, 1894, 7. Surprisingly,
after 1891 The Economist failed to publish comparative figures
for Brazilian imports as it did for those of many other countries. Brazilian imports of American hardware increased also,
but not as rapidly as those from England and Germany; The
Economist, MTS, January, 1893, 9.
~
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on Britain as an Argentine supplier.

In 1890 American ship-

ments were between one-sixth and one-seventh of the value of
British shipments; in 1891 the proportion slipped to less
than one-eighth.

By 1896 the American position had been

considerably improved.

In that year Argentine imports from the

United Kingdom were valued at $ (Gold) 44,730,000 and those
from the United States at $ (Gold) 11,210,000.32
The only other reported American competition in South
America occurred in Colombia.

Between 1888 and 1890 British

exports to Colombia exceeded American by a margin of about
four to one.

The British were far ahead of the United States

in supplying many of the items in which the United States
could compete, but the figures for 1891 showed that the Americans had a commanding lead in shipments of coal (978o2 tons
to Britain's 6.5) and of glassware (53.8 tons to Britain's
3.3).33
In the Caribbean the British also faced increasingly
serious American competition.

The reciprocity treaty between

Santo Domingo and the United States conferred such advantages
on American products, according to the British Vice-Consul
in 1892, "that a serious prejudice is expected to be derived
by British and other foreign trade, which is deprived of the

same advantages."

Though Britain had the right to most-favored-

nation treatment, the Dominican Government had not made any
2
3 The Economist, MTS, March, 1891, ?; May 13, 1893, 56970; April 3, 1897, 487-89.

33The Economist, MTS, January, 1892, 9-10; MTS, March,
1893,

7.
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of the new concessions available to Britain.

As a result,

the British official said, British trade was suffering and
the introduction of several articles which were
solely imported from British markets, such as
galvanised iron and hardware, hav(e] come to a
standstill. It would be too extensive to mention
all the articles of British manufacture which cannot
compete with American merchandise on account of the
privileges which are enjoyed by the lattero34
In 1893 the British Consul-General of Hayti reported
that during the preceding few years the United States had "to
an important degree" replaced Britain as the supplier of
certain classes of dry goods.

The American articles, he

said, were preferred for their softer finish and more lasting
colors.

Despite the fact that British merchants granted more

lenient credit terms than their American rivals, the importation of American goods had been increasing greatly for several
years.35
Between 1886 and 1892 Britain had enjoyed most-favorednation status in all the Spanish colonies and had successfully competed with the United States in Cuba and Puerto Rico.
But then, not long after Spain had accepted reciprocity with
the United States for her West Indian possessions, she had
denounced her commercial treaty with Britain and proposed a
new one.

Under its terms, The Economist complained, England

would''have to abandon all hope of being placed on the same
footing as the United States in Cuba and Puerto Rico. II
34 The Economist, MTS, May, 1892, 9.
35The Economist, MTS, July, 1893, 7o
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1893 The Times could declare that "the effect of the [reciprocity] treaty has been to throw the entire Cuban trade into
the hands of the United States merchants, with whom the importers of goods from less-favoured nations cannot competeo"
It was universally believed "that the treaty gives the United
States the command of the

~achinery

and metal imports of

Cuba" and stimulated the American export of all items enumerated in the treaty.

The European trade with Cuba in these
items, it said, "is fast disappearing. 11 36
As in the case of South America and the Caribbean, infor-

mation in the British press regardir.g American competition
in Central America was scattered and fragmentary and most
apparent in the early 1890s.

In 1892 the British Government

issued a series of Consular Reports on the decline of British
trade with Central America.

In Guatemala British sales re-

mained level while imports from America, Germany, and France
were increasing.

This "successful competition" was ascribed

in part to the saleability of inferior goods at lower prices;
but it was also noted that the American and German merchants
had close connections with their home firms, better advertising and more efficient salesmen.

In Guatemala the competition

was chiefly in hardware, tools, drugs and pharmaceuticals.37
In El Salvador, which in 1889 had purchased nearly twice as
much from Britain as from the United States

(~141,831

v • .;(80,033)

36 The Economist, June 17, 1893, 723-24; The Times, August
5, 1893-;--5.
37The Economist, MTS, February, 1892, 9.
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imports of British cottons, silks, earthenware, glassware, and
hardware were declining.

Imports from America, Germany and
France were on the increase.38 In Costa Rica the United States
and Germany were taking from Britain some of the trade in hard-

ware and in cotton goods.

The sale of large quantities of

American railway materials to Costa Rica elevated the United
States to the position of Costa Rica's chief supplier.
tain, however, regained first place in 1893.39

Bri-

The Consular

Reports also showed that Honduras was importing fewer British
goods while the United States and Germany competed for the
trade in dry goods, cutlery, prints, and boots and shoes.

By

1894 the United States had made great inroads on the British
trade with Honduras in iron products; American edge tools and
. .
. 11 y success f u 1 • 40
mining
mac h.inery were espec1a
Not surprisingly, American competition with Britain in
Mexico received more frequent and consistent attention than
American competition in other Latin American markets.

In

this market the United States had not only the advantage of
proximity and suffered less from the lack of an adequate merchant marine, but the number of British commercial houses
there had dwindled after diplomatic relations between the two
nations were severed in 1867 and the British had been slow in
re-establishing them.
9.

British exports to Mexico had remained

38 The Economist, MTS, July, 1890, 8· MTS, February, 1892,

'

39The Economist, MTS, February, 1892, 9; June 10, 1893, 694.
40
The Economist, MTS, February, 1892, 9; MTS, June, 1894, 8.
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virtually stationary since then, reported a British Consul,
"while those of American goods have increased so notably."
He noted that the sale of English agricultural and industrial
machinery was increasing, "but mining machinery is almost invariably bought from the United States, partly because it is
cheap, and, as a general rule, well suited to the requirements
of the country, and partly because orders can be filled there
quicker than if sent to Europe."

There was still another fac-

tor, one worth quoting for it exemplified a very widespread
criticism of English commercial practices:
the American manufacturers take more pains than the
British to push the sale of their goods by sending
elaborate price lists and estimates when required,
and several of them have agents in the country who
will, when called upon, visit mines free of charge,
and report upon the class of machinery best adapted
to the special local conditions.41
In 1893 Britain's proportion of Mexican trade

was~ill

low, but the British Consul in Mexico thought he saw a number
of openings for British goods; his recommendations illustrate
the competition which prospective British exporters would
have to face.

He suggested that Britain might send more

carriages and carts, which currently were being suppli°ed almost exclusively by the United States and France.

English

saddles, boots, and shoes he thought would do well for, though
they were much more expensive than the prevailing American and
French articles, they were also far superior.

He saw no rea-

son why England could not compete in lamps, hardware, cutlery,
tools, arms, and ammunition, which were being supplied by the

41 The Economist, MTS, November, 1891, 9o
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United States and Germany.
large disappointed.

42

The Consul's hopes were by and

During the mid-1890s the American pre-

ponderance in Mexico increased as the following figures show: 4 3
Mexican Imports (.;{")
_Fr~om~~~~~~~-1_8~9_4~~~~-1_8~9~5~~~F~i_;scal

Great Britain
United States

1,226,096
2,693,751

1,378,215
3,243,502

1896
1,581,003
4,029,152

Of the various markets of the New World in 1897 only
the Canadian was dominated by imports from the United States.
Great Britain remained generally the preeminent supplier of
the Latin American nations and in some of them she was overwhelmingly predominant.

But she was facing increasing rivalry

from other industrial nations and by 1897 her fastest growing
rival in some of the Latin American markets was the United
States.

8-9.

42 The Economist, MTS, March, 1893, 7; MTS, October, 1893,
4

602.

3The Economist, November 28, 1896, 1571; April 24, 1897,

CHAPTER IX
COMPETITION AROUND THE GLOBE
Europe, Africa, and Asia
Serious competition for industrial sales on the Continent was largely a matter between Great Britain and Germany.
American exports to European countries, though, were by no
means negligible.

The United States, for example, was not
far behind Britain as a supplier of German imports: 1
German Imports (thousands of marks)
From~--------~--1_8~9_2~--~-1_8_9~3~--~--18_9_4_

Great Britain
United States

620,971
611,966

656,443
458,094

608,640
532,939

During this period the United States improved its position,
relative to that of Britain, as a supplier to France: 2
French Imports (t)
From
Great Britain
United States

1890
25,080,000
12,680,000

' 1896
20,217,720
12,430,160

Even Spain, which had long-standing commercial ties with
England, purchased substantial amounts of American goods.
In 1889 her imports from Britain were valued at t;G,440,024;

1 The Economist, October 12, 1895, 1340-41.
2 The Economist, MTS, October, 1891, 7; February 20,
189?,

275-76.
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those from the United States were valued at ~4,081,876.3
However, the silence of the British press on the significance
of these figures would seem to indicate that a very substantial portion of these American exports was comprised of noncompetitive natural products, particularly breadstuff$; the
presumption is further supported by the frequent British
statements to this effect which were discussed in Chapter VI.
The only consistent American threat to British manufactures in Eul·ope between 1890 and 1897 was that of agricultural machinery.

British Vice-Consuls at LaRochelle and at

Nantes both reported concern over such competition in the
early 1890s.

Recent British strikes had driven up prices

and, according to the former,
the Americans have taken the opportunity to make a
considerable reduction in their machines, which
are equally good. The result can only be disastrous to our manufacturers, as the American price
is now so much lower than the English that if it
continues so all competition between the two will
be at an end.
The latter reported that the American machines were
equal to English, but cost less, and it seems odd
that the United States, where the protective duties
are higher than in any other manufacturing country
(a state of things which we are told should make the
cost of production greater), is able to turn out
these machines as good as English, send them 3,000
miles, and sell them cheaper than we can.
Both noted with dissatisfaction that British makers refrained
from exhibiting at agricultural shows in France.
cans did participate.

The Ameri-

They won the prizes and they sold the

3The Economist, February 21, 1891, 241.
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machines. 4
In Russia the British faced similar competition.

The

British Consul at Rostov-on-Don, a major Russian emporium
for agricultural machinery, reported that all the steam
threshers sold there in 1889 were of British

make~

The Ameri-

cans, however, supplied all the reapers, mowers, and hayrakes.

Abundant harvests in 1894 greatly increased the Rus-

sian demand for agricultural machinery.

The sale of English

engines and steam threshers increased, but it was the Americans who sold most of the reapers and binders and about half
the drills.

More than 2,000 American reapers were sold in

the Kiev district alone.

Some of the reasons for the increase

of American sales are made clear in the following report:
The long monopoly enjoyed by Britain in supplling
the steam-thrashing machinery used in [Russiaj is
threatened with serious competition fron Hungary and
America • • • • The American thrashers are being introduced by the Minister of Agriculture. It appears
the class of thrashing machinery used in America
was favourably noted by the Commissioner of Agriculture during his visit to the Chicago Exhibition of
1893, and several sets have been imported by the
Government.
The

Russi~n

Government, the report continued, was staging

official trials of the machinery on the estate of Count Tolstoi.

The competition was "well worth the attention of Bri-

tish manufacturers," for their exports of agricultural equipment to Russia were being jeopardized.

The American thrashing

. 4 The Economist, MTS, July, 1890, ?-8; MTS, June, 1891,
10; MTS, June, 1892, 9. The Americans completely monopolized
the market for reaping and binding machines; the English
retained a share of the market for other agricultural
machinery.
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machine, though equal to the British in performance, was considerably lighter and this gave the American equipment a very
great price advantage since the import duty was calculated
by weight.

A ten-horsepower portable engine of American

make paid between ii40 a:iri £50 less than a British-made engine
when it passed through Russian Customs.5

Finally, though it

was not typical, the contract obtained by Bethlehem Iron and
Steel in 1894 to furnish 1,200 tons of steel armor-plate for
Russian cruisers deserves mention for the attention it received in the British press. 6
As American competition in Europe was confined largely
to agricultural machinery, what American competition in Africa
was reported in the British press was limited to textiles.
A British Consular Report or 1891 stated that nthe competition
for the Madagascar trade in cotton goods lies entirely between
Great Britain and the United States."

Though Britain had the

lead in most articles, the favorite calico in Madagascar came
from the United States, "the New England cotton lords having
been the first to meet the Malagasy requirements in such goods."
Lancashire had found it prudent to begin producing a comparable
product.

The Americans had also been first in establishing

a trade outlet in Mozambique and the British Consular Service
recommended that the ~ritish should follow suit.?

The Foreign

5The Economist, MTS, May, 1890, 10; MTS, Ju.ne, 1894, 9;
MTS, January, 1895, 9.
0 The Economist, January 5, 1895, 15-16.

?~he Economist, MTS, June, 1891, 11; MTS, May, 1891, 10.
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0£fice received a report in 1892 that the most significant
feature of the trade of the Zanzibar-Somali area was "the
large amount of American shirtings and drills, compared to
that imported from Europe and India, the respective figures
being $225,000 and $?5,0JO."

The natives said they preferred

the American articles because they lasted through more washings.

ln 1895 Britain held first place in supplying Zanzioar's

imports, but her shipments were declining while those from the
United States were increasing. 8
American competition in Pacific markets was somewhat more
diversified.

The British press displayed some interest in

Samoa's American trade, perhaps because of the relative newness of American activity there, though

~ritish

tiamvan imports actually increased after 1890.

dominance or
In the year

British and American exports were .£25,799 and i9,661 respectively.

Britain widened the gap in 1891 and by 1895 was

sending .f53,196 worth of goods to Samoa to America's£12,124.9
Nor was Hawaii, an area of more substantial American interest,
any cause for British concern, despite the fact that certain
American manufactured goods were replacing those of British
8 The Economist, MTS, March, 1892, 9; July 25, 1895, 965.
The Americans were also apparently capable of selling substantial quantities of dynamite in South Africa, though not
necessarily in competition with British suppliers. It was
reported that the Transvaal mining industry ~as irate in
189? over an agreement between the Nobel Trust and American
manufacturers by which the Americans agreed not to sell dynamite in South Africa, thus enabling the Trust to raise its
prices. _TI?.e Economist, October 9, 189?, 1429.
9The Times, June 2, 1891, 10; July 6, 1892, 10; November,
1896,

7.
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origin. 10

British anxiety about American competition in Asia

was focused on the much more important markets of China and
Japan.
China was an important market for certain American products.

Especially in

18~2

and again in 1896 the United

States sent very large quantities of cotton goods to China.
American petroleum was another major item of Chinese trade
though it faced increasing Russian competition after 1894.
But, though they took note of American activity in China in
the mid-1890s, the British expressed little concern over it.
They were far too anxious about German, French, and Russian
competition there to be alarmed by the Americana. 11 Furthermore, if 1893 was representative,

~~erican

exports to China

were miniscule if they are compared, not with Britain's alone,
but with the exports to China from Britain and her possessions: 12
Chineseimports, 1893 (Hong Kong Taels)
From
-Hong
Kong

Great Britain
India
United States

80,891,000
28,156,100
16,739,000
5,443,600

10see Chapter VI.
11 The Economist, MTS, July, 1894, 4-5; June 27, 1896,
825-26; May 15, 1897, 710; December 25, 1897, 1820. There is
the possibility that American competition was minimized, intentionally or unintentionally, because in the international maelstrom which was China in the 1890s, the United States was
looked on as a commercial ally. This was certainly the case
after 1898.
12The Economist, April 27, 1895, 545-46. The figures ~e
quire qualification. All imports into China which were sent
through Hong Kong were officially listed as being of Hong Kong
origin, whatever their original source may have been. In any
case', the Eritish enjoyed a considerable margin over the United
States whether Britain alone or the British Enpire is the basis
of the comparison.
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American competition with Britain in Japan was more formidable.

In this market British possessions played a much

smaller role and Great Britain herself, though she led the
world in sending exports to Japan, did not enjoy so wide a
margin of preponderance over the United States: 1 3

From
Great .tSritain
United States

Japanese Imports (#.)
1890
4,635,602
1,117,115

1891
3,332,675
1,140,008

Though total American exports to Japan declined in

18~2

and

1893, the British noticed that they were losing ground in the
sale of steam engines and boilers because of the successful
competition of the Americans and the French.

ln the mid-

1890s the exports to Japan of both Britain and the United
States grew considerably, though the ratio or the former to
the latter remained much the same: 14

From
Great Britain
United States

Japanese Imports
1893(£)
1894(&:~)
4,614,517
3,767,590
1,201,218
821,567

1896 (Yen)
59,251,780
16,373,420

In 1895 The Economist pointed to the United States as
Britain's leading competitor.

And though it maintained in

1896 that Germany and France offered "more direct competition,"
it remained concerned about the Americans.

"Until quite

recently," it stated, "Japan's principal purchases .from the
l3The Economist, MTS, October, 1892, 5-?.
14The Economist, September 21, 1895, 1239; June 19,

189?, 8~
#

;15
States were kerosene oil, raw cotton and flour, none of which
possess any direct interest for British manufacturers; but
America is now sending machinery and metals to Japan. 111 5

As

events would prove, these American industrial exports of the
mid-1890s were the prelude to even stronger competition in
the future.
British Colonial Markets
In the British Colonies other than Canada, the domination
of which by the United States has already been examined, American competition was confined to a very limited range of
products and was experience4 chiefly in Australia.

A substan-

tial number of American locomotives were sold to Australia
in 1891.

Though this American competition did not completely

displace Hritish locomotives there, arguments over the respective merits of each continued for quite a long time. 16 Other
British possessions, notably Egypt and India, also experimented with American locomotives.

The climax of this competition

came after the period under review here and will be examined
later.

The British also faced competition from American

hardware in many of the Colonies.

Australia imported cutlery

and axes "of superior quality to the English and at no greater
cost" from both the United States and Germany. 1 7 Increasing
15The Economist, September 21, 1895, 1239; May 16, 1896,
615.
16carnegie, "The McKinley Bill," 1029; Com. History 1891,
23-24; Com. History 1892, 24.
l?Lord Augustus Loftus, "Commercial Unity with the Colonies," Nineteenth Century, ll.AIII (February, 1893), 342.
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foreign competition in colonial markets, including competition from American hardware, tools, and machinery, prompted
the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, to request reports
from the colonial governors as to the extent to which foreign
goods had ousted British products. 18 The final report on
competition in the colonies will be discussed later in this
chapter.
Great Britain
Not even England itself escaped the sporadic competition
the United States was offering in markets around the world in
the 1890s.

Not only were the Americans sending manufactures

to England, but these American exports were in competition
with key

~ritish

industries.

The English had grown extremely

sensitive about the question of the duraoility and the cost
of production of the

~ritish

coal industry.

In 1893 United

States coal production reached a record lb3,770,000 tons and
American coal exports increased by 3b%.

~hough ~he

:Economist

was not alarmed, pointing out that the American coal export
~rade

"is still of very diminutive proportions," not exceed-

ing 3,600,000 tons, some of those American shipments were
actually sold in England.

This prompted Jeans to remark that

If the same rate of freight could be got for American coal destined for British ports (as now prevails
for pig-iron and steel], our coal markets may soon
be flooded with supplies from the coal fields of
Virginia, Alabama, and Pennsylvania. • • • it will
18 For announcement of the investigation and comments,
see The Economist, December ?, 1895, 1584-86.
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be an evil case ror England should the day ever arrive
when coal can be mined upwards of 3,000 miles from
our shores, and landed at our very doors in successful
competition with our own.19
"Carrying coals to Newcastle" became the statement of a threat
rather than an expression of the redundant or the absurd.
Basic English

manuf~cturing

industries also raced at

least occasional American competition in their home market.

At the end of 1893 the textile center of Kidderminster reported that "the introduction of low-grade American Axminsters
into the English market in the autumn produced some a:Brm lest
permanent competition from the United States was to be looked
for."

English rug-manufacturers, however, countered the

threat by putting a new and competitive grade or carpet on
the market. 20 In 1894 there were claims that a variety of
American iron and steel manufactures were "being sold in our
markets, often of a better quality, and at lower prices than
we can produce them."

Carnegie, too, pointed out to British

readers the effects of recent American price reductions.
They had enabled American shipbuilders to tender bids for
new British war-ships; the Clyde Trustees had purchased their
new dredgers in the United States; American quarrymen sent
granite from Maine to Aberdeen; and American manufacturers of
agricultural equipment were enabled to sell in the British
l9The Economist, I1arch 24, 1894, 365; J. Stephen Jeans,
"The Coal Crisis and the Paralysis of British Industry,"
Nineteenth Centurl, XXXIV (November, 1893), 800-01.
20 com. History 1893, 31; see also Carnegie, "Britain
and the United States," 323.
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market. 21
The introduction into England of American coal and manufactures alarmed the British by the very novelty of the threat.
Two other British industries were contending, not always succ~ssfully,

with long-established American competition.

A

British observer commented in 1890 that a hundful of American
companies were coming to monopolize the life insurance business in England and the author of a letter to The Economist
in 1892 remarked that English life insurance companies "have
seen their business so seriously trenched upon for so long
by the American offices."

The extent of American domination

was made clear in 1895 when The Economist published a summary
revenue table of all eighty-one "ordinary" life assurance
companies doing business in Great Britain.

Ranked in order

of annual premium income, the four leading firms were all
American: Equitable (i?,814,656); Mutual New York
New York

~5,776,953);

(~,849,585);

and Prudential (£-2,077,956).

These

enjoyed a tremendous lead over their British competitors, only
three of which had an annual premium income exceedingi500,000,
the largest being~895,653. 22
These American insurance firms were the subject of a
number of disputes in the early 1890s.

The first centered

21 wiiliamson, British Industries and Forei63 Com~etition,
237; Carnegie, "Britain and the United States," 22-2 •
22P. M. Tait, "Life Assurance," Edinburth' CLulJ. (Octooer, 1890), 514-19; The Economist, February3, 1892, 222;
May ~~, 1895, btl2. l have not been able to establish certainly that Prudential was an American company.
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around

~r~tish

income tax law.

British insurance firms be-

lieved they were subjected to an unfair disadvantage, since
their American competitors were exempt from the British
income tax on interest derived from investments.

On the

other hand, The Economist pronounced as "most unj 1st" a
1

recent Queen's Bench ruling that life insurance premiums were
deductible from taxable income only when paid to British
firms.

"The disability thus imposed upon foreign insurance

companies doing business here is a serious one," it said; and,
though "our home offices don't like the competition of the
American institutions," they should not seek protection
against by means of discriminatory tax legislation. 2 3
More serious were the very frequent charges that the
American firms, and particularly the Equitable Life Association of the United States, operated at excessively high cost,
bad insufficient assets, and

attrac~ed

considerable business

on the basis of exaggerated advertising and highly-misleading
annual statements.

The Economist published considerable cor-

respondence and numerous articles under headings such as "Hand
to I1outh Life Assurance" and "The Promise and Performance of
American Life Offices" exposing such practices.

Editorially

it stated that American firms such as Equitable Life "have for
many years been getting an unfair advantage over their English
competitors." 24

169.

23The Economist, February 15, 1890, 211; February 8, 1890,

24The Economist, May 6, 1893, 536; December 2, 1893, 1431;
December 9, 1893, 1464-65; December 16, 1893, 1507-09; January
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Far more sinister and dangerous than the allegedly unethical practices of American life insurance companies, however, were the machinations of that epitome of the American
trust, the Standard Oil Gompany. 2 5 The Scotch oil trade was
not a major British indu&try.

Nevertheless it was of consi-

derable importance in Scotland, for much local capital had
been invested in the business and it provided one of the more
important cargoes for the Scotch railroads.

The business con-

sisted of the extraction of paraffin oil (scale) from shale
rock and its processing for use chiefly as illuminating oil
and as a base for candles.

In the past the industry had re-

turned "an exceedingly handsome profit," but then Standard
Oil had entered the British market and nearly ruined the Scotch
producers.

The result was an agreement, which in 1890 had

been in force for some time, by which the Scotch producers
limited their productions and Standard Oil, which set the
price for the product, reduced its imports into the United
Kingdom.
At the beginning of 1890 the Scotch producers, faced
with rising production costs, sought a price increase.

Stan-

dard Oil countered with a plan to increase its shipments to
the United Kingdom by 25% on the grounds that the maintenance
6, 1894, 18-19; April 6, 1895, 450-51. Such criticism was
presumably not motivated by any anti-American bias. Under
the title "Where Not to Insure," The Economist published a
scathing criticism of a Canadian insurance company; December

23, 1893, 1531-32.
2 5The British press had much to say about trusts, which
were generally considered to be a natural, though very undesireable, outcome of the American protective system. This
important topic must be excluded due to lack of space.
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of moderate prices would lead to increased consumption.
~he

As

Economist viewed the situation,
the outlook for the Scotch oil trade is not pleasant
to contemplate. Acquiescence in a continuance of
current prices means ruin to certain undertakings;
a break with the Standard, and the introduction of
unbridled competitio~ with America will amount,
sooner or later, to the same thing.

There was no doubt that American oil ruled the British
market.

Of the 1,826,297 barrels of petroleum which Britain

imported in 1890, 1,232,957 crune from the United States.
The remainder came from Russia. 26

By 1892 the Scotch oil trade was in still more serious
trouble.

Standard's Lima oil fields, which yielded petroleum

richer in scale and lubricants than the Pennsylvania fields,
were by this time in full production "and the American producers are resolved that Europe must take what they have to
send."

Standard Oil, which in 1889 had exported 16,000 tons

to the United Kingdom, sent 27,000 tons in 1891--total Scotch
production was only 25,000 tons annually--and was expected
to send 30,000 tons in 1892.

Consequently, early in 1892 the

Scotch producers were forced to agree to an additional 10%
reduction of their output, to the maintenance of their domestic prices, and to the reduction of their prices to continental consumers.

Surplus stocks of Scotch oil nevertheless

accumulated rapidly.

What could not be converted into candles

was frequently pawned, for operating capital was required
even thougb the product could not be sold.

Many of the

26The Economist, MTS, January, 1890, 6-7; MTS, July,
ia90, 5-6; Com. History 1890, 18.

322
Scotch firms were liquidated, prompting The Economist to remark:
The agreement with the American producers has been
a disastrous event for the Scotch producers, and
has been altogether one-sided, and wholly in the
interest of the Yankees • • • • All along the Americans have pursued that policy of selfishness which
characterizes most of their dealings with competitors in the mother country.
The mid-1890s brought no relief.

The Economist bsgan an

1895 article by announcing that "the Scotch oil trade--or
such part

of it as still exists--had renewed friendly rela-

tions with the all-absorbing Standard Oil Company of America."
Friends of the industry, it continued, "believe that the
Scotch oil

would have fared best by having naught to do
with the oil octopus of America. 1127
~rade

The British antagonism against Standard Oil was due to
more than the latter's ability to establish prices and production quotas to suit its own interests, disastrous as that was
for the Scotch industry.

A heated public controversy, the

origins of which went back several decades, was renewed in
1894.

Much of the oil which the United States and Russia

shipped to Britain was of inferior quality.

Its flash-point

(ignition temperature) was so low as to be a very serious
safety

haz~d.

The flash-point of American and Russian oils

was frequently as low as ?0-88 degrees F.

The flash-point of

Scotch oil was considerably higher and the Scotch producers
sought to have the Hritish government raise the minimum legal
27The Economist, January lb, lt\92, 69-70; October 1,
1892, 1237-38; January 14, 1893, 39; April 29, 1893, 507;
February lb, 1895, 224.
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flash-point to at least 100 degrees F.

The chief target of

such legislation was, of course, Standard Oil, which supplied
the bulk of British imported oil and which, it was reported,
had just come to an agreement with the Russians by which the
world was to be divided into monopolistic spheres of influence, Standard Oil obtaining control of America, Britain, and
Western ~urope. 28
The Americans, however, had surmounted such legal obstacles before.

The British government had passed an Act in

18b2 establishing a flash-point of 100 degreos F., but it had
not suited American producers and they brazenly ignored it,
according to The Economist.

'When new legislation was passed

in 1868, The American producers (operating through their
Petroleum Association) had suborned governmental consulting
experts, persuading them to adopt a testing device which
registered a very inflated

flash-po~nt.

When another commis-

sio11 was established by the British Government in 1897 to
28 The Economist, February 10, 1894, 175; The Times, May
8, 1894, 5. An interesting sidelight on Anglo-American competition is provided by the case of the entrepreneurs, including a number of British investors, who devised a scheme to
capture the American oil trade with the East. They planned
to build large reservoirs in Eastern port cities and to fill
them from newly-designed tankers of huge capacity which would
carry the oil from Black Sea Ports to the East via Suez, thus
putting the more expensive American case oil trade (oil shipped
in tin cans packed in wooden crates) out of business. British tin-plate, shipping, and financiai interests which profited from the American trade, lobbied to have the Government
prohibit the passage of such tankers through Suez on the
grounds that they were a safety hazard. They failed and by
1893 four such tankers had used Suez. The Economist, January
9, 1892, 36-37; MTS, March, 1893, 3-4.
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consider the question anew, The Economist published official
Iowa reports which described Standard Oil's fraudulent and
criminal attempts to sabotage that state's flash-point requirements.

No decision was reached in 1897, but The Economist

mounted a campaign of reporting deaths and injuries caused
by lamp explosions, simultaneously urging the commission to
have more regard for the safety of British citizens than for
the profits of American oil producers. 29
1892: A Turning Point
British concern over foreign competition was growing in
the mid-1890s in both official circles and in the press.
Late in 1895 Chamberlain requested from Colonial governors
information of the displacement by foreigners of Britishmade goods in the Colonies.

The German threat of 1896 led

to an official investigation of foreign competition and the
publication of the ".t:Soyle Memorandum" at the beginning of
1897.

Later in that year the replies of the Colonial gover-

nors to Chamberlain appeared in the form of a lengthy Blue
Book.

The year 1897 marked a turning point in two respects.

American competition intensified considerably in 1897, and for
a number of years after that date .t:Sritish attention was probably focused more on American than on German competition.
A recapitulation is in order here.

We have already

seen that by 1897 the British were coming to accept the fact
· 2 9The r:Conomist, February 16, 1895, 224; July 10, 189?,
984-86; August 28, 1897, 1235-36.
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that the United States was becoming less open as a market for
British goods, an opinion which the next few years confirmed,
and that American exports were in some cases checking the
expansion of
world.

~ritish

exports in various markets around the

We have seen that by 1897 America was a

~ominant

force in the economic life of Canada, far surpassing the
British there.

The Canadians recognized this

and,their bid

tor reciprocity with the United States rejected, opted for
preferential trade with Britain in the hope of checking still
further American penetration.

During the 1890s American

goods of several kinds were competing with British articles
in a number of Latin American markets.

American cotton goods

were competitive in China and in portions of Africa.

Metal

products, particularly agricultural implements and locomotives
were supplanting similar British products in E'.irope and Japan.
By 1897 the British were also feeling the American challenge
right at home.

The Welsh tin-plate and the Cornish tin-mining

industries had been very adversely affected by American competition and the British iron and steel industry had felt the
effects of this.

British insurance companies and Scotch oil

producers, particularly the latter, had been injured by American competition and resented the sharp practices of their
rivals.

Occasional shipments of American coal, iron, and

manufactures had reached Britain during the 1890s, opening
eyes in a way that American competition elsewhere could not.
Many of these tendencies reached a new peak of intensity in 1897.

Early in that year the renewal of revolution
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in Cuba re-established British awareness of the world role of
the United States.

The British press generally supported or

at least tolerated the thought of American intervention, even
though it was widely recognized that such intervention would
mean an increase of American influence in and possibly control
of Cuba.30
The annexation of Hawaii by the United States became all
but formalized in 1897.

As the National Review recognized:

The expansion of America into the Pacific is an
event of capital importance. Henceforth the United
States must be regarded as a great colonizing and
naval Power, for no one can imagine that she will
rest her oars in Honolulu • • • • Captain Mahan • • •
regards this new departure with unqualified approval,
for in his eyes the Sandwich Islands constitute the
Key to the Pacific.31

According to A. Maurice Low, the National Review's regular
columnist for United States affairs, "the annexation of Hawaii
is the logical forerunner of the annexation of Cuba.

And

after Cuba, with the building of the Nicaragua Canal, it is
easy to see that the lust on conquest, the passion for territory, will not be appeased until the United States command

its approaches both in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific. 11 32
30The National Review, though it was highly sensitive to
Britain's world position, virtually mounted a campaign of
appeal for American intervention. See, for example, w. Hallett Philips, "The United States and Cuba--A New Armenia,"
National, XXVIII (January, 1897), 598-604; and the regular feature, "Episodes of the Month," throughout 1897 and 1898. For
a thorough examination of British press opinion of the several
manifestations of American expansion discussed here, see A. E.
Campbell, Great Britain and the United States, 1895-1903.
3lnA Greater America," NationaJ., XX.1.X. (July, 1897), 658.
32 A. I111urice Low, "The :Month in America," National, x.x.1.x.·
{July, 1897), 744.

32?

Such a situation disturbed few in Britain.

Typical was

the British ooserver who rhetorically raised the question,
"Do Foreign Annexations Injure British Trade?" and answered,
emphatically not.

i~ough

by such annexations he oelieved the

linited States had reached the status of a "world state" as
Britain and perhaps Russia also were, he concluded that it
was in Britain's interest that the United States annex such
areas; it was better that an area come under regular government--even if a tariff wall were erected--than for free trade
with anarchy to prevail.33
Yet it was significant that Lew's vision of "Hawaii under
the American flag, Cuba destined to be an American colony,
and the Stars and Stripes flying at both ends of the Nicaragua
Canal" was juxtaposed with an account of lagging American
prosperity.

It had been supposed by many that the election

of McKinley would be followed by palmier days.

That these

had not yet appeared many Americans were blaming on the "freetrade" Wilson Tariff.

The American Protective Tariff League,

one of whose directors was McKinley's Secretary of the Interior,
complained that the United States was suffering from an invasion of foreign products.
plaints.

Others joined the chorus of com-

If na score of articles 'made in Germany' are caus-

ing irritation in .England," Carnegie asked British readers,
"what can a thousand articles 'made in England' be expected
to do in the United States? 11 34 That such conditions and such
33Henry Birchenough, "Do Foreign Annexations Injure British Trade?" Nineteenth Century, XLI (June, 1897), 1004.
34 Low, "The Month in Jl..merica," ?44; Andrew Carnegie, "Does
America Hate England?" Contemporary, LXXII (November, 189?), 660.
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opinions led to the ultra-protectionist Dingley Tariff which
further impeded British exports to the United States we have
already seen.

But these same economic conditions, insuffi-

cient home demand and declining prices, led to increased
efforts to find foreign markets for the surplus production
of America's rapidly growing industrial capability.

An exam-

ple of such efforts, more public than most and reminiscent of
Blaine's 1890 campaign, was the formal opening by President
McKinley of the International Commercial Congress at Philadelphia in mid-1897.

According to an American correspondent of

The Times, it was a revival and an extension of the Pan-American idea; not only governments but also commercial organizations were taking part in it.

He described the Congress as

"an attempt to extend trade relations between the United
States and South America, where England is thought to monopolize too large a share of business and influence •• • •
There are large exhibits of American goods for which South
America is expected to become a cus"tomer."35

Less ostenta-

tiously and in other directions the scope of American activity
was widening.

An

event of the greatest consequence was the

opening by Andrew Carnegie of sales offices in European cities
including London and Liverpool.

The American correspondent

of The Economist called this action "a gauntlet in the face
of the steel world; for that it is the intention of American
rail makers, or at least of this particular rail maker, to
35The Times, June 3, 189?, ?.
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bid on all contracts open for the world's competition which
may come up, seems unquestioned. 11 36 The export of iron and
steel and of products manufactured from them constituted the
principal but not the only form of American competition
recognized in the
1~e

~ri tislJ.

press in late 1896 and in 189?.

first indications of serious American competition

in iron and steel occurred in April, 1896.
~

One week The Econo-

announced that American rail manufacturers "have cap-

tured an order for rails for Japan against the competition of
our English makers."

Furthermore, vigorous efforts were being

made to export Southern pig-iron; "already shipments on a
small scale are being made to this country."

The following

week it reported that a thousand tons of Southern pig-iron
had been sold for export to Glasgow, 16,000 tons of steel
rails had baen sold to Japan, and "a large quantity" of rails
had been purchased in the United States by the Grand Trunk
Railroad of Canada.3?

Since it attributed this competition

to "the exceptional depression in the United States" and to
temporary situations such as the favorable fluctuations of
ocean freight rates, The Economist was not overly alarmed in
1896.

When, in the fall of that year, it again carried ac-

counts of "order for rails for Japan and Canada having been
taken [by Americans] in competition with English makers" and
it reported that "about 250,000 tons of iron and steel in
36 The Economist, February 2?, 189?, 313.
3?The Economist, April 11, 1896, 455; April 18, 1896, ~89.
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different forms (including pig-iron) have been shipped from
America to Europe," The Economist remained confident.

Bri-

tish producers, it believed, could "hol.d their own, foreign
competition notwithstandi.ng. 11 38
At the beginning of 189? both The Times and The Economist
were still complacent.

Both noted in their reviews of 1896

that the British iron and steel industry was prosperous.
Though The Times reported that Alabama pig-iron was being
offered at Middlesborough at competitive prices and The Economist once again recounted that Americans had taken Japanese
and Canadian rail orders away from English rivals, these leading newspapers used identical words to describe the situation:
"the United States have not yet commenced to seriously compete with Great Britain in foreign markets."

The extensive

sale abroad of American locomotives was dismissed as the result
of British makers being too busy to accept the enormous world
demand.

The entry of American iron and steel into Britain

was characterized by The Economist Ets "quite exceptional";
such shipments had been possible only because there was no
market in depressed America for the great surplus production.
The Economist anticipated an economic revival across the Atlantic which would, it believed, raise American prices to the
point where American iron and steel would no longer be competitive. 39

38 The Economist, October 10, 189b, 1323; October 24, 1896,
138?; November 7, 1S96, 1451.
39
.
.... The Times,
January 5, 189?, 3-4; Com. History 1896,
21-22; The Economist, January 16, 189?, 77.
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By early 1897 the cost of Alabama pig-iron had increased
by $1 a ton beyond the prices of 189b, yet the British found

that American competition not only did not slacken but actually increased.

The American correspondent of The Economist

reported in February that Alabama producers were exporting
pig-iron to England, Holland, Spain, Belgium, Italy, Austria,
India, and Japan; and they were negotiating orders with Russia, Australia, and South Africa.

l!'oreign buyers had found

Alabama pig-iron equal to that produced in Scotland and
superior to that made in Middlesborough.

Alabama producers,

he went on, "regard it reasonable to suppose that after a
i'u.11 familiarity with American iron, European consumers will
be willing to pay full market prices for it, and that this
export business is therefore likely to continue. 1140 At about
the same time Carnegie was reported to be introducing new
equipment which would reduce the production cost of steel
rails by 20%.

According to The Times, Carnegie and other

major American steel makers "are said to be making a special
effort to conquer the European and especially the South American markets, which latter has been heretofore monopolized by
England. 1141 In March came the sensational report from The
.

-

:Economist's correspondent that "orders for 100,000 tons [of
steel rails] have been received from London by the Carnegie
interests.

One-half of this order is credited to English

40
The 3?.conomist, February 20, 1897, 280.
41
The Times, March 1, 1897, 7.
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railway companies, and a large block is said to be destined
for Japan."

The remainder of his report was more startling

still:
The statement that [AmericanJ tinplate bars
have been exported to the Welsh tinplate mills for
several months, and that some of the tinned plates
imported recently were made of American steel, rests
upon good newspaper authority, but has not been
officially confirmed, as has been the announcement
that Bessemer steel billets have been going abroad
for some time past, and that one Pittsburgh concern
is "shipping on an order for 20,000 tons of billets,
to be landed on the west coast of England, at a price
said to be l2s. below the local quotations.n42
By April The Economist admitted that American competition was having "a depressing influence" on the British iron
and steel industry and it predicted that "we may have to
count upon this condition of things continuing for some time
to come."

Accounts of British and Canadian purchases of

American iron and steel continued to appear and the United
States still found Japan a very profitable market.

According

to the British Vice-Consul at Tokyo, the United States had
emerged
as a serious competitor with Europe in supplying
Japan with machinery, rails, nails, and pig-iron.
In rails alone American producers sold 30,000 tons
at lower prices than British makers were willing to
accept, and there appears to be a probability that
American locomotive builders will secure a greater
number of Japanese orders during the current year.
The Economist hoped that the United States had secured so many
foreign orders for steel that the flooding of the British market by that product might diminish, but it expected the British
importation of Southern pig-iron to continue.
42The Economist, March 6, 1897, 348.

British cotton

333
steamers offered the Americans low freight rates for pig-iron
for they found it to be excellent ballast. 4 3
Throughout the first half of 1897 The Economist continued
to insist that such competition was primarily the result of
the depressed condition of the American market.

~ut

by July

it was repudiating its former conviction that the competition
would disappear when an improvement occurred in the United
States.

lt had come to believe "that a considerable portion

of the present competition will continue,
can revival.

11

despite any Ameri-

Large quantities of American iron were being

imported by Britain and others had
found its way to lndia, China, Japan, and the Continent of Europe, and other m~rkets are daily being
found by American manuracturers. The main reason why
this conpetition must now oe viewed in a more serious
light is the fact that most successful erfo~ts have
been made towards cheapening the cost of producing
steel, and it is affirmed on the best authority that
the cost of making pig-iron and steel billets is less
in America than in this country.
At Chicago Carnegie was producing pig-iron and steel billets
at costs which "so far, have not been possible in this country, even under the most favourable conditions."

If any

further proof of American competitiveness were required, said
The

Economi~,

there were abundant examples.

In addition to

the large quantity of steel billets and the nearly ?0,000
tons of pig-iron which Britain had imported from the United
States in the preceding twelve months, the Americans had
just won a large order for rails for the Indian railways,
their price being about 20s. per ton under British quotations;
4

3The Economist, April l?, 189?, 56?; June 26, 1897, 914.
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they had also won an order for water pipes for Coolgardie;
"and steel hoops are being offered at considerably less than
English prices laid down both in English and foreign ports."
The Economist warned that the now "more serious competition
of America," coupled with existing Continental competition,
might check the expansion and jeopardize the prosperity
which the British iron and steel industry had been enjoying
for several years. 44
By the latter part of 1897 it was quite clear to the
British that American iron and steel competition was not a
temporary phenomenon resulting from depression.

The Americans

continued to take Japanese orders out of the hands of English
producers.

In England itself agents "are still pushing the

sale of American pig-iron, steel hoops, wire rods, gas, water,
and boiler tubes, and other productions of the American steel
works."

The United States was no longer depressed.

Its suc-

cessful competition was clearly attributable to "enterprise"
and to the adoption of the newest equipment and techniques.
In fiscal 1897 the United States exported 168,890 tons of
pig-iron, 107,740 tons of steel rails, 53,865 tons of wire,
and 46,248 tons of steel billets, in addition to smaller
quantities of other iron and steel products.

"If exports

on this scale are to continue," The Economist warned, "it
will be a serious matter for the iron and steel trade of
this country, and it behoves our manufacturers to do all in
44 The Economist, July 10, 1897, 986.

335
their power by cheapening the cost of production to meet this
new competitor." 4 5
This competition was not restricted to the primary products of the iron and steel industry.

In the sale of the

various kinds of machinery and equipment which

tL~

British

styled collectively as engineering products, there was also
formidable American competition.

We have already noted ear-

lier examples of the extensive foreign sales of American locomotives and agricultural machinery.

In a leading article of

1897, The Times cited the statement of an American engineer
that hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of American machinery was being sent to Asia, to Bu.rope, and to England itself.
According to The Economist, the process "which is subject to
serious and growing competition from American manufacturers"
was the application of electric motors to machine tools and
other technical innovations.

Both Journals saw this as a

demonstration that the United States was successful because
of its ability constantly to reduce industrial costs.

The

Times added the observation that the highly-paid American
worker labored harder and more efficiently than his
'
counterpart. 40

~ritish

The "American cycle invasion" was still another element
of American competition which attracted attention in 1896 and
1897.

!n 189b cycling became a mania in England and almost

45The Economist, October 16, 189?, 1458.
4 6The Times, leading article, September 23, 189?, 6-7;
Com. History IS96, 21. The Times' comparison of the American
with the British worker was occasioned by the existence of a
serious strike in the British engineering trades, a strike which
"has given a great advantage to our American and Continental
competitors"; The Times, leading article, October 9, 1897, 11.
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overnight the cycle industry experienced a fantastic boom.
British makers were not prepared for this sudden and tremendous increase in demand.

But in America, wrote a British com-

mentator, "f'or some reason or other, the rise was foreseen,
and manufacturers there • • • placed large contracts for cycle
tubing, which practically swallowed up the output of that
indispensable material • • • and so made it impossible for
the English manufacturers to cope with the subsequent rush of
orders."

While English investors were sinking large sums in

the establishment of tube works, English cycle prices were
necessarily quite high "and the market has been flooded with
cheap American ones. 1147
The American rush to take advantage of English cycle
market conditions led to the export of large numbers of inferior machines.

Even cycles that were well made by American

standards proved too light and fragile for the rugged country
lanes of England.

Soon there were widespread complaints that

the American product was shoddy and there were those in England in 1896 who were prepared to write off American cycle
competition as a failure.

But at least some American manu-

facturers adapted their product for the English market and
this competition did not disappear.

"With characteristic

push," The Economist reported in mid-1897, American cycle
manufacturers
4 7A. Shadwell, "The Economic Aspects of the Bicycle,"
National, XXVIII (November, 1896), 345-46.

33?
have not hesitated to attack the .British maker on
his own ground, and this country has been flooded with
American machines, many, no doubt, of inferior class,
but others practically as good as can be manufactured
on this side. As a matter of fact, the American cycle
has established for itself, more especially among
ladies, quite a market in England, of course to the
detriment of the home trade.
J.n

this industry, too, keener competition was a result of

American cost-cutting.

At the height of the influx of Ameri-

can cycles, a major American producer announced a 25% price
reduction.

The Economist concluded that, however damaging

to the .British industry it might be, "there appears to be no
doubt that the competition will have to be met by a general
lowering of prices" by English makers. 48
The 1897 invasion of England by American manufactures
was largely confined to products of the iron and steel and
the engineering industries, though there were also complaints
that the Americans were "dumping" quantities of Axminster
carpets in the English market at iow prices. 4 9 American competition in other world markets, however, was somewhat more
diversified.

~ritish

concern over American competition in

external markets in 1897 was particularly focused on the .British possessions.

~he

trend of American domination of the

Canadian market, which prompted the adoption of preferential
tarif!'s oy Uanada in ltb?, has already been examined.

There

were those in England who feared that a similar situation

1897,

48 Ibid.; The Economist, July 3, 1897, 952-53; August
l~

4 9com. History, 189?, 31.

21,
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had arisen in the British West Indies.
The one-product economy of these islands had been nearly
ruined since 1890, first by the refusal of the British Government to permit the West Indies to conclude a reciprocity
treaty with the United States and secondly by th& competition
of European, government-subsidized beet sugar.

In the interim

the islanders had developed a profitable trade in tropical
fruits with the United States and there were those who thought
the West Indian trade pattern was becoming ominously similar
to that of Canada:
West Indian Trade, Annual Average (millions if)
With
Great Britain
United States

1881-1885

1891-1892

5.9

5.1 '

The expanded marketing of tropical fruit, however, had not
completely compensated for the immense losses being sustained
in the sugar trade.

The planters had been refused reciprocity

with the United States in part at least because of English
fears that this would establish too close a relationship
between America and a British possession.

By 1897 the plan-

ters were requesting assistance from the British Government
in the form of subsidies, similar to those paid by the sugarbeet producing countries of Europe.

Again the Government

proved reluctant to aid the west Indies.

But there were

English critics who believed that such a refusal would be a
far greater inducement for the West Indians to turn to the
United States than any mere reciprocity treaty.

The United
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States had once admitted West Indian sugar duty-free; it
might do so again.
Geographically much nearer to America than to Great
Britain, [the West Indians] might seek, and would
certainly receive, from the United States, not alone
the commercial facilities which we deny them, but
other inducements o1 far greater importance. Trade
would follow the flag. That flag would no longer
be ours, and we might have to deplore not only the
ruin, but the loss, of our West Indian possessions. 50
In Australia, too, the American rivalry was keenly felt.
Earlier examples of American competition in locomotives and
hardware have been noted already.

According to a British

Commercial Attache, by the mid-1890s the Americans dominated
the Australian market for wooden manufactures and their monopoly of the sale of tools and implements was such that "the
British do not attempt to assail that position."

The Ameri-

can strength in this trade was "the well-known talent of the
United States manufacturers in producing the best shapes for
utility [which] gives them a strong position in a market the
requirements of which are somewhat similar to those of America."

This British official attributed American success in

certain other trades to superior packaging, more detailed and
attractive catalogues, and better advertising.

In the case

of items on which the Australian duty was levied by the size
50Williamson, British Industries and
214; Michael G. Mul a , ·'f e Traa.e o t e Hri.tis11 o onies,
ContemEorary, L.X.Xll (November, 1897), 703-04 (note that the
rigures are for total trade, not for imports alone); Mayson
M. Beeton, 111l1he Wrecking of the W'est Indies," Nineteenth Centhry, XLII (July, 18(j?), 151-bO; Lord Pirbright, 'l'he Ruin ()f
t e West Indies," National, XX.X (December, 189?), ~34.
11
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of the package, the Americans "had proved themselves able to
place a greater quantity in a cubic foot than the
and in a manner which reduced breakage.

~y

~ritish"

attention to such

minor details as these, the AmeJ.icans had been successful in
selling lamp-glasses,

and other items for which

bo~tles,

proper packing was important.

Moreover the Americans shipped

trade packages, units which could be bought and sold in the
cases in which they were imported.

Whereas British or Con-

tinental exporters sent goods in unwieldy and irregularly
sized cases, the Americans shipped clocks, lamps, and many
other articles in cases of unvarying size, each containing a
suitable number of articles for sale to retail shopkeepers,
and attractive enough to be put on display on the merchants'
shelves.51
According to this same official, "the Americans also are
doing excellent work in promoting commerce" in South Africa.
The United States was far behind Britain as a supplier to
Cape Colony but, as in other markets, American sales were
increasing at a faster rate:
Cape Colony Imports (Qf)
From
Great Britain
United States

1890

7,825,000
274,000

1895

10,427,000
867,000

Yankee enterprise was evident in South Africa.

A large Chicago

5lWilliam s. H. Gastrell, Our Trade in the World in Relation to Forei n Comoetition: 18
_
on on:
apman & a 1,
Ltd., 189?),
, ·-ts?. The Economist also recognized the
superiority of American packaging; September 18, 1897, 1322.
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machinery manufacturer had established a permanent agency in
the Transvaal with a warehouse for goods, a repair shop, and
a technical staff.

Whenever new mining projects were begun,

its engineers were on the spot offering plans and estimates.
If their offer was accepted, they could immediately supply
and erect the necessary equipment, a factor which gave them
a very great sales advantage.5 2
Such a heavy incidence of American competition in 1897,
and the fact that so much of it was taking place in England
itself or in the British colonies, brought with it a new
notoriety.

The year 1897 was a turning point in that, for

the first time in a number of years, many in Britain oegan
to express the opinion that American competition was a graver
peril than that of Germany.

As early as 1897 the climate of

opinion in Britain was being prepared for the alarmist reaction to the "American invasion" a few years hence.

There

were still those who, in 189'/, oelieved that American competition was inconsequential compared with that of Germany.53
There were others who saw little point in discriminating, who
saw dangerous competition on many sides.

"America, Belgium,

and Germany," went one example of this attitude, "are running
us very close in our own specialties of engines, printing
machines, agricultural machinery and implements, cycles,

52 Gastrell, Our Trade in the World, ?5, 172, Annex No. ?.
53see, for example, Henry Birchenough, "England's Opportunity--Germany or Canada?" Nineteenth Century, XLII (July,
1897), 1-8.
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firearms,

&c., &c."54 But there began to appear also identi-

fications of America as Britain's chief rival:

"In the

future," wrote Professor Armstrong, "we have to fear not
German competition, but that of our colonists beyond the
seas, and perhaps that of our American cousins mos·t of all. n55
The United States had been identified in the official
reports which appeared in 189?--the "Boyle Memorandum" and
the colonial replies to Chamberlain's questionnaire--as one
among a number of competitors; these reports had had their
origins in 1895 and 1896.

Publication of the responses to
'

Chamberlain's inquiry elicited this statement from The Times:
The keenest of our competitors in the colonial
trade are the United States, Germany, and Belgium,
with Japan emerging as a rival in the Far East • • • •
The general result of the inquiry appears to be that
British trade is still easily ahead in goods of the
best class, except machinery and tools, in which the
United States, on the whole, takes the lead, but that
the colonial market very largely demands goods of a
second-rate kind, which our foreign competitors furnish at lower prices and in a more finished style
than British manufacturers • • • • As yet [British
manufacturers] commercial supremacy remains unshaken,
but competition has challenged it boldly and has made
rapid advances.56
This was a somewhat stronger statement of American competition
than those which had appeared in The Times when the "Boyle
Memorandum" had been published at the beginning of 1897, but
the strongest statements were still to come.
54Pirbright, "The Ruin of the West Indies," 532.
55Quoted in J.B.C. Kershaw, "The Future of British Trade,"
Fortnightly, LXII n.s. (November, 1897), ?38, n.l.
56 The Times, leading article, September 15, 1897, 7.
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In the wake of all the news and commentary of 189? concerning American competition, a Fair Trader examined for the
British public "The Future of British Trade."

According to

him, "our difficulties are an increasingly keen competition
trom Germany and the United States."

Though he denied the

journalistic allegations of a German deluge of England, he
quoted with approval the statement of the "Boyle Memorandum"
that German and American "competition with us in neutral
markets, and even in our home markets, will probably, unless
we ourselves are active, become increasingly serious."

He

denied that report's contention that British activity could
reduce the :3eriousness of foreign competition, which he
believed "must inevitably slowly increase."

But the most

important conclusion which he drew from the evidence of
189? and the most pregnant comment on Britain's commercial
future was that "the United States is a rival in our trade
to be feared even more than Germany. 11 57

By themselves, of

course, such statements are inconclusive, for they represented no more than a single individual's point of view.

But

this particular view was shared by The Economist and The Times
and was, therefore, presumably representative of a considerable body of British opinion.

Though it was not the style of

The Economist to offer an explicit editorial statement on the
comparative gravity of the American and the German threats,

it consistently took American competition more seriously,
5?Kershaw, "The Future of British Trade," 733-3?.
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as a reading of its issues throughout the 1890s shows.

At

no time was this more evident than in 1896 when it simultaneously minimized the currently fashionable alarm over
German competition while maintaining the closest scrutiny of
American activity in nearly every issue.

The

TifuPS

had

adopted this view more explicitly by the end of 189?.

In a

leading article it agreed with the President of the Royal
Statistical Society that "the competition we may expect from
Germany [isJ insignificant in comparison with that of the
United States."58
The year 1897, then, did mark a turning point for British opinion.

While there can be no doubt that, as the pio-

neer student of the subject has shown,59 a still more extensive British concern emerged after 1898 when the United States
expressed commercial ambitions and demonstrated commercial
energy commensurate with its new
important to realize that the

r~le

as a world power, it is

fund~nental

features of the

American danger were apparent to many in Britain in 1897.

58 The Times, leading article, December 16, 1897, 9.

It
must be noted, however, that both The Times and The Economist
remained relatively confident throughout the period covered
in this study that neither American nor German competition
would overwhelm Britain.
59Heindel, The American Impact on Great Britain: 18981914, Chs. VII-IX. According to iieindel (171, n.1), Clapham's
s:tu:<!y of British economic history was the first "to give proper attention to the Atirica:EJ impact" but er:-ed by dating its
emergence in 1903 rather than in 1898. It would be pedantic
to take issue with Heindel over this date, especially since
his study includes evidence of pre-1898 British awareness of
the American challenge. Nevertheless, the pre-1898 origin of
worldwide American competition and of serious British concern
deserves emphasis.
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British alarm over the "American invasion" of 1901-1902 had
its roots in the pre-Spanish-American War years however much
the spectacular events of 1898 established a new and different context for American economic activity •

. •:<;.-( '

EPILOGUE:

THE CLIMAX OF THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE, 1898-1903

EPILOGUE
THE CLIMAX OF THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE, 1898-1903
"America has invaded Europe not with armed m0n but with
manufactured products," began Frederick Mackenzie's The American Invaders (1902), the most detailed and the most discussed
examination of the many facets of the American invasion of
Britain.
No nation has felt the results of this invasion
more than England • • • • Men have sometimes spoken as
though the dramatic coup of a Horgan, when he took
our Atlantic supremacy-away from us; of a Schwab, who
outbids our steel makers; of Philadelphia bridge builders, who capture the orders of our biggest viaducts,
comprise this invasion. They form but a very small
part o1 it. 3uch items &re merely the sensational
incidents in a vast campaign. The real invasion goes
on unceasingly and with little noise or fuss in five
hundred industries at once. From shavin~ soap to
electric motors, and from tools to telephones, the
American is clearing the field·.l
In support of this thesis, I1ackenzie drew a portrait-exaggerated yet not utterly beyond the bounds of belief,
according to the author--of the Englishman as a consumer.
Despite its length, the anecdote deserves quotation in full
not only because of its content but also because it was
probably more often alluded to than any other passage in the
literature of the American invasion.
The average citizen wakes in the morning at the sound
of an American alarum clock; rises from his New England
1 Frederick Arthur Mackenzie, The American Invaders (London: Grant Richard, 1902), 1-2.
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sheets, and shaves with his New York soap, and a
Yankee safety razor. He pulls on a_Pair of Boston
boots over his socks from West [sicj Carolina,
fastens his Connecticut braces, slips his Waterbury
watch into his pocket, and sits down to breakfast.
Then he congratulates his wife on the way her Illinois straight-front corset sets off her Massachusetts
blouse, and begins to tackle his breakfast, at which
he eats bread made from prairie flour (possibly doctored in the special establishment on the Lakes),
tinned oysters from Baltimore, and a little Kansas
City bacon, while his wife plays with a slice of
Chicago ox tongue. The children are given Quaker
Oats.
Concurrently he reads his morning paper, set
up by American machines, printed with .AI:lerican ink,
by American presses, on American paper, edited possibly by a smart journalist from New York City, and
sub-edited with as close an approach to American
brevity and verve as English pressmen can achieve,
advertising its American edition of some classical
novels or gigantic encyclopedia, which is distributed
among the subscribers on the American installment
system.
Rising from his breakfast table the citizen rushes
out, catches an electric tram I:1ade in 1Iew York, to
Shepherds Bush, where he gets into a Yankee elevator,
which takes him on to the American-fitted railway
to the city. At his office of course everything is
American. He sits on a Nebraska swivel chair, before
a Michigan roll-top desk, writes his letters on a
Syracuse typewriter, signing them with a New York
fountain pen, and drying them with a blotting sheet
from New England. The letter copies are put away in
files nanufactured in Grand Rapids.
At lunch time he hastily swallows some cold
roast beef that comes from a Mid-West cow, and flavours it with Pittsburgh pickles, followed by a few
Delaware tinned peaches, and then soothes his mind
with a couple of Virginia cigarettes.
When evening comes he seeks relaxation at the
latest Adelphi melodrama or Drury Lane startler,
both made in America, or goes to a more frivolous
theater, controlled by the great American Trust,
where he bears the latest American musical conedy,
acted by young ladies and thin men with pronounced
nasal accents. For relief he drinks a cocktail or
some California wine, and finishes up with a couple
of "little liver pills" made in America.2
2 Ibid. ,142-43.

-
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Caricature, however, was not a characteristic of this
classical study of the American challenge.

For the most part

its pages were full of detailed information and specific
examples of the invasion of American products, sarvices,
operations, and capital investments.

Mackenzie rearly suc-

ceeded in demonstrating that the invasion was affecting "five
hundred industries at once."

But, though it is the most com-

plete contemporary account and attracted considerable attention when it was published, first in 1901 as a series in
Northcliffe's Daily Mail and then as a book in 1902, it would
be misleading to allow the work's breadth of scope and vividness of example to obscure the very significant fact that The
American Invaders was only the most substantial among a great
outpouring of British writings on the American challenge
between 1898 and 1903.

This literature is much too vast for

analysis or even for adequate
cluding pages.

ident~fication

in these con-

However, having brought the account to the

brink of the great "American invasion," some indication of
the enormous impact on British opinion of the events of the
post-1897 era is in order.3
In a number of ways the post-1897 American challenge was
3Tl1ese comments apply even if consideration is limited,
as it is here, exclusively to articles, books, and pamphlets
which deal directly with the theme of the American invasion
or the American challenge. Writings in the newspapers and
in the periodicals which deal specifically with other themes
which have been treated in this study--Canada, tariffs and
reciprocity, American competition in neutral markets, etc.-are so numerous in the period 1898-1903 that discussion of
them would l"equire 'book-length treatment.
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but an intensification of already established patterns.

The

competition of American iron, steel, and engineering products
more than ever dominated the pages of The Economist.

The

British continued to buy American pig-iron and steel and to
face stiff competition in machine tools, enginest mechanical
and electrical engineering products, and locomotives.

Ameri-

can iron and steel exports rose from 150,000 tons in fiscal
1896 to 998,000 tons in fiscal 1899.

There could be no doubt,

according to The Economist, that it was the American producers
who "will for the future be the principal factors in international rivalry. ,. 4
Though it was not until 1901 that the "American invasion"
became a prominent theme in the periodical press, as early as
1900 readers of The Economist and The Times were aware that
it had reached very serious proportions.

"The Commercial

History & Review of 1897" was the first to recognize American
competition in neutral markets.

"The Commercial History &

Review of 1900" was the first to begin its analysis of the
year's trade with the recognition that "the Americans were
able not only to cut us out to some extent in foreign markets,
but also to wrest from our manufacturers some of our own home
trade."

It was also the first to include a special section

section under the heading "American competition."

American

4 com. History 1898, 19-22; Com. History 1899, 22-23; for
the last phase of the American "cycle invasion" see "Duncans,"
"The Cycle Industry," Contemporary, LXXIII (April, 1898),
500-11; after 1898 the British regained the home market in
this trade.
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manufactured exports, it noted, had risen from f'76,160,000
in 1898 to.£88,280,000 in 1900, an increase of more than 15%:
Over this development of their trade there has been
much jubilation in the States. Industrial supremacy,
they say, is passing from the Old World to the New,
and the ability of American manufacturers, through
their greater energy and adaptability, and the superiority of their machinery, to out-distance their
European competitors, is loudly vaunted. And there
can be no question as to the growing industrial capacity of the United States.
The value of American iron and steel exports had risen from
c£16,500,000 in 1898 to aboutaf26,000,000 in 1900, an increase
of nearly 60%.

England had faced competition in iron and

steel before, The Economist observed, first from Belgium and
then from Germany, "but now we are face to face with the most
powerful and determined competition of all."5
American competition in engineering was growing so intense
that in 1899 The Times dispatched

~

British engineer to tour

and report on American production facilities.

His findings

appeared as a series in The Times in the spring of 1900; they
attracted such interest that they were published in book form
as American Engineering Competition. 6 These reports described
in detail the superiority of American equipment and production techniques and presented a wide array of examples of
successful American competition in British and other markets
in iron and steel, in structural steel work, in engines,
machine tools, and agricultural equipment.

The Americans

5com. History 1900, 1, 4, 22-23.
6 The Times, American En~ineering Comnetition (London and
New York: harper & Brothers Publishers, l~Ol).
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had an even greater edge in the newer electrical engineering
industry; in England these products faced virtually no British competition at all but only that of German manufacturers.?
The British periodical press had been rather silent
regarding the American challenge since 1892.

As l:e saw in

Part III, the intensification of American competition was
broadcast for the most part in the newspapers.
of 1898 ch,1nged this.

The events

The new world role which the United

States adopted, coupled with the continuing expansion of
American manufactured exports, re-established the American
challenge as a staple item in the journals of opinion and
occasioned the publication of a number of books and pamphlets. 8
?For one of the earliest accounts, see A. A. Campbell
Swinton, "Electrical Engineering and the 11unicipalities,u
Nineteenth Centur~, XLVII (February, 1900), 297-303.
8 or the six journals of opinion used in this study, The
ContemEorary Review, The Fortniu.;btly Review, The NationalReview, and ·rhe i~ineteenth Century, might '6e saiO: to have
oeen preoccupied with tbe American challenge. For virtually
issue-by-issue coverage the regular features of The National
Review-- 11 Episodes of the I1onth" and A. Maurice Low*s column,
'11'Tfie Month in America"--deserve special mention. The Edinburgh Review and The Ouarterly Review gave it less prominence
out by no means did they ignore it.
Of the literally hundreds of articles which dealt with
or alluded to the American challenge in these six journals
between 1898 and 1903, the following represent only a sampling
of the more important contributions:
The Contemporary Review: nRitortus," "The Imperialism
of British Trade: Parts I and II," LXXVI (July, August, 1899),
132-52, 282-304; "The Author of 'Drifting, '" "The Economic
Decay of' Great Britain," LXXIX, LXXX (May, July, August, 1901),
609-38, 24-33, 264-83; Henry W. Macrosty and s. G. Hobson,
"The Billion Dollar Trust: I and II," LXXX (August, September,
1901), 177-94, 333-54; Walter F. Ford, "American Investments
in England,'' LXXXI (March, 1902), 401-08; Dr. E. J. Dillon,
"The Commercial Needs of the Empire," LXXXI (April, 1902),
457-81; Wal"ter F. Ford, "The Limits of the American Invasion,"
LXXXI (June, 1902), ?80-8?; o. Elzbacher, "The American Shipping
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The influx of American manufactured products and of American coal; the invasion of England by the Steel, the Match,
the Tobacco, and other American Trusts; the frightened outcry over Morgan's attempt to monopolize Atlantic shipping;
the construction by Americans of much of London's transit
system; the repatriation of American securities and a wave
of American investments in British enterprises--these and
Trust," LXXXII (July, 1902), 69-79; J. A. Hobson, "The Economic Taproot of Imperialism," LXXXII (August, 1902), 219-32;
and Major c. C. Townsend, "The American Industrial Peril,"
LXXXII (October, 1902), 562-67.
The Edinburgh Review: "American and English Working People," CXCIII (April, 1901), 489-510.
The Fortnightly Review: "The Commercial Future," Brooks
Adams, "The New Struggle for Life among Nations," and Benjamin
Taylor, "The Commercial Sovereignty of the Seas;" LXV n.s.
(February, 1899), 274-99; Benjamin Taylor, 11 The Struggle for
Industrial Supremacy," LXYIII n.s. (October, 1900), 639-52;
"Calchas," "Will England Last the Century?" LXIX n.s. (January,
1901), 20-34; "Commercial Rivalry with America": Benjamin Taylor, "The I•Iari time Expansion of America," and H. W. Wilson,
"Face to Face with the Trusts," LXX n.s. (July, 1901), 61-8'7;
"Two Presidents and the Limits of American Supremacy," L:XX
n.s. (October, 1901), 555-70; and J. A. Hobson, "The A:pproaching Abandonment of Free Trade," LXXI n.s. (I1arch, 1902), L~34-44.
The National Review: W. R. Lawson, "Morganeering," XXXVII
(June, 1901), 538-47; brnest E. Williams [author of Made in
German , "Made in Germany--Five Years After," XXXVIII (Septemer, 1 01), 130-44; and "The Economies of Empire," a 106-page
supplement which appeared with the regular issue of September,
1903.
The Nineteenth Centurt: Andrew Carnegie, "The Manchester
School and To-Day, 11 XLIII February, 1898), 277-83; Frederick
Greenwood, "The Anglo-American Future," XLIV (July, 1898), 111; J. W. Cross, "British Trade in 1898: A Warning Note," XLV
(May, 1899)t 850-56; Andrew Carnegie, "British Pessimism," XLIX
(June, 1901;, 901-12; Edmund Robertson, "The Shippi.Llg 'Combine'
and the British Flag,'' LI (June, 1902), 873-82; George T. Denison, "Canada and the Imperial Conference," LI (June, 1902),
900-07; John Foster Fraser "The Success of American Manufacturers," LIII (.March, 1903), 390-402; Sir Robert Giffen, Edward
Dicey, and Benjamin Kidd, "Imperial Policy and Free Trade: Parts
I-III," LIV (July, 1903), 1-54.
The Quarterly Review: "A Council of Trade," CXCVI (July,
1902), 221-38; "Mr. Chamberlain's Fiscal Policy," CXCVIII (July,
1903), 246-78; and "Retaliation and Reciprocity," CXCVIII
(October, 1903), 613-48.
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many other manifestations of the American challenge filled
the pages of the British press between 1898 and 1903.

Those

British readers not sated in this manner could turn to books
such as Harold Cox, American Progress and British Co~erce;9
B. H. Thwaite, The American Invasion; Or, England's Commercial
Danger; 10 or Beckles Willson, The New America: A Study of the
Imperial Republic. 11
None of these, however, came close to matching Mackenzie's
American invaders in demonstrating to the British the many
ways in which their lives were being affected by American
economic developments.

The only work which could rival Mac-·

kenzie's was the less intensive but wider-ranging book by
William Thomas Stead, The Americanization of the World; Or,
The Trend of the Twentieth Century. 12 Stead devoted two
chapters of his work to the economic "Americanization" of the
world but he maintained that politically, socially, and culturally, the same process was evident in England, in the Bri9(London and New York: Cassell & Company, 1902). I was
not able to obtain a copy of this work; an article by Cox
bearing the same title appeared in The North American Review
(July, 1901), 91-101. The thesis of the article was that the
expansion of American industry and prosperity was good for
Britain and that, though British "yellow journals" made much
of the American peril, "sober Englishmen only read such papers
for the sake of amusement."
10originally published in London in 1902, the only copy
I was able to obtain was that of (Wilmington, North Carolina
and Washington, D.C.: Hugh MacRae & Co., Bankers, 1902).
11 (London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1903).
12 (London and New York: Horace Markley, 1901, 1902).
I have used the latter edition.
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tish Colonies, and in other portions o.f the globe.

"That the

United States of America," Stead maintained, "have now arrived
at such a pitch of power and prosperity as to have a right to
claim the leading place among the English-speaking nations
cannot be disputed."

Though many in England would indeed

have disputed it, there were many who were in sympathy with
Stead's chief objective, the unification of the two branches
of the Anglo-Saxon race.

Many might have disputed th3 way

he phrased his argument, but his conclusion, since it was
used by many in England to rationalize their acceptance of
the American invasion, will serve as an appropriate conclusion
to this study.

"It is possible," wrote Stead,

that the American may stand to the Briton as Christianity stands to Judaism • • • • [and] so it may be
through the Americans that the English ideals expressed in the English language may make the tour of
the planet • • • • the philosophical historian may
record that the mission of the English fulfilled
itself through the American. The Americanization
of the world is but the Anglicizing of the world at
one remove.13

l3Ibid., 3-4.
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